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UNITED STATES 
v. 
NATIONAL ASSOC. OF 
SECURITY DEALERS 
0p:0 from USDCcD. C·c=: Ct) ) ~ ':J 
(Corcoran, ? , ? ) 
Federal/Civil (Antitrust) 
Titnely 
Sumr:;ary: Appellant brought suit against NASD, an organization of broker-
dealers whose rules are approved by the SEC under the Maloney Act (15 U.S. C. 
__ 78o-3), and 15 large mutual ful].ds, underwriters, - and· b-roker·a g e Hfms;- a-ss e rting-· 
~~.,_...,='--'-'-'~'-·=-==· '"'"- ._,; . .,..~. .··-..,..-.: .. ----::-=-_- --· ........... ~ .. - ... ·"·-···.. . ... ··- ·- .. ..c. -· ---·--- ---- -- ---··· - ---------- ·-· 
that they violated Sherman §1 through a conspiracy to elim.inate the "secondary 
---~ 
fund shares (trading in fund shares after they have been sold to the 
public other than redemptions by the fund) so as to extend their legitimate monopoly 
in the primary distribution of fund shares granted by §22(d) of the Inve stn.J.ent Company 
_ .... 
- 2 -
Act of 1940 (15 U.S. C. §80a-22(d) into a monopo~y on the total trade in such shares. 
Before discovery, the USDC granted summary judgment against appellant with the 
~ .... ~ 
I 
thrust of its opinion being that since the sale of fund shares is subject to pervasive 
- -- -
S. E. C. regulation it is immune from the antitrust laws. Appellant now appeals 
---~ 
arguing that while §22(d), (f) of the Investm.ent Act of 1940 and SEC regulation of 
NASD through approval of its rules do confer antitrust immunity vertically in the 
"primary" distribution process [fund shares sold by the Funds to the public through 
underwriting groups], they do not confer antitrust imrnunity for horizontal activities 
designed to eliminate the secondary market. 
Facts: The complaint generally alleges that the appellees conspired to fix 
prices on the sale of open-end mutual fund shares ::_nd to restrict sales of such 
shares in transactions between dealers ("the inter -dealer market") and in trans-
------~---- -----------~ 
actions between investors made through a broker ( 11the brokerage market") in vio -
lation of Sherman § 1. The means alleged were the development of NASD rules 
inhibiting the secondary market, restrictive broker-dealer agreernents, the dis-
.___ 
tribution of false information about the legality of such market and the suppression 
of secondary market quotations. The USDC assurned that the allegations of the com-
plaint were true in granting summary judgment. 
The mutual funds are investment companies regulated under the 1940 Investment 
Company Act and in the "open end" con1panies involved in the instant case the owner 
of such fund shares is entitled on demand to have his shares redeerned for its pro 
rata share of fund assets by the fund. Fund shares -are sold in their .!1p.timax_y _____ _ 
distribution" from the Fund through a broker-dealer group to the public at a current 
offering price which represents the prorated net value of the share plus a sales 
commission, con1monly called the load. §22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 [15 U.S. C. §80a-22(d)] makes sale at only the current offering price mandatory 
- 3 -
-in primary distribution. The secondary market in fund sh,9-res, which the appellee s 
are accused of conspiring to suppress, essentially consists of all transactions in th e 
fund shares other than "primary dl.stribu_tion 11 or redemption by the fund. A pur-
---------~ --- -
chaser in the secondary market to some extent avoids the load while a seller in 
~ the secondary market normally receives some part of the money equivalent of the 
load back which he would not get if he tendered his shares for redemption. 
Appellee NASD is the only national securities association registered with the 
SEC pursuant to the Maloney Act (15 U.S. C. §78o -3 ), is expressly given some 
powers to regulate the distribution and redemption of fund shares [15 U.S. C. 
§80a-22(a), (b)(1 )], may have its rules changed by the SEC's unilateral action 
[15 U.S. C. §80a-22(b)(4)], and has a membership consisting of a majority of the 
broker-dealers in the United States. 
§22(d) of the Investment Company Act provides in part that: 11 No registered 
investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued by it to any person 
except either to or through a principal underwriter for distribution or at a current 
public offering price described in the prospectus and, if such class of security is 
being offered to the public by or through an underwriter, no principal underwriter 
of such security and no dealer shall sell any such security to any person except a 
dealer, a principal underwriter or the is suer, except at a current public offering 
price described in the prospectus. 11 
§22(f) of the Investment Company Act provides: 
11 No registered op_e_n _ end .corr1papy_ E>b~!Lt_~st_ris:J t}~e _1:;:_~~§ .: _________ _ 
==='",......,"""'"'~u-.. .-.. ___ - ~"_,., fe-ra.b1lit'f-O~~g_.Qt~ility_ Q£ .~lioy: _ p _(j!C_\,l,);"ity 0_~ ViLhi_£h _it _i& __ th,e. ______ ----- ___ _ 
issuer except in conformity with the statements with respect 
thereto contained in its registration staternent nor in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe in the interests of the holders of all of the outstand-




Contentions: Appellant's contention is that the summary judgrnent against~ 
below, which rested on the antitrust immunity of the resps impliedly confer re d by 
§22(d), (f) and the pervasive regulation of broker-dealers by the SEC through NASD, 
was erroneous since such immunity is limited to the primary distributio:-1 o f fund 
shar~s and does not include collective action to control prices in and to limit or 
F 
destroy the secondary market in fund shares. Appellant argues that in extending 
the limited antitrust immunity implied by §22 for primary distribution of newly 
issued shares by the Fund through its broker-dealer group to all sales in fund 
shares, the court below violated the rule that exemptions from the antitrust laws 
will be narrowly construed. cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat 11 Bank, 374 U.S~ 
321 (1963). !r~ argues that since the literal wording of §22(d) requiring resale price 
maintenance does not cover brokers nor inter-dealer transactions, it cannot confer 
any exernption in the · secondary market which consists solely of such transactions. 
L"': argues that the legislative history of §22(d) shows that the provision was never 
considered with reference to the secondary market and that early SEC rulings show 
that it was interpreted to have no effect on the secondary market. 
Appellant argues that §22(f) merely restricts and does not affirmatively allow 
Fund restrictions on share transferability and hence provides no exemption. Further, 
§22(f) applies only to restrictions imposed by the Fund and appellant argues that it 
does not exempt the broad range of activities alleged in the instant complaint. 
Finally, even if §22(f) could be read to exempt unilateral restrictions, appellant 
argues that it does not exempt the collective action alleged-in the instant-complaint. 
Appellant argues that ''the pervasive regulatory scheme 11 of the Investrnent 
Company and Maloney Acts confers no implied im--rmnity since in the immediate 
case the actions challenged do not meet the criteria for immunity from a regulatory 
scheme as the SEC has no power to imm.unize the conduct in question and is not 
- 5 -
concerned with competitive cons ide rations. E· ,Pan American Airways Inc. v. 
United State s, 371 U.S. 296, 305-309; Hughe s Tool Co. v. Trans World Airline s , 
Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 384-389. He argues that Silv er v. New York Stock E xchange, 
373 U.S. 341 governs the imme diate case since appellant challenges not the NASD 
rules which are subject to SEC review but rather NASD 1 s interpretations of those 
rules which are not subject to SEC reviewo 
The l.[Sl2..C--~d ~at while §22(d) by its terms applied only to primary distribu-
tion of Fund shares, the legislative history of this section showed that it was in-
tended to preclude the development of a competitiv·e second~ry E "bootleg") ~ark~t. 
---......___._ - - < -
It pointed out that the development of a secondary market was incompatible with 
regulated resale prices in the primary distribution of Fund shares, that numerous 
proposals bad been made to repeal §22(d) so as to allow a free market in Fund 
shares but all bad been defeated, and that the objective of the Investment Company 
Act of preventing price discrimination among share purchasers could not be achieved 
if there was a secondary market. It characterized §22(f), allowing the Funds to 
impose restrictions on transferability, as impliedly approving private restrictio:J. 
agreements, and pointed out that such agreements had been made and filed under 
NASD Rule 26 since 1940. It concluded that immunity was provided by these two 
sections. 
The USDC also found an implied immunity from the pervasive regulation of the 
'----~----------------~---------~-------------------------------
Inv_:stment q_g_m1?2::J :;:rea. The court said that Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 
··- supra, recognized that antitrust immxmitywas confer~cd -whcre the- seH-regulat.i:on 
.....,.,=,..,...,--=- ""'-~"'-"-·'· '··~·= <·. - ~""""' '""'=--
was directly pursuant to statutory authority as in the case of the NASD. 373 U.S. 
358, n. 12. It reviewed the extensive SEC and NASD regulation of this area and 
distinguished cases such as Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 
(1973) on the grounds that here Congress' regulatory scheme was clearly designed 
t 
- 6 -
to preclude competition. cf. Unite d Sta t e s v. C9-rtwright, 411 U.S. 546, 549 (19 73 ). 
The court concluded tha t there was a limit e d implie d im1nunity from the a n t i trust 
laws in the fixing of fund prices in the secondary market. 
s~ 
The appell~ts reiterate the court's holding and point out this suit came about 
only after the antitrust division £ailed to secure changes in NASD rules and a ppli-
cable statutes . They point out that the Chairman of the SEC has publically opposed 
the suit~ labeling this area an SEC regulatory matter. They conclude afte r an -
extensive review of the legislative history of the 1940 Act that the purpose of the 
Act was in the main to eliminate the secondary market in fund shares. 
NASD in a separate brief points out that the complaint seeks the relief of an 
injunction against any NASD rules injuring the secondary market but has been 
amended to exclude the allegation that the NASD' s rules are violations. It points 
out that the only specific alleged violation by the NASD is a letter sent out 15 years 
ago with the concurrence of the SEC. 
Discussion: Probable jurisdiction should be noted since the case involves ...____ 
important issues of interpretation of the effect of the Investment Cornpany and 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maloney Acts on the antitrust laws and since the ultimate outcome in the case is 
~ 
of major economic importance. A literal reading of the applicable statutes and 
the inherent weaknesses of any implied antitrust immunity argument support 
appellant's position. The history o£ these acts, the repeated unsuccessful atten1pts 
of appellant to change them, the probable effect of a secondary market on the 
-- ----------------------------------------~ 
_statutorily required controlled prim:t:ry m a rket, . and the interference with -the SE-G' s 
~-:.-:.!'~"!:"~.~·~-~~-=-- ____ :--_:::::·-~---:;;:.~_ -"'"'· :.:._-_~_,-,.,~-::~:::: ...-::_,:; ... 1'-: ... :::.,.~.:~-:--:. _=;_!._::-•_!,.-:-·-·.::;!!_";:-:',_-:::;. _.,__,.=:=:.""'?. -s. ~ ---=- --=--::!':=:--!:':=~=~="'!=====,....-,-.c::-,..,....,....-,,.--, __ ~_ ":"'. -=-=- . 
regulatory system involved in this suit support the decis i on below. I am inclined to 
agree with the decision below but the question is close enough and significant enough 
that this court should hear it. 
7 / 30/74 O ' Neill Op in Appellant's Br. 
PJN 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE (:OMMISSION 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20549 
Oi'TICE CF 
T ii~ CfiAIR.'.IAN 
V-5 t/ ;1/J~d-? 
s.e~~ 
November 22, 
Mr. Gordon s.·Macklin 
President 
National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. 
1735 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
Dear Mr. Macklin: 
RECEIVED 
MAR 3 1875 
OFriCE: t:lF 'flit?: et..ERK 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. 
------~ 
1974 
On November 4, 1974, the Commission transmitted to 
Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the Sen ate Commi·ttee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 1 a staff report entitled 
~ utual Fund Distribution and Section 22(d) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940" ("Staff Report") • 
G That report:, among othe r t.hings 1 recom.rnended that the 
Commission r 'eque"St. the NAS D to amend its "RU!eS- of Fair Practice 
to prohibit its member-5 from being parties to agreements which 
restrict broker-dealers, acting as ag:ents, from matching orders 
to buy and sell fund shares in a secondary market at competi--
tively determined prices and commission rates. 
Tl1__e_ S22.._~~~<2n has considered that reconunenda tion and, 
although the- Rules ()f Fair Practice do not require that agree-
ments betv·reen fund undenrri ters and broker-dealers contain such 
res ·trictions, it b§lieves that s ound regulatory policy diet· tes 
the elimination of a r such restrlctions. As - e s a f s report 
suggests, hoVTever , action ln ·1fSarea should also include steps 
to help to neutralize any adverse impact on the funds' primary 
distribution systems and to ensure that transactions in a 
brokered market are in the interest of all of the holders of the 
funds ' outstanding shares . For example , funds would be permitted 
to impose re!asonable service fees w~1en mvnership of their shores 
is transferred in this manner. In the absence of any underwriters ' 
spread on the sale , such fees couJ.d include the cost of recording 
the trans fer as \·lell as an amount. to compensat r:~ 1:he unden·;ri ter , 
to some extent , for promotional services . To ensure that 
\ 
broker-dealers engage only in the g e nuine matching of orders, 
they should not he permitted to fill orders to buy or sel.l fund 
'.-,' 
Mr. Gordon S. Macklin 
Page TV!O 
shares more than one full business~ d~v after such orders 
are received. ~. Nor -s11ou'!cf broker-deal~;;'13"Er required to 
set up special procedures to match orders for fund shares. 
Accordj.ngly, in order to impleme nt the foregoing, we 
ask your assistance and re~es t the NASD to amend its Rules of 
Fair Practice as suggested above and as outlined in detail in 




Ray Garrett, Jr. 
Chairman 
.. ~ '' 
CHAMBERS OF 
c.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, c.JR . 
,jnvum.t <IJ'curl of tlte 2flitiUlt .:§tnhs 
2]lliaS:frittghm. If:l. <!f. 2l16l'-1~ 
March 5, 1975 
No. 73-1701 U.S. v. National Association 
of Securities Dealers, et al 
Dear Chief: 
The Clerk's Office circulated yesterday a copy of a 
letter dated November 22, 1974, from the Chairman of the 
SEC to Gordon S. Macklin, President of the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD), a respondent in the above 
case. 
This letter is a request by the Commission that the 
NASD amend its Rules of Fair Practice to prohibit its members 
from making agreements with broker-dealers which restrict 
them in making a secondary market for mutual fund shares. 
Although I have taken only a preliminary look at some 
of the briefs in this case, it seems to me that this action 
of the SEC may be highly relevant to this case. Indeed, if 
the NASD acquiesces in the request (and no doubt the SEC is 
in a position to encourage acquiescence), we may have before 
us a different case from that presented in the courts below 
and briefed in this Court by the parties. 
In view of this possibility, it occurs to me that it 
may be desirable to have the Clerk request the parties to 
file supplemental briefs, before argument, commenting on 
the effect of this action on the pending litigation. If this 
is to be done, we should act promptly as the case is now 
set for Monday, March 17. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
P.S. The Clerk did not receive the letter until March 3. 
. ·~ . ' 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.$)u:punu cq~url cf tqt~tlt .§taUS' 
~Mfringion, ~. <!}. Zll&fJ!~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
March 5, 1975 
No. 73-1701 U.S. v. National Association of 
Securities Dealers, et al. 
Dear Chief, 
In light of the information contained in 
Lewis' letter to you of today's date, I agree that the 
issues in this case seem to have taken a new turn. 
I think we should ask the parties to file supplemental 
briefs in typewritten form before argument. If, 
however, it is thought that this would be an unreason-
able request to the parties in view of the limited time 
available, · I would at least specifically ask the parties 
to address the effect of the SEC Chairman's letter on 
this litigation at oral argument, with the thought that 
supplemental briefs might thereafter be filed at our 
request. 
The Chief Justice 






THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.itt.prttttt Clfltltri of t4t J'nittlt ,itaftg 
Jfa.gftinght~ ~. <!f. 2ll~'!.;l 
March 5, 1975 
Re: 73-1701 - U. S. v. National Association of 
Securities Dealers 
Dear Lewis: 
Re your memorandum of March 5, my tentative 
disposition is to leave this problem with the litigants. 
They have known of the matter since the November 22, 1974 
letter and I would wait on them. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
) 
j;eyrttttt <qottrl !1{ tlrt ~ttittb j)fa.ttg 
~~slthtgfon:. !9. <q. , 2!1.?>!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
March 7, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1701 - U. S. v. National Association 
of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
Dear Chief: 
I note that the letter of November 22, 1974 from 
the Chairman of the SEC to the President of the NASD is 
re roduce d n um a e 18 of the brief · ed by eight 
appellee dealers (the red brief) an t at, in addition, a 
number of the briefs cull out pertinent passages from the 
1974 study. I mention this in connection with the recent 
correspondence among us about this case. I am inclined 
to feel that we should let this matter simmer until the 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
No. 73-1701 U.S. v. NASD 
MISCELLANEOUS NOTES 
I. Complaint 
In sum, government charges conspiracy to inhibit a 
"market" for "brokerage transactions" (brokers acting as 
agents -not principals), and thereby to suppress a 
"secondary market" in mutual fund shares. The alleged result 
is that public pays noncompetitive"sales loads". 
Government charges both horizontal and vertical price 
fixing agreements. 
II. Government position "clarified" (Reply Brief) 
Concedes that 22(d) requires resale price maintenance 
("current public offering price") in the "primary distribution" 
of mutual fund shares, and in sales by dealers to investors 
"if the shares are currently being offered to the public 
by or through an underwriter". 
Also says that 22(d) does not require price maintenance 
as to sales (i) by dealers to other dealers, (ii) to the 
issuing fund itself, or (iii) to its underwriters. 
Regardless of how a dealer acquires shares, if he sells 
for his own account (i.e. as dealer rather than broker) to 
an investor, 22(d) requires that sale be at current public 
2. 
offering price. 
But argues that "brokerage transactions" and "inter-
dealer" transation should be in free market. 
III. Defendants' (Respondents) Motion to Dismiss* 
Three grounds: 
(a) 22(d) establishes a retail price maintenance 
system inconsistent with antitrust concepts, and creates an 
antitrust exemption and immunity for dealers' conduct in 
maintaining the fixed public offering price. 
(b) 22(f) sanctions contractual restrictions on 
transferability or negotiability of mutual fund shares, subject 
to regulation by SEC. These restrictions - incorporated in 
dealers' publicly filed investment company sales agreements -
are exempt from antitrust. 
(c) By virtue of the pervasive regulation by SEC of 
investment companies, and marketing of mutual funds, the 
SEC has''exclusive jurisdiction" to regulate this market free 
from antitrust interference. 
*see Op. D.C.- Jurisdictional Statement, 32. 
No. 73-1701 U.S. v • . NASD 
I. Section 22(d) 
THE STATUTES 
(Incomplete notes) 
". . . no principal under writer . . . 
and no dealer* shall sell any such security 
to any person except a dealer, a principal 
underwriter or the issuer, except at the 
current public offering price .... " 
1. Government contends: 
Since 22(d) does not mention the term "broker" or 
"broker-dealer", transactions by dealers acting as 
brokers (agents) are not restricted to the public offering 
price - i.e. a free secondary market should exist in which 
investors may trade through brokers at competitive prices. 
2. The Uniform Sales Agreement 
The underwriter (wholesaler) sells shares to retail 
~~-r 
dealers who sell to public. The~dealers agree not to sell 
at other than the public offering price, thus assuring 
absence of price competition among sellers of same fund. 
As mutual fund shares are sold continuously under a 
prospectus kept current, the uni form sales agreement maintains 
price uniformi ty. 
The focus of governments attack is on this agreement. 
*Note that this provision applies to all dealers - not 
merely those who have a dealer contract with an underwriter 
of shares of a particular fund. Thus if an outside dealer 
buys from another dealer, he can sell to public only at 
current offering price. 
2. 
3. DC's holding (JS 46-56) 
Government ignores fact that a free secondary market 
would be inconsistent with - and destroy the primary 
marketing system prescribed by 22(b). The two markets 
could not co-exist. This will defeat congressional purpose 
of making mutual fund shares available at a fixed, regulated 
price, thereby preventing price discrimination between 
similarly situated investors. 
DC relies on consistent interpretation of 22(d) to 
this effect. See, e.g., JS 48. 
Congress has repeatedly declined to amend 22(d). 
II. Sec. 22(f) (JS 56) 
It provides, in substance that: 
(i) if restrictions on transferability are 
included in the Registration Statement, and (ii) if 
such restrictions are not in contravention of such 
Rules and Regulations as Commission may prescribe, 
then such restrictions are permissible. 
1. Government contends: 
(a) that 22(f) can't be read as authorizing under-
writers and contract dealers to agree to restrict the 
terms under which they will conduct transactions with non-
contract dealers ("inter-dealer transactions"); nor as 
authorizing the prohibiting of dealers (both contract 
and noncontract) from trading as "brokers" at less than 
public offering price. 
3. 
Government reads 22(f) narrowly as refering to 
restrictions on transfer by shareowner which must be printed 
on face of certificates. 
(b) If 22(f) may be read as SEC and DC interpret it 
(authorizing such restrictions which have been in effect for 
35 years)) Government says it would not immunize collusive 
action. 
2. View of DC, SEC and Respondents. 
DC says 22(f) a "necessary companion to 22(b)" if 
disruptive price competition is to be avoided. (JS 56). 
SEC agrees with DC, but says it will soon prescribe 
Rules which, in a limited and experimental way, will allow 
some competition in the "brokerage market" - SEC's Brief - 46. 
As to Respondents, see: 
(i) Brief of Dealers (Lee Loewingar) p. 33. 
(ii) Brief of Wellington Fund, p. 7, 56. 
No. 73-1701 U.S. v. NATL. ASSN. OF SECURITIES 
DEALERS , INC. 
Argued 3/17/75 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David Boyd DATE: March 18, 1975 
No. 73-1701 United States v. NASD, et al. 
This memorandum begins where the initial one concluded: 
assuming that the preferable ruling would be one that reverses 
the District Court's determination that an antitrust immunity 
could be predicated on Section 22(d) of the Act but upholds 
the dismissal in major part on the alternative Section 22(f) 
ruling. In this memorandum I will attempt to outline the 
basic arguments that will have to be made in justification 
of that result, as well as to identify what I presently view 
to be the most significant weaknesses in the position. 
I will begin by indicating the basis from which I 
speak. I have by no means managed to read all of what I 
consider to be the relevant legislative history of this case. 
Nor have I gone beyond the sources cited by the parties. What 
I have done to date, however, is to dip into and sample each 
of the major areas in an attempt to get a feel for the tenor 
of the strength of support of each of the positions. And in 
view of the thoroughness with which the positions are briefed, 




in the history of the Act that the parties have not found 
and brought to our attention. 
Tension Between Approach in 22(d) and (f): 
2. 
In overgeneralized terms, it can be said that the 
position I have outlined can only be supported by doing in 
one instance what you will refuse to do in another. To 
reverse the District Court on its 22(d) determination you 
must follow the Justice Department's basic suggestion and read 
that section to confer no immunity beyond its precise terms. 
To affirm on the basis of 22(f), however, it is necessary to 
apply greater liberality of interpretation and hold, in effect, 
that the immunity conferred by that section extends slightly 
beyond the literal terms of the statute. Moreover, this 
"extension" would be done in the face of an existing but as 
yet dormant regulatory SEC authority. 
As I stated before, it would seem that some legal 
argument can legitmately be made for a slightly more liberal 
view of section 22(f) than 22(d). The basic reason for the 
distinction derives from the difference in consequence that 
would obtain from a liberal interpretation of each subsection. 
An expansive reading of subsection (d) results in a complete 
ouster of antitrust principles; that subsection represents a 
legislative judgment that price protectiveness is too important 





begrudging nature that should attend any attempt to repeal the 
antitrust laws by implication, that section should be very 
narrowly construed. A liberal interpretation of subsection (f), 
by contrast, results in a substitution of the "regulatory" 
control of the various enforcement mechanisms of the antitrust 
laws for another regulatory control, that of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. And while the SEC apparently is not 
specifically charged to take antitrust principles into 
consideration, it can, to some extent, be chargea to honor 
some of the concerns of the antitrust laws when it exercises 
its responsibility to act in the interests of the shareholders 
and the investing public. And one can in fact point to some of 
the regulatory actions taken by the SEC for the proposition 
that the Commission has occasionally taken into consideration 
manners in which price competition or cost savings might be 
effected consistent with the basic needs of the securities 
industry. 
Thus, as an analytic matter an argument can be made 
for receiving with less sympathy any argument for an "implied 
innnunity" in 22(d) than in 22(f). The question remains whether 
) 
the legislative history will allow any real progress to be made 
from this starting point. 
Contemporary History of the Investment Act of 1940. 




history of the Investment Act is by no means an easy task, 
as witnessed by the fact that many authorities disagree even 
over the basic question whether discernible legislative history 
exists, much less what it means. And the difficulty of 
determining the contemporary legislative history is compounded 
by the fact that a considerable amount of post-1940's legislative 
history reflects the mutuals industry that evolved from the 
original Act without recognizing that fact. An equally 
difficult problem is caused by the fact that, as is generally 
the case, much of the legislative history is too generalized in 
nature to be related to one subsection as opposed to another. 
My readings from the Investment Trust Study that 
provided much of the impetus and a great deal of the foundation 
for the original enactment indicate that the mutuals industry's 
problems were aggravated by a number of factors that no longer 
exist today. For example, one of the factors that made the 
secondary market so attractive in the 1920's and 30's was the 
pricing practice that allowed dealers and other insiders to 
buy mutual funds without significant risk of loss. The timing 
of the daily evaluations of net assets in relation to market 
closing permitted dealers to know the net asset value at the 
close of one day and to purchase securities on the basis of 
price established by the value set a day prior to that time. 





of what Wednesday's price would be. Not only did this cause 
the dilution of shareholder's interests, which was a major 
factor for congressional concern, but it generally made any 
unauthorized trading more attractive. 
Section 22(c) authorizes the Commission to deal with 
this phenomenon. Apparently the industry itself was the first 
to undertake to ameliorate these problems instituting a "two 
price" system that at least decreased the advantage one might 
obtain from the previous regime. Thereafter the SEC instituted 
the system of "forward pricing" which seems to eliminate those 
practices entirely. 
The alteration of the pricing practices significantly 
changed the context in which the "bootleg market" operated. 
Of course no one can know how significant that alteration was 
in decreasing the attractiveness of that market, and I am not 
sufficiently conversant with the timing of the pricing changes or 
the disappearance of the secondary market even to begin to 
speculate. But it does seem that this is a factor that should 
be taken into account in assessing subsequent claims in the 
legislative history of the 60's that credit Section 22(d) for 
eradicating that market. In the same manner, this makes it 
difficult to assert that 22(d) rather than 22(f) was designed 
to meet this problem. To the extent that one might believe 
that control of the pricing practices would make the secondary 




concern with the "bootleg market" is a more ambivalent factor 
than appellees portray it to be. To the extent that one can 
point to other subsections of Section 22 that might be used 
to discourage the "bootleg market" appellees' arguments 
regarding subsection (d) are diminished in force. 
A second relevant consideration stems from the nature 
of the secondary market that existed in the 1930's. Appellees' 
basic argument that this was primarily a dealers market is 
correct. However, that factor might be thought to operate to 
their detriment rather than to their benefit. The major 
"disruptive" effect that concerned Congress in 1940 was that 
caused by non-contract dealers who dealt in sufficiently large 
volumes of mutual fund shares to effectively compete with the 
contract dealers. 
Appellees seem to argue from this initial beginning that 
the term "dealers" in 22(d) was a generic term encompassing 
both statutory dealers and dealers acting in the capacity as 
brokers in the statutory sense. However, if one begins with the 
proposition that any implied repeal of the antitrust laws should 
only be found where that was clearly contemplated 
~ ele~~4AP£eeeea), one can assert with some justification 
that it was not contemplated in this instance for the simple 
reason that the brokerage market was not a sufficiently disruptive \ 
factor in the 1930's to attract congressional attention. The 
----
7. 
argument thus would be that Congress did not extend the 
Section 22(d) mandatory price maintenance scheme to brokers 
for the simple reason that brokers were not then a cause of 
congressional concern. 
This same basic approach might be brought to bear to 
rebut one factor in the 1940 legislative history that appellees 
have used rather effectively in their behalf. They point out 
(red brief at 55) that the industry opponents of 22(d) 
realized and called to Congress' attention the fact that the 
purpose of that subsection was to el~inate competition in 
the secondary market. It would seem that you can argue, 
consistent with the preceding argument, that the "street 
trading" that opponents of 22(d) sought to protect was secondary 
dealer activities, not non-contract brokerage tiansactions. 
Thus, the thrust of that argument seems to be effectively blunted. 
Summary of 22(d) Argument in Relation to 1940 History 
With these preliminary considerations in mind, the 
following is what I presently consider to be the best argument 
for reversal of the District Court's holding on 22(d). First, 
you point out the unusual nature of that subsection: it 
affirmatively requires an exception to antitrust principles 
rather than a·uthorizing an exemption that arises in view of the 
regulatory supervision of some other federal body. Thus, the 




with more force than in other cases. You might draw a contrast 
to previous implied repeal cases such as Pan American World 
Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) and Hughes Tool 
Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973), where the 
Court relied on another federal agency's responsibility to 
regulate in the public interest as a justification for finding 
an implied repeal of the antitrust laws. 
You might also assert that the argument you make in this 
context is somewhat similar to that recognized by the Court in 
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). There 
one of the considerations militating against an implied repeal 
of the antitrust laws was the fact that the SEC lacked jurisdiction 
over the particular Securities and Exchange practice at issue, 
a group boycott effectuated by Exchange Rules controlling the 
use of direct-wire telephone connections which were essential 
to effective trading. The Court relied in part on the absence 
of Commission jurisdiction and pointed out that a different 
case would be presented if the Commission had jurisdiction over 
the practice at issue. Id., at 358. Significantly, it cited 
Commission regulation under the Maloney Act as one possible 
instance in which the existence of SEC jurisdiction might call 
for a different antitrust result. Id., n. 12. 
The problem presented by Section 22(d) is similar 
to that in Silver to the extent that any finding of implied anti-




regulatory authority in the SEC. To the contrary, a deter-
mination that a particular practice is required by 22(d) makes 
SEC regulation somewhat more difficult under 22(f). That 
regulation could only be effected, it would seem, by first 
exercising the power to grant exemptions from the Act and there-
after reimposing some lesser command through rules and regulations. 
It seems questionable whether the SEC could properly exempt on 
a sufficiently broad-scale basis to reinstitute the kinds of 
controls it presently visualizes through 22(f) if the District 
Court is affirmed on 22(d). 1 
Having thus established the conceptual framework for 
the argument, you must conclude that the 1940's legislative history 
is not a sufficiently strong indication of congressiona concern 
with the bootleg market to justify extension of 22(d) beyond its 
terms. The bootleg market was one of a number of topics discussed 
in the Investment Trust Study, and some of the contributing factors 
1. I may be a bit out of bounds in saying this. The 
parties have pointed to no case in which the scope of the SEC's 
exemptive power has been challenged. But it does appear that the 
Commission has in the past exercised that power in a rather broad-
brush fashiono For example, the SEC rule allowing quantity discounts 
for fund purchases of large amounts of funds arguably amounts to an 
exemption of a generic category of transactions from 22(d). 
At some point it would seem that SEC exercise of its 
power of exemption would begin to approach an "administrative repeal" 
of 22(d) which, especially in light of repeated congressional 





to the success of that market can be dealt with by other 
subsections of Section 22 as well as by 22(d). You could 
argue that, whatever its ultimate use, the primary purpose of 
22(d) was to provide a check for preferential price treatment 
of insiders. There appears to be some support for that 
pesition, although it is by no means clear. 
Subsequent Legislative History: 
The subsequent legislative history of 22(d) is 
troublesome. Although I doubt that I could ever establish 
this fact, it appears that 22(d) has come to be regarded as 
more than it might have originally been intended to be. 
During hearings held in relation to consideration 
of repeal of 22(d) during the 60's and 70's that section is 
repeatedly attributed with eliminating all secondary trading --. 
( 
of mutual funds. Indeed, in a few instances the Commissioner 
of the SEC even refers to 22(d) eliminating broker-dealer 
transactions. That history is sprinkled with references to 
22(d) that appear to support appellees' characterization of its 
role. 
I have read certain portions of the hearings, and I 
presently can think of no way to deal with that segment of 
the legislative history other than to assert that it is not 
sufficiently clear on the critical points to warrant implying 






Perhaps more convincing arguments will occur at a later point 
in time. 
Argument for Exemption Through 22(f). 
I do not now contemplate that the argument on 22(f) will 
differ in any material respect from those set forth by the 
parties. In this_ instance, the force of the argument is supported 
significantly by the long period of continued practice of restrictions 
in the secondary market. The only problem is in relating those 
restrictions to subsection (f) rather than (d). 
The result of finding that the practices are sheltered 
from antitrust immunity through 22(f) is to hold that such I practices are immunized to the extent that the SEC acquiesces in ( 
them. 
What to Do With Count I 
It presently appears that an affirmance on the rationale 
I have outlined would require reversal and remand for further 
consideration of Count I. The immunity that this solution 
contemplates derives from 22(f) and depends on the conditions 
of that Section. Count I seems to allege practices that do 
not benefit from potential Commission oversight. In order to 
immunize those practices you would have to find that SEC 
regulatory authority under 22 displaces antitrust laws entirely. 
At the minimum, it would seem that a remand and further 
12. ,.--.,. 
consideration would be necessary to determine whether the 
~ 
powers of the SECAreach these alleged practices, if they 
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell 
Re: No. 73-1701 United States v. 
From: David National Assoc1at1on of Securities 
Dealers, et. al --
I am continuing to wind my way through the arguments 
and counterarguments in this complicated case, as well as 
some of the rather massive legislative history. Rather than 
wait until I finish, I thought it best to provide an initial 
memorandum that outlines the issues as I presently see them 
and identifies what I view to be the more difficult of the 
decisions that you will have to make. I hope to supplement 
this before the Wednesday conference. 
I presently retain an inclination to affirm the decision of 
the District Court, albeit on a more circumscribed basis than 
those that that court offered on its own behalf. As I now 
view the case, I think that the District Court's determination 
that the challenged activities are required by section 22(d) 
is probably erroneous. I consider the District Court's second 
and third grounds for dismissal to be essentially the same point, 
ahd my present feeling is that the court was correct on that 
score. 
This position generally corresponds with that taken by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. I note that the SEC 
only takes a stand with reference to counts II-VIII of the 
complaint, and that it seems to remain silent as to the validity 
of count I. That remains a matter for resolution; before voting 
I will have to determine how the legal conclusions and the plead-





I have now read or examined enough of the legislative 
history and secondary materials to be able to predict with 
some degree of confidence that nothing in the history of the 
2. 
Act will provide any more than the sketchiest notion of·the 
proper solution to the precise questions presented by this 
appeal. For example, the most prevalent view of the contemporary 
history of section 22~d) is that there really is none. This 
view has been expressed by commentators, ~.g., Greene, The 
Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the Invest-
ment Company Act ef 1940,37 U. Det.L.J., 369, 371 (1960). The 
SEC has, at various times, itself adopted this theory. 
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the 
SEC on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company 
Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 219 (1966). 
Even the one commentators who assert that there is in fact 
discernible contemporary legislative history are, in the final 
analysis, somewhat speculative as to what the history clearly 
reveals. Heffernan & Jorden, Section 22(d) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 -Its Original Purpose and Present Function, 
1973 Duke L.J. 975. 
In practical terms, this means that the Court's decision 
is likely to be a more heavily weighted "policy decision" than 
most efforts at legislative interpretation. With this in mind, 
it seems that the general operation of the Investment Company 
Act and the expectations that that operation have engendered 
are important considerations. Equally important is the manner 
in which the SEC has ~egun to exercise increasing regulatory 






the Court's decision might affect those developments. With 
these considerations in mind, my approach is to favor a ruling 
that allows the SEC a maximum of regulatory flexibility in 
this area . Regulatory supervision is the general theme of 
the totality of Section 22, and to the extent that an interpreta-
tion of the subsections at issue here dilutes that general 
pattern, I view it with some distrust. 
Relationship of Section 22(d) and 22(f): 
It first should be recognized that sections 22(d) and 22(f) 
do significantly different things. Section 22(d), as all 
parties admit, requires price maintenance; the issue in this 
case is how much price maintenance it requires. Section 22(f), 
by contrast, only authorizes price maintenance subject to the 
Act's discJ.osure requirement and to the Commission's supervisory 
authority; trre issue in this re@ard is how much and what kinds 
of price restraints can the Commission authorize. 
If the Court were to affirm the District Court on both the 
section 22(d) and (f) rulings, a certain tension would be 
established. For if section 22(d) requires retail price 
\maintenance throughout all of the secondary market the Commission's 
~oversight function under section 22(f) is correspondingly diluted. 
To the extent that subsection d commands retail price maintenance, 
the Commission's supervisory function is rather unimportant. 
lndeed, if 22(d) is read to cover the waterfront, the only way 
( the Commission might exercise significant regulatory authority 
) in the direction of introducing certain price competition would 
I 






ments of the Act to free brokers and deale~s from the strictures 
of 22(d) and thereafter reimpose some more limited control 
through ·the exercise of the power of approval under 22(~). 
The Antitrust Division apparently has argued before Congress 
that the SEC might exercise its power in' this fashion, and 
certain SEC exemptions do appear to represent almost_.as broad 
an approach as that ~uld entail. For example, in the years 
following 1941 the SEC granted certain exemptions that generally 
permitted "quantity discounts" from the specified sales loads. 
Thus, by purchasing a sufficient quantity of mutuals one might 
obtain a more favorable load rate and, to that extent, break 
free from the apparent uniformityiof the retail price maintenance 
scheme seemingly required by 22(d). But the kinds of price 
competition that the SEC now appears to contemplate would seem 
m require even broader exemptions than this. If indeed section 
22(d) requires price maintenance in all the transactions 
encompassed in this action, the Commission might be forced either 
to exercise its power of exemption in a manner similar to 
administrative repeal of the section, an opti6n:,that would 
seem to be particularly inappropriate in view of the numerous 
times Congress itself has refused to repeal the section, or to 
abandon its restricted price competition entirely. 
Thus, to some extent the District Court's interpretation 
of section 22(d) might pose a threat to the Commission's recent 
decision to experiment with some forms of price competition 
1 in tbesecondary market. 
{ be avoided, if possible. 






Justice Department's Approach to the Litigation: 
The Justice Department's attitude in this litigation 
is rather simple and can be broadly summarized in relatively 
few words. Essentially the Department relies on the general 
disfavor for implied repealers of the antitrust laws as an 
essential basis for its argument that the antitrust immunity 
conferred by sections 22(d) and (f). It argues, in effect, 
that the legislative history of the Act provides no justifica-
tion for expanding antitrust immunity beyond the precise terms 
of the statute. The Department bolsters this argument by 
pointing to the care with which the securities laws are drafted, 
asserting that the Court should not find antitrust shelter 
where not is explicitly provided. 
As a preliminary matter, it appears to me that much of 
the Justice Department's argument has persuasive validity. The 
initial focus of that argument appears correct, and it does 
seem appropriate to approach with some health~ skepticism the 
notion of expanding the shelters of sections 22(d) and (f) 
much beyond their terms. That same notion is expressed in 
the Court's opinion in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 
373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963), where it was said that , absent 
repealing or exclusivity provisions, conflicting law should be 
pre-empted by exchange self-regulation "only to the extent 
necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the Securities 
1 
Act." 
1. Silver is not precisely analogous on the facts, because there 
the Commiss1on lacked the kind of regulatory authority over the practice 
in question that it has in this case under 22(f). 
~ 
r 
While the Justice Department~s argument has general 
validity for all of the issues considered in this appeal, it 
would appear to have more force with reference to 22(d) than 
to 22(f). For a finding in appellees' favor under 22(d) would 




of the secondary market, subject only to the Commission's 
ill-defined power of exemption~ubject to that power of 




a:ount-to a tot~ repealer of antitrust les~A find~ng 
for appellees under 22(f), by contrast, amounts to a 
...... -------:=-
substitution of the SEC's·oversight function for the antitrust 
-----------~ ~--------------------------- laws. Clearly the SEC should be expected to be less sensitive 
·--- to the concerns of the antitrust laws than the Antitrust Division, 
and to that extent antitrust principles are sacrificed by 
affinning under 22(f) as well. But the "sacrifice" is more 
in the nature of a substitution of one regulatory body's judgment 
for·the legislative judgments expressed in treantitrust laws. 
As an abstract matter, it would seem to me that this "sacrifice" 
should more readily be implied. 
Section 22(d) 
The essence of the ~ustice Department's argument 
on this score is that 22(d) speaks only to dealers and not to 
brokers, and that the price maintenance accordingly should not 
be read to encompass brokered transactions. On this point the 
SEC agrees, and indeed has expressed similar views on occasion 






Although I am not entirely certain of this, it would appear 
that the Commission's recent attempts to encourage limited 
price conpetition in the secondary market is premised on 
this conclusion. 
The Justice Department further argues that section 22(d) 
expressly exempts from the retail price maintenance scheme 
sales from one dealer to another. On the face of the statute 
they are correct. The SEC does not specifically dispute this 
contention, but instead argues that the policy of section 22(d) 
manifests an intention to protect the primary distrubution process 
from possible disruptive effects caused by the secondary 
, dealer market. The difference between the SEC and the appellees 
is that the SEC asserts that the mechanism for protection of 
I 
the primary market from this evil) is its own supervisory power 
of 22(f). 
The conclusion that I draw from all of this, taking into 
account the legislative history that I have managed to read, is 
that the Justice Department is correct on this score. I have 
found nothing that would warrant extending section 22(d) as far 
as the District Court did, especially in view of the more attrac~ive 
alternative posed by section 22(f). Thus, if 22(d) were the sole 
issue, this case probably would have to be reversed. 
Section 22(f) 
The Department.!s argument on this point, which is nicely 





insofar as it asserts that the statute's reach should be 
restricted to its literal terms. The Justice Department 
therefore would limit restrictions on transfer and negotiability 
2 
to those that are imposed by the fund. The Department further 
asserts that the SEC would have to. affirmatively orde~ the 
kinds of restrictions here at issue in order ·to confer antitrust 
immunity under 22(f). 
I think that the Department's second argument is 
clearly incorrect. In view of the close regulatory relation-
ship established between the SEC and the industry, I would 
consider knowing SEC acquiescence sufficient to confer antitrust 
immunity. The question therefore seems to focus down to 
whether the SEC can through 22(f) confer antitrust immunity on 
transfer restrictions that are not imposed by the fund 
itself but rather are imposed by the principal underwriter upon 
the contract dealers who are to sell the fund's shares. 
My present inclination is to side with the SEC on this 
matter. It would seem that so long as the principal underwriter 
imposes conditions on the contract dealers that are similar to 
those imposed on him from the fund the policy of 22(f) is 
not abused. The result admittedly requires reading a bit 
more into the statute than is contained in its precise words, 
but my present view is that the history of the statute and the 
long subsequent practice would justify this action. 
2. The SEC points out, without apparent rejoinder by Justice, 
that even under this restrictive reading counts III, V, and VII 
would have to be dismissed. I have not checked this, but I assume 






In the course of preparing this memorandum a few 
possible questions have occurred to me that you might wish 
to explore at oral argument. 
First, it might be helpful to pin the SEC down on the 
question of section 22(d) and interdealer transactions. As 
I understand their position, they agree with the Justice 
Department that !2(d) should not be interpreted to require 
price maintenance in interdealer transactions. They would l 
instead seem to feel that the Commission can authorize 
price control at this level through 22(f). 
Second, you m~t seek to elicit the views of either 
the SEC or the Justice Department on the relationship between 
22(d) and 22(f). You might do this by asking whether, if the 
v 
Court affirms'the District Court on the 22(d) point, the SEC 
would be forced to resort to exercising its power to grant 
statutory exemptions in order to pursue its recent policy of 
encouraging limited price competition in the secondary market. 
You might also ask whether the parties view the power to grant 
exemptions as one that can be exercised in a bread manner with 
reference to generic categories. 
Finally, you might ask the Justice Department whether 
counts III, V, and V!I a charge fund-imposed restrictions that 
should be dismissed even under the theories advanced by them. 
The SEC makes this contention at page 52, n. 10 of its 
9 • 
amicus brief, and the Justice Department does not seem to respond 
to that in its respon~e. You might also seek some clarification of 
count I, which I cannot understand. 
' 
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Mr. David Boyd 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: April 27, 1975 
No. 73-1701 U.S. v. NASD 
This confirms -and to some extent supplements -our 
conversation Saturday afternoon about your fine first draft. 
I am impressed by the mountain of work which you have 
accomplished and your marshaling of the background, history 
and purpose of the Investment Company Act. It has been 
educational for me to read the draft and the accompanying 
notes. 
I have done some editing in pencil, although I did not 
read the draft primarily in an editorial role. Rather, I 
sought to obtain an overall view of the opinion and your 
proposed analysis. 
We are in agreement that we must find sound ways to 
reduce the length. If we add another 15 pages to the present 
37 pages, the printed opinion -especially with the full 
footnotes -would be oppressiv~ly long. It has been helpful, 
initially, however, for me to see the full story. 
One specific suggestion for cutting back relates to 
pages 15-20. Rather than explain the "two-price system" 
in detail, with its resulting evils, I suggest that you 
• 
2. 
summarize in conclusory terms the abuses which prompted enact-
ment of § 22. Readers of our opinion will accept our conclusory 
characterization of these abuses • w 
I also suggest that you look for opportunities to reduce 
or summarize in subparts A and B of Part IV. My first impres-
sion (which may not be my final one) is that suboart· •B 
(commencing p. 32) is not tightly written. Some of the 
arguments advanced as refuting appellees reliance on legislative 
history are not entirely persuasive. Putting it differently, 
some of this appears to be a bit "labored" •. The strength of 
our position, with respect to the meaning of § 22(d), derives 
from the statutory language itself, and especially from the 
definition of "dealer". It seems to me we come close to having 
a "plain language" position. When this is combined with the 
strong presumption against inferring antitrust immunity, I 
find our position as to 22(d) quite convincing. Some of the 
subsidiary arguments advanced in the draft may detract, rather 
than support, the basic strength of our position. 
Moreover, since we end up deciding this case against 
the government, our opinion may be "unbalanced" if we devote 
the greater part of it supporting the government's position 
as to 22(d), and finally knocking it out under 22(f). We. 
don't want the 22 (d) "tail" to wag the 22 (f) "dog". .J1 
Now for a coupl:~e of minor points: 
~f~·'':... 1"-
3. 
I mentioned the possible confusion arising from the 
use throughout the draft of the terms "broker", "dealer", 
"broker-dealer", "contract dealer", and "statutory dealer". 
Perhaps definition of these terms up front would be helpful. 
Also, I do not believe the draft contains (unless I 
overlooked it) a clear exposition of the difference between 
the "generic" and the "statutory" definition of "dealer". 
As I recall, one of the briefs is quite helpful on this point. 
' 
On page 4, you properly note the government's position 
as to secondary interdealer transactions and brokerage 
transactions. As I recall, however, the discussion in 
subsequent parts of the draft is confined to the brokerage 
transactions, with little or nothing being said further about 
interdealer transactions. I realize that the latter are 
relatively unimportant. 
* * * * * 
When one has worked asrrbard aad as effectively as you 
have on this draft, I am sure that an exhortation to reduce 
its length -without specific guidance -may be a bit dis-
couraging (although I have observed that you do not discourage 
easily). I think we must ~ke this effort, however, and I 
will try to be a bit more constructive when I am able to devote 
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Mr. David Boyd 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: May 10, 1975 
No. 73-1701 United States v. NASD 
This will confirm that I have reviewed (i) our first chambers 
draft, which includes Part I•III; and (i) the typewritten of 5/8/75 
of Part IV. I am pleased with Parts I-III, as printed -indeed, 
I think it reads very well. Although I was not reviewing the 
chambers draft primarily for printer's errors, I have noted a 
few of these -in addition to a couple of minor changes -on my 
copy attached hereto. 
I also think the typewritten draft of Part IV is fairly close 
to being ready for a chambers draft. Apart from some editorial 
changes, my only substantive change is in subpart B. I see no 
need to repeat the reference to Silver and its doctrine. Also, 
I would like to 'lean" a bit on the SEC's view as to repugnancy. 
I am not entirely content with the first paragraph of Part 
IV. It must be read in context with the concluding sentences 
of Part III. You might take another look at this. 
I am dictating this memorandum Saturday afternoon, and under• 
stand that before the day is out you will give me a draft of Part 
v. I will review this, and have it back in your hands Monday 
morning. My hope is that we can send Parts IV and V to the printer 
early next week; have the chambers draft reviewed promptly by 
one of your co-clerks; and, with luck, circulate by Friday, the 16t~ 
·-2. 
especially as I will be away from the afternoon of the 16th until 
the morning of the 20th. 
* * * * * 
I now record random thoughts and questions to be kept in mind 
as we go through the final reviewing and editing process: 
1. I am not sure the draft is clear as to "inter-dealer" 
transactions. The SG's reply brief, for example, states: 
"The secondary dealer market that we contend is 
permitted by f 22(d) extends no further than to 
sales by dealers to other dealers, to the issuing 
fund itself, or to the underwriters". 
The government recognizes that a dealer who sells to an 
investor is bound by 22(d), but contends that appellees are 
"suppressing the secondary inter-dealer market". The SEC's brief, 
p. 3, states as one of the questions whether restrictions may be 
imposed upon the terms under which the underwriter and contract-
dealers will conduct transaction with non-contract dealers in 
the fund's shares. 
You have added a sentence tn note 20 (p. 15 of chambers draft) 
to the effect that the express language of § 22(d) does not require 
resale price maintenance with respect to inter-dealer transactions. 
I suppose that the restrictive agreements that we sustain under 
§ 22(f) include price maintenance provisions with respect to 
inter-dealer sales. My question is whether we have been sufficientl:. 
explicity with respect to the inter-dealer restriction challenged 




2. In part IV we rely primarily on legislative history tn 
our interpretation of the language of 22 (f). We say little, 'lil 
anything, as to the literal meaning of the language itself ~ which 
is usually the starting point of statutory construction. I suppose 
the truth is that the literal meaning of restrictions on "the 
transferability or negotiability of any security" is ambiguous in 
the sense that it could conceivably mean either what the govern-
ment claims or what we think it means. Thus, we properly rely 
on the history of this section and the purpose of the entire act. 
Perhaps we have said enough about this. What do you think? 
3. Throughout our draft opinion we refer to the restrictive 
agreements or contracts without ever having designated them as 
"defined terms". Compare page 6 of the chambers draft with page 
8 of the jurisdictional statement. The latter makes clear that 
there are two specific types of contractual agreements that are 
challenged. I also states, perhaps more clearly than we do, the 
government's complaint with respect to prohibiting participation 
by broker-deiJlers in inter-dealer markets. My concern is that 
a reader, after passing lightly over page 6, may be confused in 
subsequent portions of the opinion as to exactly what sort of 
agreements we are talking about. There is probably no way to 
avoid this. I would like your thtnking as to whether should 
attempt a "defined terms" approach, such as that used by the 
government. 
4. We have agreed that we do not want to read 1 22(d) out 
of this case entirely. I would like to incorporate in our opinion 
'• 
4. 
something along the lines of what the SEC says in its amicus brief, 
beginning at the bottom of page 45 and going to the middle of page 
47. As the SEC puts it: 
"It is necessary to view the conduct at issue in this 
lawsuit in the context of the retail price maintenance 
scheme established by § 22(d)." (p. 46) 
If we only had § 22(f), I would be far less certain of our position. 
But 22(f) in light of the retail price maintenance scheme of 
22(d) and more generally of the pervasiveness of the enti~e 
regulatory scheme, is correctly interpreted by us. 
S. The SEC's brief, p. 12, contains a rather good summary 
from the DC's opinion of the extent to which the SEC has actively 
regulated the pricing and distribution of mutual fund sharea.cl 
I believe we have the essence of this already in our draft, and 
I do not wish unduly to increase the footnotes -which I have been 
urging you to limit. But there may possibly be a place for this 
awmna.ry. 
6. The SEC emphasizes that the regulatory scheme cannot 
work if the secondary market is free. See SEC's brief pp. 27, 46, 
S6 and 57. We have said this in somewhat different terms. Possibly 
it would be helpful to quote the SEC. 
* * * * * 
The foregoing questions and suggestions are not important 
enough to justify delaying completing our chambers draft, and 




it will be two or three weeks before a dissent circulates, Thus, 
we will have time after May 31 to do some polishing and editing 
on this and other opinions. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
as 
lfp/ss 6/_24/75 73-1701 U.S. v. National Association 
of Securi til .........., Dealers 
~~~~---------------
This is an antitrust action, instituted by the United 
States against the National Association of Securities 
Dealers and certain other parties connected with the mutual 
fund business. The complaint charged Sherman Act violations 
as the result of various vertical and horizontal restrictions 
on the market for mutual fund shares. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint, and we 
affirm -although on somewhat different grounds. 
We conclude, for the reasons set forth in the Court's 
opinion filed today, that the challenged restrictions are 
immunized from antitrust liability under § 22(f) of the 
Investment Company Act, and the pervasive regulatory 
scheme established by Congress in the Maloney and Invest-
ment Company Acts. 
Mr. Justice White has filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan and 
Mr. Justice Marshall have joined. 
... lfp/ss 6/24/75 73-1701 U.S. v. National Association 
of Secur~ -1.es Dealers 
The United States brought this antitrust action 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to challenge certain 
sales and distribution practices commonly used in the 
sales of securities of mutual fund companies. The 
complaint alleged that the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) and certain mutual funds, 
underwriters and broker-dealers had conspired to restrict 
trading in mutual fund shares. The United States charged 
that various agreements had imposed vertical and horizontal 
restrictions on the market for mutual fund shares, with 
the result that secondary market trading was discouraged 
to a greater extent than contemplated by Congress when 
it enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint, finding 
that the challenged activities were immunized from anti-
trust liability by Sections 22(d) and 22(f) of the 
Investment Company Act. It further found that, apart 
from this specific immunity, the pervasive regulatory 
scheme established by the Investment Company Act and 
the Maloney Act displaced the antitrust laws in the 
field of the sales and distribution of mutual fund shares. 
2. 
We affirm, although on somewhat different grounds. 
We agree with the United States that the challenged 
practices are not immunized by Section 22(d) of the 
Investment Company Act. That section, which requires 
that dealers maintain an established price in most mutual 
fund shares, does not extend to sales in which the dealer 
acts in the capacity of broker rather than as a 
statutorily-defined dealer. The statute defines its 
terms carefully, and we find no justification for expanding 
the mandate of Section 22(d). 
We further conclude, however, that the challenges 
to the alleged vertical restrictions on the marketing 
practices are immunized by Section 22(f) of the Act. 
That section authorizes the funds to impose restrictions 
on the transferability and negotiability of mutual fund 
shares, provided they are properly disclosed and do not 
contravene SEC regulations. Our examination of the 
history of the Investment Company Act persuades us, 
moreover, that Congress intended to authorize the 
imposition of limitations on the distribution system 
as well as on the actual shares themselves. The primary 
~ 
3. 
evils to which the Act was addressed were problems of 
that distribution system, and it would be artificial 
indeed to prevent the SEC and industry from addressing 
those problems at their source. Moreover, our determina-
tion that these limitations are authorized by the 
Investment Company Act necessarily requires that they 
be immunized from antitrust liability, for we can see 
no way to reconcile SEC approval of these practices 
with Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Finally, we conclude that the alleged horizontal 
restrictions on the marketing of mutual fund shares are 
immunized by pervasive regulatory schemes of the Maloney 
and Investment Company Acts. The activities here 
challenged are related to, and are supportive of, those 
immunized by Section 22(f) of the Investment Company Act. 
Subjecting them to antitrust liability would lead to 
possibly inconsistent and conflicting judgments between 
the courts and the SEC that would limit the Commission's 
flexible mandate to regulate the mutual fund industry. 
Mr. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, which 
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall joined. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
""' 
...--.... 
~tt}tt"mtt <!fltltrlltf tlrt ~h .Jiatts 
~Mlfhtghm, ~.<!f. 2!lgi'1-~ 
May 21, 1975 
No. 73-1701 -United States v. National 
Association of Securities Dealers 
Dear Lewis, 
Although I knew that this was no easy 
case, I did not realize at the time of oral 
argument and at our subsequent Conference 
discussion what a massive and complicated 
job the opinion would entail. I think you have 
done that job most admirably, and I am glad 
to join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
() £j' 
/ Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
?s .. 
~ (}~c.. ft.-It_~ fL~ 





JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
---,. ....--... 
.iu:pnmt <lfltmt ltf t4t ~ttitt~ .jtattg 
~a:tt!pughm. ~. <If. 2!Tbf'l-' 
May 21, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1701 -U.S. v. National Association 
of Securities Dealers Inc. 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 




JUSTICE H ARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~nut <!fottrl d t4~ ~a ~mtte 
Jl'ulfitt:gtcn, ~. <!f. 2ll,;t,_.~ 
May 26, 1975 
/ 
Re: No. 73-1701 -United States v. National Association of 
Securities Dealers 
Dear Lewis: 
Please Join me. 
Sincerely, 
I~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
-JU ST ICE W'M . -.J . BRENNAN. -JR. 
~u:p-rttttt ~cud of tqt ~nittb .itaftg 
2JlTztGltinghttt, ~. ~· 20,?'1-~ 
June 10, 1975 
! 
RE: No. 73-1701 United States v. National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in the 
above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.§u:punu Qf01trt ltf tltt 'Jllnittb .§tafts 
'IDas-lyiltgbm.tn. <!f. 2ll.;tJ!-~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL June 11, 197 5 
. ; 
Re: No. 7 3-1701 -- United States v. National Association 
of Securities Dealers, Inc • . 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Mr. Justice White 




C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.§uprttttt <!Jllttri ~f t£rt ~tb .§taftg 
'~htitfringhnt, ~. <!f. 2llgt~~ 
June 11, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1701 -United States v. NASD 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM eERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.'"":~-rr tntt <!fonrl ttf t4t~b j;taftg 
~aafringht~ ~· <!f. 2LTc?'!~ 
June 16, 1975 
/ 
Re: 73-1701 - U. S. v. Nationa 1 Association of Securities Dealers 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your May 20 ci.,rculation. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.§ttpuntt ~ourl ltf tqt ~ttitt~ .§falts 
~as!ringfon, l!l. <!J. 20,?~~ 
JUSTICEWILLIAMO. DOUGLAS June 19, 1975 
. ' 
Re: No. 73-1701 - U.S. v. Nat. Asso. Securities 
Dealers 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me, though I may be influenced 
by the fact that I drafted the Maloney Act. 
Sincerely, 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
• 
June 24, 1975 
No. 73-1701 u.s. v. National Association 
of Securities Dealers 
Dear Harry: 
I would be most grateful if you would deliver my 
NASD case on 'lburaday, when you bring dOWD Gordon. 
After the Chief Justice decided not to attend the 
Fourth Circuit Conference, and after the progress we have 
made this week, I decided that I would adhere to -.y previous 
plan. I am on the program at the Executive Session of the 
Circuit and District Judges on Thursday morning. I will 
return to Washington on Saturday and be here for our final 
session on MOnday. 
I enclose a brief statement which I think will suffice 
for purposes of your oral presentation. In addition, in the 
event you prefer a somewhat more detailed summary, I also 
enclose a statement prepared by David Boyd - who worked with 
me on this case. David will be happy to assist you .. 
With my thanks. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackam 
lfp/ss 
1--·- ~-·-
I ':r 1--3 
~ - t;rj 
s~ 0 0 :--< 
<1\~ 
MAY 2 o W15 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 73-1701 
United States, Appellant, 
v. 
National Association of 
Securities Dealers, 
Inco1 et aL 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, 
[May - 1 1975] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This appeal requires the Court to determine the extent 
to which the regulatory authority conferred upon the 
Securities and Exchange Commission by the Maloney Act 
and the Investment Company Act of 1940 displaces the 
strong antitrust policy embodied in § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. At issue is whether certain sales and distribution 
practices employed in the marketing of open-end man-
agement companies, popularly referred to as "mutual 
funds," are immune from antitrust liability. We con-
clude that they are, and accordingly affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
I 
An "investment company1' invests in the securities of 
other corporations and issues securities of its own,1 
1 The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines "investment com·· 
pany" to mclude any issuer of securities which 
" (1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or pro-
posed to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, 
or trading in securities; 
"(2) is engaged or propo.<res to engage in the business of issuing 
face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been 
'~ , 
73 1701-0PINION 
2 UNITED STATES v, NATIONAL ASSR SEC, DEALERS 
Shares in an investment company thus represent propor-
tionate interests in its investment portfolio, and their 
value fluctuates in relation to the changes in the value 
of the securities it owns. The most common form of 
investment company, the "open end" company or mutual 
fund, is required by law to redeem its securities on demand 
at a price approximating their proportionate share of the 
fund's net asset value at the time of redemption.2 In 
order to avoid liquidation through redemption, mutual 
funds continuously issue and sell new shares, These 
features-continuous and unlimited distribution and com-
pulsory redemption-are, as the Court recently recog-
nized, "unique characteristic[s]" of this form of invest-
ment. United States v, Cartwright, 411 U. S, 546, 547 
{1973). 
The initial distribution of mutual-fund shares is con-
ducted by a principal underwriter, often an affiliate of 
the fund, and by broker-dealers 3 who contract with that 
engaged in such business and has any such certificate outstanding or 
"(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, owning, boWing, or trading in securities, and owns or 
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 
40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of 
Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis!' 
15 U.S. C.§ 80a-3 (a). 
This broad definition is qualified, however, by a series of specific 
exemptions. See id., §§ 80a-3 (b) and (c) . 
2 See 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (d) (32); id., § 80a-22 (e). 
Management investment companies whose securities lack this· 
redeemability feature are defined as "closed-end" companies, id., 
§ 80a-5 (b), and their sales and distribution practices are regulated 
under § 23 of the Act. /d., § 80a-23. Section 22, the provision 
under considerat.ion in this appeal, goveros the sales and distribu-
tion practices of "open-end" companies only. 
8 In this opinion we will use the term "broker-dealer" to refer 
generally to persons registered under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78o et seq., and authorized to effect trans-
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,underwriter to sell the securities to the public. The 
sales price commonly consists of two components, a sum 
calculated from the net asset value of the fund at the 
time of purchase, and a "load," a sales charge represent-
ing a fixed percentage of the net asset value. The load 
is divided between the principal underwriter and the 
broker-dealers, co.>:npensating them for their sales efforts.4 
The distribution-redemption system constitutes the 
primary market in mutual-fund shares, the operation of 
which is not questioned in this litigation. The parties 
agree that § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act 
requires broker-dealers to maintain a uniform price in 
sales in this primary market to all purchasers except the 
fund, its underwriters, and other dealers. And in view 
of this express requirement no question exists that anti-
trust immunity must be afforded these sales. This case 
focuses, rather, on the potential secondary market in 
mutual-fund shares. 
Although a significant secondary market existed prior 
to enactment of the Investment Company Act, little 
presently remains. The United States agrees that the 
authorization of that Act. We also will refer separately to "brok~rs'' 
and "dealers" as defined by the Investment Company Act, see 15 
U. 8. C. §§ 80a-22 (6) and (11), to describe the capacity in which 
a broker-dealer acts in a particular transaction. 
' The Act defines "sales load" to be the difference between the 
public offering price and the portion of the sales proceeds that is 
invested or held for investment purposes by the issuer. !d., § 80a-
2 (a){19). Most mutual funds charge this sales load in order to 
encourage vigorous sales efforts on the part of underwriters and 
broker-dealers. There are some fundR that do not charge this addi-
tional sales fee These "no load" funds generally sell dirE>ctly to the 
investor without relying on the promotional and sales efforts of 
underwriter::. and broker-dealers. See SEC Report of the Divh;ion 
of Investment Management Regulation, Mutual Fund Distribution 
and § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 112 (Augullt 
1974) (heremafter 1974 Staff Ht>port). 
'13-1701-0PINION 
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Act was designE::d to restrict most of secondary marl<et 
trading, but nonetheless contends that certain industry 
practices have extended the statutory limitation beyond 
its proper boundaries. The complaint in this action 
alleges that the defendants, appellees herein, combined 
and agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices 
of mutual-fund shares in ser-ondary market transactions 
between dealers, from an investor to a dealer, and be-
tween investors through brokered transactions.r, Named 
as defendants are the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) ,u and certain mutual funds, 7 mutual-· 
fund underwriters,8 and securities broker-dealers.9 
5 Two additional private antitrust actions premised on similar 
theories were filed in the District Court and subsequently dismissed, 
Haddad v. Crosby Corp. and Gross v. National Assn. of Securities 
Dealers, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 95. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia 8tayed those appeals to await the resolution of 
this case. The petition of onf' of the parties for certiorari before 
jHdgment was denied, Gross v. Natianal Assn. of Securities Dealers, 
lnc., 41!} U: S. 843 (1!}74). 
Subsequent to the filing of the United States' complaint some 50 
prlvate suits purporting to be class actions under Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 23 were filed in various district courts around the country. 
These cases were transferred to the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation, In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigatian, Civil Ac-
tion No. Mise. 103:..73: See 374 F . Supp., at 97 n. 4. The District 
Court deferred determination whether the actions could be main-
tained · as class actions under Rule 23 and additionally postponed 
discovery and other activity pending disposition of the motion to 
dismiss in this case. 374 F. Supp., at 114. 
6 The National AHsociation of Securities Dealers is ~egistered under 
§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 et 
seq. , the so-called Maloney Act of 1!}38. The Maloney Act SU}Jple-
ments the Securities and Exchange Commisswn's regulation of the· 
over-the-counter markets by providmg a system of eooperative "elf-
regulation through voluntary associations of brokers and dealers. 
The Act, prov1des that, associa1wn:> may register with the Commission1 
[Footnotes 7, b, and 9 are on p. 5] 
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The United States charges that these agreements vio-
late ~ 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1/0 and prays 
that they be enjoined under § 4 of that Act. /d., § 4. 
Count I charges a horizontal combination and con~ 
spiracy among the members of appellee N ASD to pr~ 
vent the growth of a secondary dealer market in the 
purchase and sale of mutual-fund shares. See n. 42, 
pursuant to specified terms and conditions, see generally id., § 78o-3, 
and authorizes them to promulgate rules designed to prevent fraud-
ulent and manipulative practices; to promote equitable principles 
of trade; to safeguard against unreasonable profits and charges; and 
generally to protect investors and the public interest. /d., §§ 78o-
3 (b) (8) . The Act also authorizes the SEC to exercise a significant 
oversight function over the rules and activities of the registered 
associations. See, e. g., id., §§ 78o-3 (b), (e), (h), (j), and (k). 
The N ASD is presently the only association registered under this · 
Act. 
1 The mutual fund:;: named as defendants in this action are 
Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, Inc., Fidelity Fund, 
Inc., and Wellington Fund, Inc. 
8 The defendant underwriters include the Crosby Corporation; 
Vance Sanders & Co., Inc., and the Wellington Management Com. 
pany, Inc. 
9 Named as defendant broker-dealers are the following : Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Bache & Company, Inc., 
Reynolds Securities Corp., F. I. duPont, Glore Forgan, Inc., E. F. 
Hutt.on, Inc., Walston & Company, Inc., Dean Witter & Company, 
Inc., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc , and Hornblower & 
Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc. 
10 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: 
"Every contract, combination m the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev= 
eral States, or with fore1gc nations, is declared to be illegal. . • • 
"Every person who shall make any contraJt or engage in any combi-
nation or conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be 
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be pumshed by fine not exceeding fifty thousand 
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court." 
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infra, Counts II-VIII, by contrast, allege various ver~ 
tical restrictions on secondary market activities. In 
Counts II, IV, and VI the United States charges that the 
principal underwrHers and broker-dealers entered into 
a.greements that compel the mllintenance of the public 
offering price in brokerage transactions of specified 
mutual-fund shares and th&t prohibit interdealer trans .. 
a.ctions by allowing etlch broker-dealer to sell and pur-
cha.se shares only to or from investors.u Count VIII 
alleges that the broker-dealers entered into other, similar 
contracts and combinations with numerous principal 
underwriters. Counts III, V, and VII allege violations 
on the part of the pripcipal underwriters and the funds 
themselves. In Counts III and VII the various defend-
ants are charged with entering into contracts requiring 
thf restrictive underwriter-dealer agreements challenged 
11 The violations alleged in Count II are typical of those charged 
in Counts IV and VI. In Count II, appellee Crosby, a principal 
underwriter of appellee Fidelity Fund, Inc., is charged with entering 
into contracts and combinations with appellee broker-dealers, the 
substantial terms of which are that 
"(a) each brokerjdealer must maintain the public offering price in 
any brokerage transactiOn in which it. participates involving the 
purcbase or sale of shares of the Fidelity Funds; and 
"(1-) each broker jdealer must sell sharrs of the Fidelity Funds only 
to investors or the fund and puH•hase such shares only from investorS' 
or the fund .. " App. 10. 
Count VI, in addition to charging restrictive agreements similar to 
the above, alleged that appellee Wellington, a principal1mderwriter, 
agreed to act only as an agent of the appropriate mutual fund in all 
transactions with the broker-dealers ld., at 15. 
The alleged effect of tht> 1estrietive agreement charged in , (a} 
was to mhibit the growth and development of a brokerage market 
in mutual fund sharC::l The alleged effect of t.he rC::ltr!Ction identi-
fied in ~ (b); by contrast, was to inhibit interdealer transactions and 
thus to restrict the growth aml development of a Reeondary dealer 
market,, ld~ at H. 
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in Counts II and VI. Count V charges that the agree-
ment between one fund and its underwriter restricted the 
latter to serving as a principal for its own account in all 
transactions with the public, thereby prohibiting broker-
age transactions in the fund's shares. App. 14. 
After carefully examining the structure, purpose and 
history of the Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C, 
§ 80a-1 et seq., and the Maloney Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 
et seq., the District Court held that this statutory scheme 
was "incompatible with the maintenance of [an] anti .. 
trust action," 347 F. Supp., at 109, quoting Silver v. New 
York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 358 (1963). The 
court concluded that§§ 22 (d) and (f) of the Investment 
Company Act, when read in conjunction with the Ma--
loney Act, afford antitrust immunity for all of the prac~ 
tices here challenged. The court further held that 
apart from this explicit statutory immunity, the per-
vasive regulatory scheme established by these statutes 
confers an implied immunity from antitrust sanction in 
the "narrow area of distribution and sale of mutual 
fund shares." 374 F. Supp., at 114. The court accord-
ingly dismissed the complaint, and the United States 
appealed to this Court.12 
'l'he position of the United States in this appeal can 
be summarized briefly. Noting that implied repeals of 
the antitrust laws are not favored, see, e. g., United States 
v, Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 
(1963), the United States urges that the antitrust im-
munity conferred by § 22 of the Investment Company 
Act should not extend beyond its precise terms, none of 
which, it maintains, requires or s.uthorizes the practices 
12 The Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 15, 1974, 
419 U. S, 822. Accordingly, the recent amendments to the Expedit-
ing Act, 15 U. S. C, § 29, as amended by 88 Stat, 1709, do not 
affect our jurisdiction. 
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here challenged. The United States maintains, moreover, 
that the District Court expanded the parameters of the 
implied immunity doctrine beyond those recognized by 
decisions of this Court. In response, appellees advance 
all of the positions relied on by the District Court. They 
are joined by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which asserts as amicus curiae, azce£ ts that the 
regulatory authority conferred upon it by § 22 (f) of the 
Investment Company Act displaces § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The SEC contends, therefore, that the District 
Court properly dismissed Counts II-VIII but takes no· 
position with respect to Count I. 
II 
A 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 originated in 
congressional concern that the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U. S. C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq., were inadequate to protect 
the purchasers of investment company securities. Thus, 
in § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 79z-4, Congress directed the SEC to study 
the structures, practices and problems of investment 
companies With a view toward proposing further legisla-
ti..m. Four years of mtensive scrutiny of the industry 
culminated in the publication of the Investment Trust. 
Study and the recommendation of legislation to rectify 
the problems and abuses it identified. After extensive:' 
congressional consideration, the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 was adopted. 
The Act vests in the SEC broad regulatory authority 
over the business practices of investment companies.13' 
1" For example, the Act requires companies to register with the· 
S.E0; 15 U" S. C. § 80a--8, see also, id., § 80a-7. Companies also 
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We are concerned on this appeal with § 22 of the Act, 
id., § SOa-22, which controls the sales and distribution of 
mutual-fund shares. The questions presented require 
us to determine whether § 22 (d) obligates appellees 
to engage in the practices challenged in CountR II-VIII 
and thus necessarily confers antitrust immunity for them. 
If not, we must determine whether such practices 
are authorized by § 22 (f) and, if so, whether they 
are immune from antitrust sanction. Resolution of 
these issues will be facilitated by examining the nature of 
the problems and abuses to which § 22 is addressed, a 
matter to which we now turn, 
B 
The most thorough description of the sales and distri-
bution practices of mutual funds prior to passage of the 
Investment Company AcL may be found in Part III of 
the Investment Trust Study.14 That study, as Congress 
1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a; Investment Company Act, 15 U. S, C. 
§ 80a-24 (a), and must submit for SEC inspection copies of the 
sales literature they send to prospective investors. /d.,§ 80a-24 (b). 
The Investment Company Act requires the submission and periodic 
updating of detailed financial reports and documentation and the 
semiannual transmission of reports containing similar information 
to the shareholders. /d., § 80a-29. It also imposes controls and 
restrictions on the internal management of investment companies: 
establishing minimum capital requirements, id., §§ 80a-14 and 80a-
17; limiting pem1issible methods for selecting directors, id., § 80a-16; 
and er,'tablishing cm·tain qualifications for persons seeking to affiliate 
with the companies, id., § 80a-9. Finally, the Act imposes a num~ 
ber of controls on the internal practices of investment companies. 
For example, it requires a majority shareholder vote for certain 
fundamental business decisions, id., § SOa-11, and limits certain 
dividen.i distributions, id., § SOa-19 See generally, the Mutual Fund 
Industry: A I,egal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Law, 732 (1969). 
l 4 SEC Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, 
H. R. Doc, No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940) (The Investment 
Trust Study). In this opinion we will refer primarily to Part III of 
. • · •• '1· 
.· .• 
' ' 
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has recognized, see 15 U. S. C. § SOa-1, forms the initial 
basis for any evaluation of the Act. 
Prior to 1940 the basic framework for the primary dis .. 
tribution of mutual-fund shares was similar to that exist-
ing today. The fund normally retained a principal 
underwriter to serve as a wholesaler of its shares. The 
principal underwriter in turn contracted with a number 
of broker-dealers to sell the fund's shares to the invest-
ing public.15 The price of the shares was based on the 
fund's net asset value at the approximate time of sale, 
and a sales commission or load was added to that price. 
Although prior to 1940 the primary distribution sys-
tem for mutual-fund shares was similar to the present 
one, a number of conditions then existed that largely 
disappeared following passage of the Act. The most 
prominently discussed characteristic was the "two-
price system," which encouraged an active secondary 
market under conditions that tolerated disruptive 
and discriminatory trading practices. The two-price 
!J
he price for the following day was established. The nef1 
ystem reflected the relationship between the com-
nonly used method of computing the daily net asset 
alue of mutual-fund shares and the manner in which 
the Study, and all citations will be to that part unless otherwise 
designated. For addit~onal discussion of the operations of open-end 
management investment companies, see 197 4 Staff Report; SEC 
Report of the Staff on the Potential Economic Impact, of a Repeal 
of § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (November 
1972); SEC Report on Public PoUcy Implications of Investment 
Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 
(hereinafter the 1966 SEC Report); SEC Report of the Special 
Study of Securities Markets, c. XI, Open .. End Investment Com~ 
panies (Mutual Funds), H. R. Doc. No. 9.1, pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. ( 1963) (hereinafter 1963 Special Study) .. 
15 The broker-dealers operating within the primary distribution 
-system are denominated "contract dealers" in the Study and will be 
so identified in this opinion .. 
")!:. 
-, 
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asset value of mutual funds, which depends on the mar~ 
ket quotations of the stocks in their investment port-
folios, fluctuates const~ntly, Most funds computed their 
net asset values daily on the basis of the fund's portfolio 
value at the close of exchange trading, and that figure 
established the sales price that would go into effect at a 
specified hour on the following day. During this interim 
period two prices were known : the present day's trading 
price based on the portfolio value established the previ-
ous day; and the following day's price, which was based 
on the net asset value computed at the close of exchange 
trading on the present day. One aware of both prices 
could engage in "riskless trading" during this interim 
period. See Investmer1t Trust Study, at 851-852. 
.. r ,· 
The two-price system did not benefit the investing 
public generally. Some of the mutual funds did not 
explain the system thoroughly, and unsophisticated in~ 
vestors probably were unaware of its existence. See id., 
at 867. Even investors who knew of the two-price 
system and understood Its operation were rarely in a 
position to exploit it fully. It was possible, however, 
for a knowledgeable investor to purchase shares in a ris-
ing market at the current price with the advance infor-
mation that the next, day's price would be higher. He 
thus could be guaranteed an immediate appreciation in 
the market value of his investment/6 although this ad~ 
vantage was obtained at the expense of the existing share~ 
16 The Study indicates that mutual funds increasingly began to 
disclose more information about the existence and operation of the 
two-price &'Ystem. See Investment Tmst Study, at 867-868. And 
in some instances the funds encouraged broker-dealers to explain 
to potential incoming investors the immediate appreciation in in-
vestment value that could be obtained from the pricing system in 
the hope of encouraging the purchase of shares, !d., at 854. Sefl 
194.0 Senate Hearin~s . pt. :t, at. 13R 
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holders whose equity interests were diluted by a cor~ 
responding amount.17 The load fee that was charged 
in the sale of mutual funds to the investing public made 
it difficult for these investors to realize the "paper gain" 
obtained in such trading. Because the daily fluctuation 
in net asset value rarely exceeded the load, public in-
vestors generally were unable to realize immediate profits 
from the two-price system by engaging in rapid in-and-
out trading. But insiders, who often were able to pur-
chase shares without paying the load, did not operate 
under this constraint. Thus insiders could, and some-
times did, purchase shares for immediate redemption at 
the appreciated value. See n . 24, infra, and sources 
cited therein, 
The two-price system often afforded other advantages 
to underwriters and broker-dealers. In a falling market 
they could enhance profits by waiting to fill orders from 
shares purchased from the fund at the next day's antici-
pated lower price. In a similar fashion, in a rising mar-
ket they could take a "long position" in mutual-fund 
shares by establishing an mventory m order to satisfy 
•anticipated purchases w1th securities previously obtained 
at a lower price. ld., at 854-855. In each case the 
investment company would receive the lower of the two 
prevailing prices for 1ts shares, id., at 854, and the equity 
interests of shareholders would suffer a corresponding 
dilution. As a result, an active secondary market in 
mutual-fund shares ex1sted. Id., at 865-867. Principal 
underwriters and contract broker-dealers often main-
11 The existing shareholders' equity interests were diluted because 
the incoming investors bought into the fund at less than the actual 
value of the shares at the time Of vurchase. See ul., pt. 1, at 138. 
SEC testimony indicated that. tins dilution could be substantial. In 
one instance the CommtsHion calculated that the two-price system 
resulted in ~;~, loss to exiHtmg shareholders of one tru:;;t of some: 
$133,000 in a single day. I I, at 1~9-141. 
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tained inventory positions established by purchasing 
shares through the primary distribution system and by 
buying from other dealers and retiring shareholders.18 
Additionally, a "bootleg market" sprang up, comprised 
of broker-dealers having no contractual relationship with 
the fund or its principal underwriter. These bootleg 
dealers purchased shares aCi a discount from contract 
dealers or bought them from retiring shareholders at a 
price slightly higher ~han the redP.mption price. Bootleg 
dealers would then offer the shares at a price slightly 
lower than that required in the primary distribution sys-
tem, thus "initiating a small scale price war between re-
tailers and tend [ ing] generally to disrupt the established 
offering price." I d., at 865. 
Section 22 of the Investme:r.t Company Act of 1940 
was enacted with these abuses in mind. Sections 22 (a) 
and (c) were designed to "eliminat[e] or reduc[e] as 
far as reasonably practicable any dilution of the value 
of other outstanding securities ... or any other result of 
[the] purchase, redemption or sale [of mutual fund 
securities] which is unfair to holders of such other out-
standing securities,'' 15 U.S. C. § 80a-22 (a) . They au-
thorize the NASD and the SEC to regulate certain pric-
ing and trading practices in order to effectuate that 
goa.l.19 Section 22 (b) authorizes registered securities 
1s Contract dealers trading from an inventory position often could 
obtain an additional profit from the sales load. When the draler 
acted as an agent for the fund and traded from the primary distri-
bution system, the dealer and the underwriter divided the load 
charge in accordance with the sales agreement . But the dealer 
could retain the full load when he filled the purcha:;e order from an 
inventory position in shares purchased from retiring 11hareholders 
or other dealers. ld., at 858-859. 
1o Sections 22 (a) and (c) reflect the same basic relationship between 
the SEC and the NASD that ts established by the Mayoney Act. 
See n. 5, supra. Section 22 (a) authorizes regh;tered ~>ecurities a&oci-
atiom~, in this case the NASD, to pre8cnbe mle~;: for the regulation of 
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associations and the SEC to prescribe the maximum 
sales commissions or loads that can be charged in con-
nection with a pnmary distribution; and § 22 (e) pro-
tects the right of redemption by restricting mutual funds' 
power to suspend redemption or postpone the date of 
payment. 
The issues presented in this litigation revolve around 
subsections (d) and (f) of § 22. Bearing in mind the 
history and purposes of the Investment Company Act, 
we now consider the effect of these subsections on the 
question of potential antitrust liability for the practices 
here challenged, 
III 
Section 22 (d) prohibits mutual funds from selling 
shares at other than the currant public offering price 
to any person except to or through a principal under-
writer for distribution. It further commands that "no 
these matters. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (a). The industry thus is 
afforded the initial opportunity to police its own practices. If, how-
ever, industry self-regulatwn proves insufficient, § 22 (c) authorizes 
the Commission to make rules and regulations "covering the same 
subject, matter, and for the accomplishment of the same ends as are 
prescribed in subsection (a)," and proclaims that the SEC rules and 
regulations supersede any inconsistent rules o'f the registered securi-
ties association. ld., § 80a-22 (c) . 
Shortly after enactment of the Investment Company Act the 
NASD proposed, and the SEC approved, a rule establishing twice-
daily pricing. See Proposed Amendment to the Rules of Fait 
Practice of the NASD, Inc., 9 S. E. C, 38 (1941). Twice-daily 
pricing reduced the time period in which persons could engage in 
riskless trading and eorrespondingly decreased tl:.e potential for 
dilution. The Commission subsequently provided full protection 
against the dilutive effects of riskless tradmg. In late 1968 it exer-
cised itR authority under § 22 (c) to adopt Rule 22c-1, which re-
quires all funds to establish "forward pricing." Forward pricing 
eliminates the potential for riskless trading altogether. See Adoption 
of Rule 22c-1, Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 5519 (1968) , CCH Fed, Sec, L. 
Rep. ~ 77,616; 17 CFR § 270.22c-1.. 
··., 
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dealer shall sell [mutual funq shares] to a.ny person ex-
cept a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, 
except at a current public offering price described in the 
prospectus." 15 U. S. S. § 80a-22 (d).20 By its terms, 
§ 22 (d) excepts interd~aler s~.Jes from its price mainte-
nance requirement. Accordiflgly, this section cannot be 
relied upon by appellees as justification for the restric-
tions imposed upon interdealer transactions. At issue, 
rather, is the narrower questior. wheth¢r the § 22 (d) 
price maintenance mandate for sales by 11dealers" ap-
plies to transactions in which a broker-dealer acts 
as a statutory 11broker" rather than a statutory 11dealer." 
The District Court concluded that it does, and thus that 
§ 22 (d) governs transft,ctions in which the broker-dealer 
acts as an agent for a.n investor as well as those in which 
he acts as a principal selling shares for his own account. 
A 
The District Court's decision reflects an expansive 
view of § 22 (d). The Investment Company Act spe-
cifically defines "broker'' and "dealer" 21 and uses the 
2o This section provides in pertinent part: 
"No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable 
security issued by it to any person except either to or through a. 
principal underwriter for. distribution or at a current public offer-
ing price described in the prospectus, and, if such class of security 
is being currently offered to the public by or through an under-
writer, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer 
shall sell any such secunty to any person except a dealer, a prin-
cipal underwriter, or the issuer, except at a. current public offering· 
price described in the prospectus." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (d) .. 
n The Investment Company Act defin~ a "dealer" to be : 
"Any person regularly engaged in the business of buying and 
selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise,. 
but does not include a bank, insurance company, or investment com-
pany, or any pero:Jon insofar as he is engaged in investing, reinvesting,. 
Cll!' tralll1n~ in securities, or iilm ow.niimg or hoiJiling securities for his 
'. 
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terms distinctively throughout.22 Appellees maintain, 
however, that the defintion of "dealer" is sufficiently 
broad to require price maintenance in brokerage transac ... 
tions. In support of this position appellees assert that 
the critical elements of the dealer definition .are that 
the term relates to a "person" rather th~tn to a trans-
action and that the person must engage "regularly" in 
the sale and purchase of securities to qualify as a dealer. 
It is argued, therefore, that any person who purchases 
and sells securities with sufficient regularity to qualify as 
a statutory dealer is thereafter bound by all dealer re-
strictions, regardless of the nature of the particular 
transaction in question. We do not find this argument 
persuasive. 
Appellees' reliance on the statutory reference to "per-
son" in defining dealer adds little to the analysis, for the 
Act defines "broker " "investment banker " "issuer " ' ,, ' ' 
"underwriter," and others to be "persons as wen.• See 
id., §§ SOa-2 (21) (2) & ( 40). ln each instance, the 
own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but 
not as a part of a regular business." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a)(ll). 
A "broker," by contrast., is defined to be: 
"Any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in 
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank or 
any person solely by reason of the fact that such person is an 
underwriter for one or more investme:p.t companies." /d., § 80a-Z 
(a)(6). 
22 Congress employed the term "broker" without reference t.o 
"dealer" in various sections of the Act. See id., §§ 80a-3 (c) (2); 
SOa-10 (b) (1); 80a-17 (e) (1) and (2) . In other instances, the Act 
refers to "dealer" without reference to "broker," see id., §§ 80a-2 (a) 
(4D); 83a-22 (c) and (d). And in some cases, including the very 
definition of the term "dealer" itself, see n 21, supra, the Act refers 
to both "broker" and "dealer" in the same provision, see id., §§ 80a-1 
(b) (2); 80a-9 (a)(l) and (a), 80a-12 (a){3); and 80a-30 (a). 
Finally, the Act in some cases refers to the more general term 
~'broker-dealer/' see id., §§ 80a-·22 (b) (1) and (2), 
:·' 
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critical distinction relates to their transactional capacity. 
Moreover, we think that appellees reliance on the regu-
larity requirement m the dealer defi~ition places undue 
emphasis on that el'3ment at the expense of the remainder 
of the provision. On the face of the statute the most 
apparent distinction between a broker and a dealer is that 
the former effects transa<:tiohs for the account of others 
and the latter buys and sells securities for his own account. 
We therefore cannot agree that the terms of the Act 
compel the conclusion that a broker-dealer acting in a 
brokerage capacity would be bound by the § 22 (d) 
dealer mandate. Indeed, the language of the Act sug-
gests the opposite result. 
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the statutory defi-
nition is ambiguous, we find nothing in the extensive 
contemporaneous legislative history of the Investment 
Company Act to justify interpreting § 22 (d) to encom-
pass brokered transactions. That history is sparse,23 and 
23 The original Commission-sponsored bill considered in the initial 
hearings before the Senate Banking and Commerce Subcommittee, 
S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. ( 1940), contained no provision resem-
bling this subsection. Section 22 (d) first emerged in a compromise 
proposal advanced after a period of mtensive consultation betwtlen 
the SEC and industry representatives that followed initial Senate 
hearings, see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, at 1105-1107, and the 
Commission subsequently has mdiCated that this provision was sug~ 
gested by the industry. See Mtdr..merica Mutual Fund, 41 S. E. C. 
328, 331 (1963); 1966 Public Policy Study, at 219. Revised legisla-
tion reflecting this compromise was submitted, and further hearings 
were conducted in the Senate and the House. Both bills were 
reported favorably by their respective committees, S. Rep. No. 1775, 
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), H. R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d 
s~ss. (1940), and the House bill, with minor amendments not rel~ 
vant to this appeal, was Bccepted by the Senate. 86 Cong. Rec. 
10069-10071. 
This history perhaps Pxplain,. the dearth of discus!>ion relating 
to § 22 (d). The m11jority of the Senate hearings were completE'<! 
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suggests only that § 22 (d) was considered necessary to 
curb abuses that had arisen in the sales of securities to 
insiders.24 
The prohibition against insider trading would seem 
adequately served by the first clause of § 22 (d), which 
prevents mutual funds from selling shares at other than 
the public offering price to any person except a principal 
underwriter or dealer. See n. 20, supra.~5 The further 
restriction on dealer sales bears little relation to insider 
trading, however, and logically would be thought to serve 
some other purpose. The obvious effect of the dealer 
prohibition is to shield the primary distribution system 
from the competitive impact of unrestricted dealer trad-
ing in the secondary markets, a concern that was reflected 
before this provision was advanced, and both the Senate and House 
hearings that followed provide relatively little illumination as to 
the intended purpose or scope of this subsection. 
24 Insider trading abuses were identified as a problem during the 
Senate hearings that preceded submission of the compromise bill 
containing §22 (d), see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 526-5p7 and 
660-661, and at the close of the initial Senate hearings an industry 
representative suggested that the Act should contain a provision 
prohibiting sales at preferential terms to insiders and others. !d., 
at 1057. The Commission and industry representatives thereafter 
met to seek a compromise on the various differences that had 
been identified in the Senate hearings, and the industry memoran-
dum outlining the nature of the resultant agreement indicates that · 
a provision should be addrd to the Act to prohibit insider trading. 
See Framework of Proposed Investment Company Bill (Title I), 
Memorandum Embodying Suggestions Resulting from Conference 
Between Securities and Exchange Commission and Representatives 
of Investment Companies fMay 13, 1940), printed in HMO House 
Hearings, at 99. 
See also S. Rep. No. 1775, supra, at 16; H. R. Rep. No. 2639, supra, 
at 20. 
25 The insider trading prohibition is complimented by §'22 (g), 
which precludes the issuance of mutual fund shares for services or 
property other than cash or securities. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (g). 
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in the Study, see lnvestment Trust Study, at 865. The 
SEC perceives this to be one of the purposes of this 
provision 26 
But concluding that protection of the primary distri-
bution system is a purpose of § 22 (d) does little to resolve 
the question whether Congress intended tc require strict 
price maintenance in all broker-dealer transactions with 
the investing public. By its terms, § 22 (d) protects ohly 
against the possibly disruptive effects of secondary dealer 
sales which, as statutorily defined, constituted the most 
active secondary market existing prior to the Act's pas-
sage. Nothing in the contemporary history suggests that 
Congress was equally concemed with possible disruption 
from investor transactions in outstanding shares con-
ducted through statutory brokers. 
Nor do we think that the history attending subsequent 
congressional consideration of the Act provides adequate 
support for appellees' contention that § 22 (d) requires 
strict price maintenance in all broker-dealer transactions 
in mutual-fund shares. To be sure, portions of the testi-
28 See Adoption of Rule N-22-D-1, Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 2798, 
p. 1 (1958), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 176,625, p. 80,393; Investors 
Diversified Services Inc., Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 3095 (1960), CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'P6,699, p. 80,620; In re Sideris, Exch Act Rei. 
N.:>. 8816, p. 2 (1970); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc ., Inv. Co. Act 
Rei. No. 6932, p 4 (1972) . 
The SEC also has suggestad that preventing discrimination 
among investors was one of the purposes of this provision. See, 
e. g., In re Sidem, supra, Midamerica Mutual Fund, Inc., 41 S. E. C. 
328, 331 (1963) ; Adoption of Rule N22-D-t, supra. We do not 
think, however, that brokerage transactions inevitably would foster 
the kmd of investor discnminatlon sought to be remedied by this 
statute. All investors would be equally free to seek to engage in 
brokered transactions, and the possibility that the more sophisti-
cated or fortuitous investor would profit from this market do~ 
not, of itself, bring this c11tegory of transactions within the purview 
of ~ '22 (d). 
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mony of Chairman Cohen of the SEC before the House 
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance in 1967 sug-
gested that the price maintenance requirement of § 22 
(d) encompassed all broker-dealers, irrespective of how 
they obtained the traded shares,27 and on other occasions 
the Chairman referred to sales by brokers when discuss-
. ing mutual fund transactions.'28 Appellees also can point 
·to congressiona.I characterizations of § 22 (d) that suggest 
that some members of Congress understood the reach of 
that provision to be as broad as the District Court 
thought.29 
Appellees maintain that this history indicates that. 
Congn~ss always intended § 22 (d) to control broker as 
well as dealer transactions, and that it re-enacted the 
27 Responding to inquiries concerning the relationship of § 22 (d) 
and the operation of state law, Chairman Cohen stated: 
"The statute is unequivocal. No person, no matter where he gets 
it, from the issuer, from another dealer, or even from a private per~ 
son, no broker-dealer may sell a share of a particular fund at a 
price less than that fixed by the issuer:" 1967 House Hearings, pt. 
2, at 711. 
28 !d., at 53. 
·~Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Cur~ 
rency Committee which reported the 1970 amendments to the full 
Senate, stated on the floor of the Senate that § 22 (d) "now makes 
it a crime for anyone to sell mutual fund shares at a price lower 
than that fixed by the fund's distributor." 115 Cong. Rec. 838 
'(1969) (emphasis added) . Senator Magnuson reflected perhaps a 
similar view, stating that, as a result of§ 22 (d) "mutual fund shares 
are totally insulated from price competition." 113 Cong. Rec. 23057 
1(1968) (emphasis added). 
The testimony of some witnesses suggests that they shared this 
expansive view. See, e. g., Hearings on S. 1659 before the Senate 
'Committee on 'Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 
at 741 (1967) (hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings) (testimony of 
Mr. Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange); id., 
pt. 1, at 348, 356, 366 (testimony of Professor Samnelson); id., p. 2. 
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amended § 22 with that purpose in mind. The Dis-
trict Court accepted this position, and it is not without 
some support in this historical record.30 But impressive 
evidence to the contrary is found in the position consist-
ently maintained by t.he SEC. Responding to an inquiry 
in 1941, the SEC General Counsel stateq that § 22 (d) 
did not bar brokerage transactions in mutual fund shares: 
uin my opinion the term 'dealer,' as used in Sec-
tion 22 (d), refers to the capacity in which a broker-
dealer is acting in a particular transaction. It 
follows, therefore, that if a broker-dealer in a par-
ticular transaction is acting solely in the capacity 
of agent for a selling investor, or for both a selling 
investor and a purchasing investor, the sale may be 
made at a price other than the current offering price 
described in the prospectus, 
110n the other hand, if a broker-dealer is acting 
for his own account in a transaction and as principal 
sells a redeemable security to an investor, the public 
offering price must be maintained, even though the 
sale is made through another broker who acts as 
agent for the seller, the investor, or both, 
"As Section 22 (d) itself states, the offering price 
is not required to be maintained in the case of sales 
80 We conclude, however, that the context of the post-enactment 
history of § 22 (d) limits the force of the statements relied upon by 
appellees. A broker-dealer can serve in either a broker or a dealer's 
capacity, and the distinction bet.ween the two functions IS rather 
technical and precise. Thf' parties are in general agreement that 
no significant number of brokered transactions, as statutorily de-
fined, existed prior or subsequent to pas.<>age of the Act. In view of 
the care with which the o;tatute defines these functions and the 
absence of focus on these distinctions m the statements in the subse-
quent comnderation of § 22 (d), we think that the broader character-· 
izations of that section must be viewed with some skepticism. 
0 ., 
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in which both the buyer and the seller are dealers 
acting as principals in the transactions. Inv. Co. 
Aot Rel. No. 78, March 4, 1941, fed. Reg. 10992." 
This substantially contemporaneous interpretation of the 
Act has consistently been maintained in subseqUfmt SEC 
opinions, see Oxford, Co., Inc., 21 S. E. C. 681, 690 
(1946); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. ReL 
No. 69·32, at 3 (1972). The same position was asserted in a 
recent Staff Report, see 1974 Staff Report, at 105 n. 2, 107 
n. 2, and 109 (1974), was relied on by the SEC in its sub-
sequent decision to encourage limited price competition 
in brokered transactions,<~1 and is advanced by it as amicus 
curiae in this Court. This consistent and longstanding 
interpretation by the agency charged with administration 
of the Act, while not controlling, is entitled consider-
able weight. See, e. g., Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65 
(1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 
U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 
1, 16 (1965). 
81 Acting in accordance with the recommendations of the Staff 
Report, the SEC Chairman recently requested that the NASD 
amend its Rules of Fair Practice to prohibit agreements between 
underwriters and broker-dealers that preclude broker-dealers, act~ng 
as agents, "from matching orders to buy and sell fund shares in a 
secondary market at competitively determined prices and commis-
sion rates." Letter from Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the 
SEC to Mr. Gordon S. Macklin, President of the NASD, Novem-
ber 22, 1974, printed in addendum to brief of appellees Bache & 
Co., et al., at 17. The Chairman further revealed the SEC's inten-
tion to exercise its regulatory authonty under § 22 (f) to neu-
tralize any adverse effects this market. might have on the 
ft1nd's primary distribution systems. Id., at 18. As the Staff 
Report indicates, the Commission's exerch;e of regulatory authority 
is premised on its view that § 22 (d) does not require strict price 
maintenance in brokered transactions. See 1974 Staff Report, at 
104. If § 22 (d) did control these transactions as well as "dealer,. 
sales, the Commission's ability to encourage controlled competition 




UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL ASSN. SEC. DEALERS 23 
B 
The substance of appellees' position is that the dealer 
prohibition of § 22 (d) should be interpreted in generic 
rather than statutory terms. The price maintenance re-
quirement of that section accordingly would encompas~ 
all broker-dealer transactions with the investing public 
and would shelter them from antitrust sanction. But 
such an expansion of § 22 (d) beyond its terms would 
not only displace the antitrust laws py implication; it 
also would impinge seriously on the SEC's more flexible 
regulatory authority under§ 22 (f).82 
Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be 
justified only by a convincing showing of clear repug-
nancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory sys-
tem. See, e. g., United States v. Philadelphia National 
Bank, 371 U.S. 321,350-351 (1963); California v. Federral 
Power Comm'n, 369 U. S. 452, 456--457 (1945); United 
States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 197-206 (1939). 
We think no such showing has been made. Moreover, 
in addition to satisfymg our responsibility to reconcile 
the antitrust and regulatory statutes where feasible, Silver 
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 356-357 
(1963), we must interpret the Investment Company Act 
~2 The Department of Justice previously suggested a manner in 
which its interpretation of § 22 (d) could be reconciled with the 
Commission's exercise of regulatory authority over brokered trans-
actions. Addressing the question of possible repeal of § 22 (d), the 
Justice Department suggf'-sted that rather than continue to wait 
for congressional repeal, the Commission should eliminate the adverse 
effects of price maintenance by freeing all transactions from the 
§ 22 (d) mandate through the exercise of its § 6 (c) power of exemp-
tion, 15 U .. S, C. § 80a-6 (c) . !d., at '70. This presumably would 
leave the SEC free to regulate transactions through the exercise of 
the powers conferred to it by other provisions of the Act. We need 
not consider the validity of the Justice Department's broad inter•· 
pretation of the SEC's power of exemption, for even assuming it: 
ttl be co:rrect our analysis would not be affected. 
i' 
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in a manner most conductive to the effectuation of its 
goals. We conclude that appellee's interpretation of § 22 
(d) serves neither purpose. and cannot be justified by the 
language or history of that sectwn. 
We therefore hold that the price maintenance mandate 
of § 22 (d) cannot be stretched beyond its literal terms 
to encompass transactions by broker-dealers acting as 
statutory "brokers." Congress defined the limitations 
for the mandatory price maintenance requirement of the 
Investment Company Act. "We are not only bound by 
those limitations, but we are bound to construe them 
strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege re-
strictive of a free economy." United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956). Accordingly, we 
hold that the District Court erred in relying on § 22 (d) 
in determining that the activities here questioned are 
immune from antitrust liability. 
IV 
Our determination that the restrictions on the second-
ary market are not immunized by § 22 (d) does not end 
the inqmry, for the District Court also found them 
sheltered from antitrust liability by § 22 (f). Appellees, 
joined by the SEC, defend this ruling and urge that it 
requires dismissal of the challenge to the vertical restric-
tions sought to be enjomed in Counts II-VIII. 
Section 22 (f) au.thorm~s mutual funds to impose 
restrictions on the negotiability and transferability of their· 
shares, provided they conform with the fund's regis-
tration statement and do not contravene any rules and 
regulations that the CommissiOn may prescribe in the 
interests of the holders of all of the outstanding securi-· 
ties.8" Appellant does not contend that the vertical 
38 Section 22 (f) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (f), provides· 
"No registered open-end company ;;hall restrict th£> transferability 
Q! negotiability of any serurit.y of which i.t JS the 1s.~uer except in1 
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restrictions are not disclosed in the registration state-
ments of the funds in question. Nor does it assert that 
the agreements imposing such restrictions violate Com-
mission rules and regulations. Indeed, it could not do so 
because to date the SEC has prescribed no such stand-
ards. Instead appellant maintains that the contractual 
restrictions do not comfl within the meaning of the Act, 
asserting that § 22 (f) does not authorize the imposition 
of restraints on the distribution system rather than on 
the shares themselves. Appellant apparently urges that 
the only limitations contemplated by this section are 
those that appear on the face of the certificate itself. 
Appellant also urges th11t the SEC's unexercised power 
to prescribe rules and regulations is insufficient to create 
repugnancy between its regulabry authority and the 
anti trust laws. 
Our examination of the language and history of§ 22 (f) 
persuades us, however, that the agreements challenged 
in Counts II-VIII are among the kind8 of restrictions 
Congress contemplated when it enacted that section. And 
this conclusion necessarily leads to a determination that 
they are immune from liability under the Sherman Act, 
for we see no way to reconcile the Commission's power 
to authorize these restrictions with the competing man-
date of the antitrust laws. 
A 
Unlike§ 22 (d),§ 22 (f) originated in the Commission-
sponsored bill considered in the Senate subcommittee 
hearings that preceded introduction of the compromise 
proposal that was enacted into law. The Comrnis-
conformity with the statements with respect thereto contained in 
its registration etatement nor in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe in the interests of 
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sian-sponsored provision authorized the SEC to promul-
gate rules, regulations or orders prohibiting restrictions 
on the transferability or negotiability of mutual fund 
shares, S. 3580, § 2~ (dJ(2), 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)!1i 
Commission testimony indicates that it considflred this 
authority necessary to allow regulatory control of indus-
try measures designed to deal with the disruptive effects 
of 11bootleg market" trading and with other detrimental 
trading practices identified in the Investment Trust 
Study.35 
84 Section 22 (d) of the original bill, S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 
(·1940), provided, in pertinent part; 
"The Commission is authonzed, by rules and regulations or order 
il:J. the public interest or for the protection of investors, to prohibit---
" (2) restrictions upon the transferability of negotiability of any 
redeemable security of which any registered investment company ir1 
t~e issuer " 
30 Teshfying before the Senate Subcommittee, an SEC spokesman 
tated: 
"Now coming to subparagraph (2) of (d), it just says that the 
Commission shall have the right to make rules and regulations with 
respect to any restrictions upon the transferability or negotiability 
of any redeemable security of which any registered investment 
cpmpany is the issuer. 
"There are some companies that have a provision in their certifi~ 
Cll.tes to the effect that you cannot sell that certificate to anybody 
else, and the only way you can salt it is to sell it back to the com .. 
pany. That is a technical problem. It presents a whole problem 
which they call the bootleg market. What happens is that dealers 
keep switching people from one company to another. In order to 
prevent these switches, some provisions require that you cannot 
make these !!witches but must sell t.he certificate back to the 
cpmpany. 
"If the committee wants the provision, we shall recommend what, 
on the basis of our experience up to the present time, it ought to be; 
but we thmk subjects like that ought to be a matter of rules ancl 
regulations." 1940 SenAte Hearings, pt. 1, at 292-293. 
. '· 
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The Study indicates, moreover, that a number of funds 
had begun to deal with phese problems prior to passage 
of the Act. And while their methods may h~ve included 
the imposition of restrictive legends on the face of the 
certificate, see n. 3~supra, they were by no mean.s con-
fined to such narrow limits. A number of funds imposed 
controls on the activities of their principal underwriters, 
see Investment Trust Study, at 867-869; and in some 
instances the funds required the underwriters to impose 
similar restrictions on the dealers, see id., at 869, or entered 
into these restrictive agreements with the dealers them-
selves, id., at 870-871. 
In view of the history of the Investment Company 
Act, we find no justification for limiting the range of 
possible transfer restrictions to those that appear on the 
face of the certificate. The bootleg market was pri-: 
marily a problem of the distribution system, and bootleg 
dealers found a source of supply in the contract-dealers 
as well as in retiring shareholders. See id., at 865. 
Moreover, the Study indicates that part of the bootleg 
distribution system consisted of "trading firms" that 
served as wholesalers of mutual-fund securities in much 
the same fashion as the principal underwriters. These 
trading firms primarily purchased and sold shares to and 
from other dealers, id., 11t 327, frequently offering them 
at a price slightly lower than the discounted rate charged 
to dealers in the primary distribution system. Invest-
ment Trust Study, pt.. II, at 327-328. Thus trading 
firms not only helped supply the bootleg dealers whose 
sales undercut those of the contract-qealers, they com-
peted with the principal underwriters by offering a source 
for lower cost shares that. inevitably discouraged partici~ 
pation in the primary distribution system. . See id., at 
328 n. 85. 
The bootleg n1arket was a complex phenomenon whose 
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principal origins lay in the distribution system itself. In 
view of this history, limitation of the industry's ability, 
subject of course to SEC regulation, to reach these prob-
lems at their source would constitute an inappropriate 
contraction of the remedial function of the statute.80 In-
deed, in view of the role of trading firms and interdealer 
transactions in the maintemmce of the bootleg market, 
the narrow interpretati6n of § 22 (f) urged by appellant 
would seem to afford inadequate authority to deal with 
the problem. 
Together, §§ 22 (d) and 22 (f) protect the primary 
distribution system for mutual-fund securities. Section 
22 (d), by eliminating price competition in dealer sales, 
inhibits the most disruptive factor in the pre-1940's 
mutual market and thus assures the maintenance of a 
viable sales system. Section 22 (f) compliments this 
protection by authorizing the funds and the SEC to deal 
more flexibly with other dttrimental trading practices by 
imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability 
and negotiability. Appellant's limiting interpretation of 
§ 22 (f) compromises this flexible mandate, and cannot 
be accepted. 
We find support for our interpretation of § 22 (f) 
in the views expressed by the SEC shortly after the 
passage of the Act. Rule 26 (j)(2), proposed by NASD 
to curb abuses identified in the Study and the con-
gressional hearings, provided limitations on underwriter 
3(l Neither are we convinced of the neceS<>ity to limit negotiability 
or transferability restrictions to those appearing on the face of the 
certificate in order to assure their adequate disclosure to investors. 
Section 24 of the Act requires that mutual funds submit for SEC 
inspection copies of all sales literature that they send to prospective 
investor&. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-24 (b) . The Commission is therefore 
fully apprised as to the nature and sufficiency of the disclosure of 
these restrictions and can, if necessary, require supplementation 
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sales and redemptions to or from dealers who are not 
parties to sales agreements. In commentip.g on this pro-
posed rule, the SEC characterized it as a "restriction 
on the transferability of securities," and specifically 
averted to its po•ver to regulate such restrictions under 
22 (f). National Association of Securities Dealers, 
9 S. E. C. 38, 44-45 and n. 10 (1941). As indicated 
above, see p. 2~upra, and sources there cited, this con-
temporaneous interpretation by the responsible agency 
is entitled to considerable weight. We therefore con-
clude that the restrictions on transferability and negoti-
ability contemplated by § 22 (f) include restrictions on 
the distribution system for mutual-fund shares as well 
as limitations on the face of the shares themselves. The 
narrower interpretation of thic provision advanced by 
appellant would disserve the broad remedial function of 
this provision.31 
37 Neither do we agree with appellant's suggestion that § 22 (f) 
does not authorize restrictions in contracts between underwriters 
and dealers in which the fund is not a party. We note, prelim-
inarily, that this position would not save Counts III, V, and VII 
from dismissal, since they relate to restrictions on underwriter con-
duct that are imposed by the fund. Even under the most technical 
reading of the statute these restrictions are "fund-imposed." 
Moreover, it further appears from the complaint that the agree-
ment challenged in Count II is required by the fund-underwriter 
agreement challenged in Count III and thus also is "fund-imposed" 
in any but the most literal sense. More importantly, however, we 
think that appellant's position fails to recognize the relationship be-
tween the various participants in the distribution chain. As the 
history of the Investment Company Act recognizE's, the relation-
ship between the fund and its principal underwriter traditionally ha.~ 
been a close one. Sections 15 (b) and (c) reflect this fact, requiring, 
in effect, that the funds establish a written contract with the under-
writer that must be approved by a majority of the fund's disin-
terested directors and cannot remain in force for more than two 
years. 15 U. S. C.§§ SOa-15 (b) and (c) . And NASD Rule 26 (c), 
in effect since 1941, requires that principal underwriters enter into 
t 
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Appellant1s additional contention that the SEC's exer-
cise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give 
rise to an implied immunity for agreements conforming 
with § 22 (f) misconceives the intended operation of the 
statute. By its terms, § 22 (f) authorizes properly 
disclosed restrictions unless they are inconsistent with 
SEC rules or regulations. The provision thus authorizes 
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restric-
tions subject to Commission disapproval. In view of the 
evolution of this provision, there can be no doubt that 
this is precisely what Congress intended. 
Section 22 (f) as originally introduced would have 
authorized the SEC to promulgate rules, regulations 
or orders prohibiting restrietions on the redeemability 
or transferability of mumal-fund shares. Congressional 
consideration of that provision raised some question 
whether existing restrictions on transferability and nego-
tiability would remain valid unless specifically disap-
proved by the SEC.38 The compromise provision, which 
subsequently was enacted into law, eliminated this uncer-
tainty, however, and manifests a more positive attitude 
toward self-regulation. 
Thus § 22 (f) specifically recognizes that mutual 
funds can impose such restrictions on the distribution 
system provided they are disclosed in the registration 
statement and conform to any rules and regulations that 
the SEC might adopt. In addition, § 22 (f) alters the· 
focus of Commission scrutiny. Whereas the original 
provision allowed the SEC to make rules that serve "the 
public interest and . , , the protection of investors,'t 
agreements with the dealers who distribute the fund's securities .. 
See National Association of Securities Dealers, 9 S. E. C. 38, 44, 48 
(1941) . In view of these requirements, and the broad remedial 
purpose of § 22 (f), we thmk that the underwriter-dealer agree-
ments challenged in this complaint also must be regarded as fund-
imposed within the contemplation of the statute. 
as See 1940 Senate Ht>arings, pt. 1 ~ at 293. 
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S. 3580, § 22 (d) (2) , supra, § 22 (f) as enacted, limited 
the Commission's rulemaking authority to the protection 
of the "interests of the holders of all of the outstanding 
securities of such investment company." 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80a-22 (f) . Viewed in this historical context, the 
statute reflects a clear congressional determination that, 
subject to Commission ovetsight, mutual funds should 
be allowed to retain the initiative in dealing with the 
potentially adverse effects of disruptive trading practices. 
The Commission repeatedly has recognized the role 
of private agreements in the control of trading practices 
in the mutual fund industry. For example, in First 
Multifund of Amer-ica, Inc., Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 6700 
(1971), F. Sec. L. Rep. 1T 78,209, at 80,602, it looked to 
restrictive agreements similar to those challenged in 
this litigation to ascertain the capacity in which an 
investment advisor acted in a particular transaction. 
At no point did it intimate that those agreements ~ere 
not legitimate.39 Likewise, Commission reports repeat-
edly have acknowledged the significant role that private 
agreements have played in restricting the growth of a 
secondary market in mutual-fund shares.40 I 1 \ 
39 Commissioner Loomis, dissenting from an SEC determination 
that an applicant lacked standing to seek an exemption from §§ 17 
{a) (1) and 22 (d) of the Act, stated, 
"I would conclude that applicant IS a dealer in its relationship with 
the fund underwriter because to do otherwise would require us to 
ignore or nullify the perfectly lawful requirement in the dealer 
agreements that applicant act as a dealer. . . . [I] do not know 
of anything unlawful about the generally accepted form of dealer 
(tgreement used in the investment company industry." Mutual 
Funds Advisory, Inc ., Inv. Co. Act. ReL No. 6932, at 7 (1972) 
(dissenting opinion) . 
While the majority disagreed with Commissioner Loomis' assessment 
of the facts of the case, it did · not question his approval of the 
mentioned dealer agreement. 
4{) See 1963 Special Study, at 98 ; 197 4 Staff Report, at 104, 105. 
llll. 1, 106l 109, 
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1lntil recently the Commission has allowed the indus-
try to control the secondary market through contractual 
restrictions duly filed and publicly disclosed. Even the 
SEC's recently e:r.pressed intention to introduce an ele-
ment of competition in brokered transactions reflects 
measured cautiOn as to the possibly adv6rse impact of 
a totally unregulated and restrained brokerage market 
on the primary distribution system. See n. 31, supra. 
The Commission's acceptance of fund-initiated restric-
tions for more than three decades hardly represents abdi-
cation of its regulatory responsibilities. Rather, we 
think it manifests an informed administrative judgment 
that the contractual restrictions employed by the funds 
to protect their sharelwlders were appropriate means for 
combatting the problem. The SEC's election not to ini-
tiate restrictive rules or regulations is precisely the kind 
of administrative oversight of private practices that Con-
gress contemplated when it enacted § 22 (f). 
We conclude, therefore, that the vertical restrictions 
sought to be enjoined in Counts II-VIII are among the 
kinds of agreements authorized § 22 (f) of the Invest-
ment Company Act. 
B 
The agreements questwned by the United States re-
strict the terms under whiCh the appellee underwriters 
and broker-dealers may trade in shares of mutual funds. 
Such restrictions, a.ffecting resale price maintenance and 
concerted refusals to deal, normally would constitute per 
se violations of ~ 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., KlM, 
Inc. v. Broadt~~ay-Hale StMes, Inc. , 359 U. S. 207, 211-213 
(1959); Fashion Onginatcrs' Guild of America, Inc. v. 
Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 465-468 
(1941). Here, however, Congress has made a judgment 
that these restrictions on competition might be necessi-
tated by the unique problems of the mutual fund in~ 
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dustry, and it has vested in the SEC final authority to 
determine whether and to what extent they should be 
tolerated "in the interests of the holders of all the out-
standing securities" of mutual funds. 15 U. S. C. § SOa-
22 (f). 
The SEC, the federal agency responsible for regulating 
the conduct of the mutual-iund industry, urges that its 
authority will be compromised seriously if these agree-
ments are deemed actionable under the Sherman 4ct.41 
We agree. There can be no reconciliatiop of its author-
ity under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restric-· 
tive agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that 
they are illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust 
laws must give way if the regulatory scheme established 
by the Investment Company Act is to work. Silver v. 
New York Stock Exchange, supra. We conclude, there-
fore, that such agreements are not actionaQle under the 
Sherman Act, and that the District Court properly dis-
missed Counts II-VIII of the complaint. 
v 
It remains to be determined whether the District 
Court properly dismissed Count I of appellant's com-
plaint, which charged activities allegedly constituting a 
hcrizontal conspiracy between the NASD and its mem-
bers to "prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market 
and a orokerage market in the purchase and sale of 
mutual fund shares." App., at 9. 
41 In its brief to this Court, the SEC maintains: 
"It would nullify the effect of this grant of regulatory au-
thority to the Commisston [under § 22 (f)] for this Court to 
hold that a District Court may apply antitrust principles to con-
duct like that alleged in Counts II through VIII, when the expert 
body designated and empowered by Congress to regulate ancl 
supervise that r.onduct has not deemed it appropriate to prohibit 
the conduct." Brief of the Seeunties and Exchange Commission as; 
Amic«s Curiae, at 54. 
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The precise nature of the allegations of the complaint 
are obscured by subsequent concessions made by appel-
lant to the District Court and reiterated here. It is 
clear, however, that Count I alleges activities that are 
neither required by § 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22 
(f) . And since they cannot find antitrust shelter in 
these provisions of the Investment Company Act, the 
question presented is whether the SEC's exercise of 
regulatory authority under this statute and the Ma-
loney Act is sufficiently pervasive to confer implied im-
munity. We hold that it is, and accordingly affirm the 
District Court's dismissal of this portion of the complaint. 
Count I originally appeared to be a general attack on 
the NASD's role in encouraging the restrictions on sec-
ondary market activities challenged in the remainder of 
appellant's complaint. The acts charged in Count I 
focused in large part on N ASD rules and on information 
distributed by that association to its members.42 Subse-
42 The complaint averred that, in effectuating the conspiracy to 
restrain the growth of a serondary market in mutual-fund shares, 
the NASD, its members, and more particularly the other named 
defendants, 
" (a) established and maintained rules which inhibited the develop-
ment of a secondary dealer market and a brokerage market in 
mutual fund shares; 
"(b) established and mAmtained rules which induced broker j 
dealers to enter into sales agreements with principal underwriters, 
with knowledge that sales agreements contained restrictive provisions 
which inhibited the development of a secondary dealer market and 
brokerage market in mutual fund shares, 
"(c) mduced member prmCJpal underwriters to inrlude restrictive 
rrovisions in their sales agreements' 
" (d) discouraged persons who made inquiry about the legality of 
a brokerage market from participating in a brokerage market and 
distributed misleading mformat10n to its members concermng the 
legality of a brokerage market in mutual fund shares; and 
" (e) suppressed market quotations for the secondary dealer 
market." App., at 9. 
,. 
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quently appellant advised the District Court that its 
complaint was not to be read as a direct attack on NASD 
rules, and it repeated that position before this Court.43 
Appellant now contends that its complaint should be 
interpreted as a challenge to various unofficial NASD 
interpretations and to appellees' extension of the rules in 
a manner that inhibit a secondary market. 
In view of the scope of the SEC's regulatory authority 
over the activities of the NASD, appellant's decision to 
withdraw from direct att~tck on the association's rules 
was prudent. The SEC's supervisory authority over the 
N ASD is extensive. Not only does the Maloney Act 
require the SEC to determine whether an 9.ssociation 
43 Appellant first indicated abandonment of its attack on the 
NASD rules during oral argument of appellees' motion to dismiss. 
See App., at 328-332. Notwithstanding clauses (a) and (b) of 
paragraph 17 of the complaint, see n. 42, supra, appellant's counsel 
stated that it did not intend to challenge any NASD rule, id., at 330. 
Counsel ambiguously suggested, however, that the members' com-
pliance with those rules had aided and abetted alleged the conspiracy, 
id., at 332, and stated that informal and secret activities of the 
association likewise had tended to inhibit growth of the secondary 
market, id., at 330. Thereafter, in response to the District Court's 
invitation to join in the litigation as amicus curiae, the SEC indi-
cated its concern that the action might involve an attack on NASD 
rules, a matter "over which the Commission is granted exclusive 
jurisdiction by Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 et seq. (the Maloney Act)." Letter from Mr. 
Lawrence E. Nerheim, General Counsel of the SEC to the District 
Court. App. , at 327. Appellant thereafter infonned the court 
that the issues it sought to raise did not represent "an attack upon 
NASD Rules as such" but rather "aimed at an over-all course of 
conduct engaged in by the NASD and its members going beyond the 
NASD's rule-making authority.'' Letter from Mr. Bruce B. Wilson, 
Acting Asst . Attorney General for the Antitrust Division to the 
District Court. App. , at 327 . It maintains the samt> position in 
this Court. See Brief for the United States, at 51 n . 47. 
' t ' 
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satisfies the strict statutory requirements of that Act 
and thus qualifies to engage in supervised regulation of 
the trading activities of its membership, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78o-3 (b), it requires registered associations thereafter 
to submit for Commission approval any proposed rule 
changes, id., § 78o-3 ( J). The Maloney Act additionally 
authorizes the SEC to request changes in or supplemen-
tation of association rules, a power that recently has been 
exercised with respect to some of the precise conduct 
questioned in this litigation, see n. 31, supra. If such a 
request is not c0mplied with, the SEC may order such 
changes itself if necessary. !d., § 78o-3 (k) (2) . 
The SEC, in its exercise of authority over association 
rules and practices, is charged with protection of the 
public interest as well as the interests of shareholders, 
see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 78o-3 (a)(1), (b)(3), (c),. 
and it repeatedly has indicated that it weighs competi-
tive concerns in the exerci~:.e of its continued supervisory 
responsibility. See, e. g., In re Nat. Assn. of Securities 
Dealers, Inc., 18 S. E. C. 424, 236, 486-486-487 (1945); 
Proposed Amendment to The Rules of Fair Practice of 
Nat. Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38, 43-46 
(1941); see also 1974 Staff Report, at 105, 109. As the· 
Court previously has recognized, United State{) v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 227 n. 60 (1940), the 
investiture of such pervasive supervisory authority in 
the SEC suggests that Congress intended to lift the ban 
of the Sherman Act from association activities approved' 
by the SEC. 
We further conclude that appellant's attack on NASD' 
interpretations of those rules cannot be maintained under 
the Sherman Act, for w~ see no meaningful distinction 
between the association's rules and the manner in which 
it construes and implements them Each is equally a 
subject of SEC oversight. 
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Finally, we hold that appellant's additional challenges 
to the alleged activities of the membership of the NASD 
designed to encourage the kinds of restraints averred in 
Counts II-VIII likewise are · ;'4 lOW'~~ 
sr '· t by the regulatory authority vested in the SEC 
by the Maloney and Inv6stment Company Acts. It 
should be noted that appellant does not contend that 
appellees' activities have had the purpose or effect of 
restraining competition among the various funds, 44 In-
stead, appellant urges in Count I that appellees' alleged 
conspiracy was designed to encourage the suppression of 
intrafund secondary market activities, precisely the re-
striction that the SEC consistently has approved pursu-
ant to § 22 (f) for nearly 35 years. This close rela-
tionship is fatal to appellant's complaint, as the Commis-
sion's regulatory approval of the restrictive agreements 
challenged in Counts II-VIII cannot be reconciled with 
appellant's attack on the ancillary activities averred in 
Count I. This conclusion applieR with equal force 
now that the SEC has determined to introduce a con-
trolled measure of competition into the secondary market. 
There can be little question that the broad regulatory 
authority conferred upon the SEC by the Maloney and 
Investment Company Acts enables it to monitor the 
act:vities questioned in Count I, and the history of Com-
mission regulations suggests no laxness in the exercise 
of this authority. 45 To the extent that any of appellees' 
44 Indeed, it appears that vigorous inter--brand competition exists 
in the mutual-fund industry-between the load fuuds themselves, 
between load and no-load funds, between open and closed-end com-
pamet:, and between all of these mvestment form8 and other mvest-
ments. See 1974 Staff Report, at 20 et seq. 
45 As SEC Chairman Garrett observed in his letter submitting the-
1974 Staff Report for congressional consideration, "No issuer of 
securities is subject to more detailed regulation than a mutual 
fund." Letter .from Ray Garret,t, Jr., Chairman, Securities and 
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ancillary activities frustrate the SEC's regulatory objec-
tives it has ample authority to eliminate them.46 
Here implied repeal of the antitrust laws is "necessary 
to make the [regulatory scheme] work." Silver v. New 
York Stock Exchange, supra. 1$ ul mcszsits · 1 t at 
w *1 iM u~ne. In generally similar situations, we have im-
plied immunity in particular and discrete instances to 
assure that the federal agency entrusted with regulation 
in the public interest could carry out that responsibility 
free from the disruption of conflicting judgments that 
might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under 
the antitrust laws. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World 
Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 296 (1963). In 
this instance, maintenance of :tn antitrust action for ac-
tivities so directly related to the SEC's responsibilities 
poses a substantial danger that appellees would be sub-
jected to duplicative and inconsistent standards. This is 
hardly a result that Congress would have mandated. We 
therefore hold that with respect to the activities chal-
lenged in Count I of the complaint, the Sherman Act 
has been displaced by the pervasive regulatory scheme 
established by the Maloney and Investment Company 
Acts. 
Affirmed. 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS took no ·part in the considera-
tion or decision of this case. 
Exchange Commission to the Honorable John Sparkman, Chairman 
of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United 
States Senate (Nov. 4, 1974), ~ontained in 1974 Staff Report, at v. 
46 The Commission can, for example, require amendment of the· 
NASD rules regulating the conduct of its membership, see 15 
U. S. C. § 78o-3 (k) (2), or exercise the more general rulemaking· 
power conferred by § 38 (a) of the Investment Company Act, 15· 
U. S. C. § 80a-38 (a), to contain any of the challenged activities 
that might in any way frustrat~ its regulation of the restrictions it 
authorizes under§ 22 (f). 
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UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., ET AL. 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
No. 73-1701. Argued March 17, 1975-Decided June 23, 1975 
Section 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides 
that "no dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any person 
except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, except at 
a current public offering price described in the prospectus." Sec-
tion 22 (f) authorizes mutual funds to impose restrictions on 
the negotiability and transferability of shares, provided they 
conform with the fund's registration statement and do not con-
travene any rules and regulations that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) may prescribe in the interests of the holders 
of all of the outstanding securities. Section 2 (6) of that Act 
defines a "broker" as a person engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities for the account of others, and § 2 (11) 
defines a "dealer" as a person regularly engaged in the business· 
of buying and selling securities for his own account. The Maloney 
Act of 1938 (§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) sup-. 
plements the SEC's regulation of over-the-counter markets by 
providing a system of cooperative self-regulation through volun-
tary associations of brokers and dealers. The Government 
brought this action against appellee National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD), certain mutual funds, mutual-fund 
underwriters, and broker-dealers, alleging that appellees, in viola-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act, combined and agreed to restrict 
the sale and fix the resale prices of mutual-fund shares in second-
ary market transactions between dealers, from an investor to a 
dealer, and between investors through brokered transactions, and 
sought to enjoin such agreements. Count I of the complaint 
charged a horizontal combination and conspiracy among NASD's 
members to prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market in 
I 
-
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Syllabus 
the purchase and sale of mutual-fund shares, the Government 
contending that such count was not to be read as direct attack 
on NASD rules, but on NASD's interpretations and appellees' 
extension of the rules so as to include a secondary market. 
Counts II-VIII alleged various vertical restrictions on secondary 
market activities. The District Court dismissed the complaint 
on the grounds that §§ 22 (d) and (f), when read in conjunction 
with the Maloney Act, afforded antitrust immunity from all of 
the challenged practices. It further determined that, apart from 
this statutory immunity, the pervasive regulatory scheme estab-
lished by these statutes conferred an implied immunity from anti-
trust sanction. The court concluded that the § 22 (d) price 
maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" applied to transactions 
in which a broker-dealer acts as statutory "broker" rather than 
a statutory "dealer," and thus that § 22 (d) governs transactions 
in which the broker-dealer acts as an agent for an investor as 
well as those in which he acts as a principal selling shares for 
his own account. Held: 
1. Neither the language nor legislative history of § 22 (d) 
justifies extending the section's price maintenance mandate beyond 
its literal terms to encompass transactions by broker-dealers act-
ing as statutory "brokers." Pp. 15-24. 
(a) To construe § 22 (d) to cover all broker-dealer trans-
actions would displace the antitrust laws by implication and also 
would impingt' on the SEC's more flexible authority under § 22 (f). 
Implied antitrust immunity can be justified only by a convincing 
showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the 
regulatory sy~ .)m, and here no such showing has been made. 
P. 23. 
(b) Such an expansion of § 22 (d)'s coverage would serve 
neither this Court's responsibility to reconcile the antitrust and 
regulatory statutes where feasible nor the Court's obligation to 
interpret the Investment Company Act in a manner most con-
ducive to the effectuation of its goals. Pp. 23-24. 
2. The vertical restrictions sought to be enjoined in Counts 
II-VIII are among the kinds of agreements authorized by§ 22 (f), 
and hence such restrictions are immune from liability under the 
Sherman Act. Pp. 24-33. 
(a) The restrictions on transferability and negotiability con· 
templated by § 22 (f) include restrictions on the distribution 
system for mutual-fund shares as well as limitations on the face 
of the shares themselves. To interpret the section as covering 
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only the latter would disserve the broad remedial function of 
the section, which, as a complement to § 22 (d)'s protection against 
disruptive price competition caused by dealers' "bootleg market" 
trading of mutual-fund shares, authorizes the funds and the 
SEC to deal more flexibly with other detrimental trading practices 
by imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability and 
negotiability. .Pp. 25-29. 
(b) To contend, as the Government does, that the SEC's 
exercise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give rise 
to an implied immunity for agreements conforming with § 22 (f) 
misconceives the statute's intended operation. By its terms 
§ 22 (f) authorizes properly disclosed restrictions unless they are 
inconsistent with SEC rules or regulations and thus authorizes 
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restrictions subject 
to SEC disapproval. Pp. 30-32 
(c) The SEC's authority would be compromised if the agree-
ments challenged in Counts II-VIII were deemed actionable under 
the Sherman Act. There can be no reconciliation of the SEC's 
authority under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restrictive 
agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that they are 
illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust laws must give way 
if the regulatory scheme established by the Investment Company 
Act is to work. Pp. 32-33. 
3. The activities charged in Count I are neither required by 
§ 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22 (f), and therefore cannot find 
antitrust shelter therein. The SEC's exercise of regulatory 
authority under the Maloney and Investment Company Acts is 
sufficiently pervasive, however, to confer implied immunity from 
antitrust liability for such activities. Pp. 33-38. 
374 F. Supp. 95, affirmed. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No, 73-1701 
United States, Appellant, 
v, 
National Association of 
Securities Dealers, 
Inc,, et aL 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, 
[May -~ 1975] 
MR, JusTICE P oWELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court, 
This appeal requires the Court to determine the extent 
to which the regulatory authority conferred upon the 
Securities and Exchange Commission by the Maloney Act 
and the Investment Company Act of 1940 displaces the 
strong antitrust policy embodied in § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. At issue is whether certain sales and distribution 
practices employed in marketing securities of open-end 
management companies, popularly referred to as "mutual 
funds," are immune from antitrust liability. We con~ 
elude that they are, ar.d accordingly affirm the judgment 
of the District Court, 
I 
An "investment company11 invests in the securities of 
other corporations and issues securities of its own} 
1 The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines "investmeni; com-
pany" to include any issuer of secunt1es WhlCh 
"(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or pro~ 
poses to engage primarily , in the businPsf\ of mvt·stmg, reinvet-tmr,. 
or trading in securities ; 
"(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing 
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Shares in an investment company thus represent propor .. 
tionate interests in its investment portfolio, and their 
value fluctuates in relation to the changes in the value 
of the securities it owns. The most common form of 
investment company, the "open end" company or mutual 
fund, is required by law to redeem its securities on demand 
at a price approximating their proportionate share of the 
fund's net asset value at the time of redemption.ll In 
order to avoid liquidation through redemption, mutual 
funds continuously issue and sell new shares. These 
features-continuous and unlimited distribution and com., 
pulsory redemption-are, as the Court recently recog~ 
nized, 61unique characteristic [s]" of this form of invest· 
ment. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U. S. 546, 547 
(1973). 
The initial distribution of mutual-fund shares is con~ 
ducted by a principal underwriter, often an affiliate of 
the fund, and by broker-dealers 8 who contract with that 
face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been 
engaged in such busmess and has any such certificate outstandmg; or· 
"(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or 
propos<Js to acquire investment securities having a value exceed!ng 
40 pel' centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of 
GovP.rnment securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis."' 
15 U.S. C.§ 80a-3 (a). 
This broad definition is qualified, however, by a series of specific· 
exemptions. See id., §§ 80a-3 (b) and (c). 
2 See 15 U.S. G § 80a-2 (a) (32); td., § SOa-22 (e). 
Management investment companies whose securities lack this' 
redeemability feature are defined as "closed-end" companies, i,d., 
§ 80a-5, and their sales and distribution pra.ctices are regulated 
under § 23 of the Act. !d., § SOa-23. Section 22, the provision 
under conaiderat.ion in this appeal, governs the sales and distribu., 
tion practices of "open-end" companies only. 
8 In this opinion we will use the term "broker-dealer" to refer· 
generally to persons ·registered under the Securities Exchange Act 
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underwriter to sell the securities to the public. The 
sales price commonly consists of two components, a suru 
calculated from the net asset value of the fund at the 
time of purchase, and a "load," a sales charge represent~ 
ing a fixed percentage of the net asset value. The load 
is divided between the principal underwriter and the 
broker-dealers, compensating them for their sales efforts.4 
The distribution-redemption system constitutes the 
pdmary market in mutual-fund shares, the operation of 
which is not questioned in this litigation. The parties 
agree that § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act 
requires broker-dealers to maintain a uniform price in 
sales in this primary market to all purchasers except the 
fund, its underwriterR, and other dealers. And in view 
of this express requirement no question exists that anti~ 
trust immunity must be afforded these sales. This case 
focuses, rather, tm the potential secondary market in 
mutual-fund shares. 
Although a significant secondary market existed prior' 
to enactment of the Investment Company Act, little 
presently remains. The United States agrees that the 
actions or induce the purchase or sale of securities pursuant to the 
aut.horization of that Act. We also ~ill refer separately to "brokers" 
and "dealers" as defined by the Investment Company Act, see 15 
U. S. C. §§ 80a-2 ( >') ( 6) and ( 11), to describe the capaCity in which 
a broker-dealer acts in a particular transaction. 
4 The Act defines "sales load" to be the difference between the· 
public offering price and the portion of the sales proceeds that is 
invested or held for investment purpose3 by the issuer. !d., § 80a-
2 (a) (35). Most mutual funds charge thts sales load in order to 
encourage vigorous sales efforts on the part of underwriters and 
broker-dealers. There are some funds that do not charge this addi-
tional sales fee. These "no load" fwtds generally sell directly to the 
investor without relying on the promotional and sales efforts of 
underwriters and broker-dealers. See SEC Report of the Division 
of Investment Management Regulation, Mutual Fund Distribution 
and § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 112 (AuglliJ~ 
t974) (hereinafter 1974 Staff Report). 
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Act was designed to restrict most of secondary market 
trading, but nonetheless contenns that certain industry 
practices have extended the statutory limitation beyond 
its proper boundaries. The complaint in this action 
alleges that the defendants, appellees herein, combined 
and agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices 
of mutual-fund shares in seiJondary market transactions 
between dealers, from an investor to a dealer, and be~ 
tween investors through brokered transactions.5 Named 
as defendants are the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD),6 and certain mutual funds, 7 mutual-
fund underwriters,8 and securities broker-dealers.9 
6 Two additional private antitrust actions premised on similar 
theories were filed in the District Court and subsequently dismissed, 
Haddad v. Crosby Corp. and Gross v. National Assn. of Securities 
Dealers, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 95. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia stayed those appeals to await the resolution of 
this case, and the petition of or..e of the parties for certioran before 
judgment was denied, Gross v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 
Inc., 419 U.S. 843 (1974) . 
Subsequent to the tiling of the United States' complaint some 50 
private suits purporting to be class actions under Fed. RuJe Civ. 
Proc. 23 were filed in various district courts around the country. 
These cases were transferred to the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia by the Judicial Panel on MuJtidistrict 
Litigation, In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, Civil Ac-
tion No. Misc. 103-73. See 374 F. Supp., at 97 n. 4. The District 
Court deferred determination whether the actions could be main-
tained as class actions under Rule 23 and additionally postponed 
discovery and other activity pending disposition of the motion to 
dismiss m this cUBe. !d., at 114. 
6 The National Association of Securities Dealers is registered under 
§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C § 78o-3, 
the so-called Mt<loney Act of 1938. The Maloney Act supple-
ments the Securities and Exchange Commission's reguJation of the 
over-the-counter markets by providing a oystem of cooperative Helf-
reguJation throngh voluntary associations of brokers and dealers. 
The Act provides that associations may register with the CommiRsion 
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The United States charges that these agreements vio"' 
late § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1,10 and prays 
that they be enjoined under § 4 of that Act. ld., § 4, 
Count I charges a horizontal combination and con"' 
spiracy among the members of appellee N ASD to pre"' 
vent the growth of a secondary dealer market in the 
purchase and sale of mutual-fund shares, See n, 421 
pursuant to specified terms and conditions, and authorizes them to 
promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative 
practices; to promote equitable principles of trade; to safeguard 
against unreasonable profits and charges; and generally to protect 
invest,ors and the public interest I d., § 78o-3 (b) (8). The Act 
also authorizes the SEC to exercise a significant oversight function: 
over the rules and activities of the reg:isten>d associations. See, e g ., 
id., §§ 78o-3 (b), (e), (h), (j), and (k) The NASD is presently 
the only association registered under this Act . 
7 The mutual funds named as defendants in this action are 
Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, Inc., Fidelity Fund, 
Inc., and Wellington Fund, Inc. 
8 The defendant underwriters include the Crosby Corporation, 
Vance Sanders & Co., and the Wellington Management Company .. 
9 Named as defendant broker-deruers are the following: Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Bache & Company, Inc., 
Reynolds Securities Corp., F. L duPont, Glore Forgan, Inc., E. F. 
Hutton, Inc., Walston & Company, Inc., Dean Witter & Company, 
In~., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., and Hornblower & 
Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc. 
10 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: 
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev"" 
eral States, or with foreign nations, is decla.red to be illegal. .. , 
"Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any comb!~ 
nation or conspiracy declart>d by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be· 
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand' 
dollars, or by imprisonment,not exceeding one year, or by both saidi. 
;punishments,, in the discretion of the. cow:t/ ' 
•'., 
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infra. Counts II-VIII, by contrast, allege various ver" 
tical restrictions on secondary market activities. In 
Counts II, IV, and VI the United States charges that the 
principal underwriters and broker-dealers entered into 
agreements that compel the maintenance of the public 
offering price in brokerage transactions of specified 
mutual-fund shares, and that prohibit interdealer tran:r 
actions by allowing each broker-dealer to sell and pur-
'Chase shares only to or from investors.u Count VIII 
,alleges that the broker-dealers entered into other, similar 
contracts and combinations with numerous principal 
underwriters. Counts III, V, and VII allege violations 
on the part of the principal underwriters and the funds 
themselves. In Count.s III and VII the various defend~ 
ants are charged with entering into contracts requiring 
the restrictive underwriter-dealer agreements challenged 
11 The violations alleged in Count II are typical of those charged 
in Counts IV and VI. In Count II, appellee Crosby, a principal 
underwriter of appellee Fidelity Fund, Inc., is charged with entering 
into contracts and combinations with appellee broker-dealers, the 
substantial terms of which are that 
"(a) each brokerjdealer must maintain the public offering price in 
any brokerage transaction in which it participates involving the 
purchase or saJe of shares of the Fidelity Fundi:!; and 
"(b) each broker jdealer must sell shares of the Fidelity Funds only 
'to investors or the fund and purchase such shares only from investors 
or the fund." App. 10-11. 
Count VI, in addition to charging restrictive agreements similar to 
the above, alleged that appellee Wellington, a principal underwriter, 
agreed to act only as an agent of the appropriate mutual fund in all 
transactions with the broker-dealers. I d., at 15. 
The alleged efect of the restrictive agreement charged in , (a) 
was to inhibit the growth and development of a brokerage market 
in mutual fund shares. The alleged effect of the restriction identi~ 
iied in , (b), by contrast, was to inhibit ini:erdealer transactions and 
thus to restrict the growth and development of a secondary deale!' 
market. Id.~ at 11. 
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in Counts II and VI. Count V charges that the agree-
ment between one fund and its underwriter restricted the 
latter to serving as a principal for ita own account in all 
transactions with the public, thereby prohibiting broker-
age transactions in the fund's shares. App. 14. 
After carefully examining the structure, purpose and 
history of the Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C, 
§ 80a-1 et seq., and the Maloney Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 78o-3, 
the District Court held that this statutory scheme 
was "incompatible with the maintenance of [an] anti~ 
trust action," 347 F. Supp., at 109, quoting Silver v. New 
York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 358 (1963). The 
court concluded that§§ 22 (d) and (f) of the Investment 
Company Act, when read in conjunction with the Ma,.. 
loney Act, afford antitrust immunity for all of the praco 
tices here challenged. The court further held that 
apart from this explicit statutory immunity, the perQ 
vasive regulatory scheme established by these statutes 
confers an implied immunity from antitrust sanction in 
the "narrow area of distribution and sale of mutual 
fund shares." 374 F. Supp., at 114. The court accord-
ingly dismissed the complaint, and the United States 
appealed to this Court.12 
'fhe position of the United States in this appeal can 
be summarized briefly. Noting that implied repeals of 
the antitrust laws are not favored, see, e. g., United States 
v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 34:3 
(1963), the United States urges that the antitrust im-
munity conferred by § 22 of the Investment Company 
Act should not extend beyond its precise terms, none of 
which, it maintains, requires or authorizes the practices 
12 The Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 15, 1974. 
419 U. S. 822. Accordingly, the recent amendments to the Expedit .. 
ing Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29, as amended by 88 Stat. 1709, do noj 
4ect our iurisdictiOl.).. 
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here challenged. The United States maintains, moreover, 
that the District Court expanded the parameters of the 
implied immunity doctrine beyond those recognized by 
decisions of this Court. In response, appellees advance 
all of the positions relied on by the District Court. They 
are joined by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which asserts as a'fYI,icus curia¥" that the reg~ 
ulatory authority conferred upon it by § 22 (f) of the 
Investment Company Act displaces § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The SEC contends, therefore, that the District 
Court properly dismissed Counts II-VIII but takes no 
position with respect to Count I. 
II 
A 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 originated in 
congressional concern that the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U. S. C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U. S.C. § 78a et seq., were inadequate to protect 
the purchasers of investment company securities. Thus, 
in § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 79z-4, Congress ditected the SEC to study 
the structures, practices and problems of investment 
companies with a view toward proposing further legisla-
tior.. Four years of intensive scrutiny of the industry 
culminated in the publication of the Investment Trust 
Study and the recommendation of legislation to rectify 
the problems and abuses it identified. After extensive 
congressional consideration, the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 was adopted. 
The Act vests in the SEC broad regulatory authority 
over the business practices of investment companies"18 
18 For example, the Act requires companies to register with the 
SEC, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-8, see also, id., § 80a-7. Companies also 
must register all securities they issue, see Securities Exchange Act. of 
7S-1701-0PINION 
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We are concerned on this appeal with § 22 of the Act, 
id., § SOa- 22, which controls the sales and distribution of 
mutual-fund shares. The questions presented require 
us to determine whether § 22 (d) obligates appellees 
to engage in the practices challenged in Counts II- VIII 
and thus necessarily confers antitrust immunity for them. 
If not, we must determine whether such practices 
are authorized by § 22 (f) and, if so, whether they 
are immune from antitrust s~:mction. Resolution of 
these issues will be facilitated by examining the nature of 
the problems and abuses to which § 22 is addressed, a 
matter to which we now turn. 
B 
The most thorough description of the sales and distri~ 
bution practices of mutual funds prior to passage of the 
Investment Company Act may be found in Part III of 
the Investment Trust Study.14 That study, as Congress 
1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a; Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80a-24 (a), and must submit for SEC inspection copies of the 
sales literature they send to prospective investors. I d., § 80a-24 (b) . 
The Investment Company Act requires the submission and periodic 
updating of detailed financial reports and documentation and the 
semiannual transmission of reports containing similar information 
to the shareholders. !d., § 80a-29. It also imposes controls and 
restrictions on the internal management of investment companies: 
establishing minimum capital r'lquirements, id., § 80a-14; limiting 
permissible methods for select ing directors, id., § 80a,-l6 ; and estab-
lishing certain qualifications for persons seeking to affiliate with 
the companies, id ., § 80a-9. Finally, the Act imposes a num-
ber of controls on the internal practices of inves-cment companies. 
For example, it requires a majority shareholder vote for certain 
fundamental business decisions, id., § 30a-13, and limits certain 
dividend distributions, id., § 80a-19. See generally, the Mutual Fund 
Industry : A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Law. 732 (1969) . 
14 SEC Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, 
H. R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940) (The Investment 
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has recognized, see 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1, forms the initial 
basis for any evaluation of the Act. 
Prior to 1940 the basic framework for tpe primary di~ 
tribution of mutual-fund shares was similar to that exist~ 
ing today. The fund normally retained a prmcipal 
underwriter to serve as a wholesaler of its shares. The 
principal underwriter in turn contracted with a number 
of broker-dealers to sell the fund's shares to the invest~ 
ing public.15 The price of the shares was based on the 
'fund's net asset value at the approximate time of sale, 
and a sales commission or load was added to that price. 
Although prior to 1940 the primary distribution sys-
tem for mutual-fund shares was similar to the present. 
one, a number of conditions then existed +,hat largely 
disappeared following passage of the Act. The most 
prominently discussed characteristic was the "two·, 
price system," which encouraged an active secondary 
market under conditivns that tolerated disruptive 
and discriminatory trading practices. The two-price 
system reflected the relationship between the com~ 
manly used method of computing the daily net asset 
value of mutual-fund shares and the manner in which 
the price for the following day was established. The net 
the Study, and all citations will be to that part unless otherwise 
·aesignated. For additional discussion of the operations of open -end 
manngement investment companies, see 197 4 Staff Report; SEC 
Report of the Staff on the Pot,ential Economic Impact of a Repeal 
o! § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (November 
1972); SEC Report on Public Policy Implications of Investment 
Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 
(hereinafter the 1966 SEC Report) ; SEC Report of the Special 
Study of Securities Markets, c. XI, Open-End Investment Com~ 
panies (Mutual Funds) , H. R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1Rt. 
Sess. (1963) (hereinafter 1963 Special Study). 
:15 The 'broker-dealers operating within the primary distribution 
system are denominated "contract dealers" in the Study and will ll!!< 
:ilo identified in this opinion . 
.. 
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asset value of mutual funds, which depends on the mar., 
ket quotations of the stocks in their investment port~ 
folios, fluctuates constantly. Most funds computed their 
net asset valuE:s daily on the basis of the fund's portfolio 
value at the close of exchange trading, and that figur~ 
established the sales price that would go into effect at. a 
specified hour on the following day. During this interim 
period two prices were known : the present day's trading 
price based on the portfolio value established the previ~ 
ous day; and the following day's price, which was based 
on the net asset value computed at the close of exchange 
trading on the present day, One aware of both pnces 
could engage in "riskless trading" during this interim 
period. See Invesi;ment Trust Study, at 851-852, 
The two-price system did not benefit the investing 
public generally. Some of the mutual funds did not 
explain the system thoroughly, and unsophisticated in" 
vestors probably were unaware of its existence. See id.» 
at 867. Even investors who knew of the two-price 
system and understood its operation were rarely in a 
position to exploit it fully. It was possible, however', 
for a knowledgeable investor to purchase shares in a ris~ 
ing market at the current price with the advance infor~ 
mation that the next day's price would be higher. He 
thus could be guaranteed an immediate appreciation in 
the market value of hif:l investment/6 although this ad-· 
vantage was obtained at the expense of the existing share~ 
16 The Study indicates that mutual funds bcreasingly began to 
disclose more information about the existence and operation of the 
two-price system. See Investment Trust Study, at 867-868. And 
in some instances the funds encouraged broker-dealers to explain 
to potential incoming investors the immediate appreciation in in· 
vestment value that could be obtained from the pricing system m 
the hope of encouraging the purchase of shares. !d., at 854. Se~ 
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holders, whose equity interests were diluted by a cor~ 
responding amount .17 The Joad fee that was charged 
in the sale of mutual funds to the investing public made 
it difficult for these investors to realize the "paper gain11 
obtained in such trading. Because the daily fluctuation 
in net asset value rarely exceeded the load, public i~1 
vestors generally were unsble to realize immediate profit,s 
from the two-price system by engaging in rapid in-and"" 
out trading. But insiders, who often were able to pur~ 
chase shares without paying the load, did not operate 
under this constraint. Thus insiders could, and some~ 
times did, purchase shares for immediate redemption at 
the appreciated value. See n. 24, infra, and sources 
cited therein, 
The two-price system often afforded other advantages 
to underwriters and broker-dealers. In a falling market 
they could enhance profits by waiting to fill orders with 
shares purchased from the fund at the next day's antici~ 
pated lower price. In a similar fashion, in a rising mar= 
ket they could take a "long position" in mutual-fund 
shares by establishing an inventory in order to satisfy 
anticipated purchases with securities previously obtained 
at a lower price. I d., at 854-855. In each case the 
investment company would receive the lower of the two 
prevailing prices for its shares, id., at 854, and the equity 
interests of shareholders would suffer a corresponding 
dilution. 
As a result, an active secondary market in mutual~ 
fund shares existed. ld. , at 865-867. Principal under· 
writers and contract broker-dealers often maintained 
11 The existing shareholders' equity interests were diluted because 
the incoming investors bought into the fund at less than the actual 
value of the shares at the time of purchase. Moreover, SEC tef'ti· 
mony indicated that this dilution could be substantial. In onr 
instance the Commission calculated that the two-price •>}Hem m-· 
stilted in a loss to existing shareholders of onP trust of som<' $133,000 
in a single day. l d., at 139-14-0 • 
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inventory positions established by purchasing shares 
through the primary distribution system and by buy-
ing from other dealers and retiring shareholders.~8 Ad·o 
ditionally, a "bootleg market" sprang up, comprised 
of broker-dealers having no contractual relationship with 
the fund or its principal underwriter. These bootleg 
dealers purchased shares at a discount from contract 
dealers or bought them from retiring shareholders at a, 
price slightly higher than the redemption price. Bootleg 
dealers would then offer the shares at a price slightly 
lower than that required in the primary distribution sys~ 
tern, thus "initiating a small scale price war between re" 
tailers and tend [ing] generally to disrupt the established 
offering price." I d., at 865. 
Section 22 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
was enacted with these abuses in mind. Sections 22 (a) 
and (c) were designed to "eliminat[e] or reduc[e] as 
far as reasonably practicable any dilution of the value 
of other outstanding securities , , , or any other result of 
[the] purchase, redemption or sale [of mutual fund 
securities] which is unfair to holders of such other out-
standing securities," 15 U. S. C. § SOa-22 (a). They au-
thorize the NASD and the SEC to regulate certain pric-
ing and trading practices in order to effectuate that 
goaP9 Section 22 (b) authorizes registered securities 
18 Contract dealers trading from an inventory position often coul.i 
obtain an additional profit from the sales load. When the dealer 
acted as an agent for the fund and traded from the primary distri · 
bution system, the dealer and the underwriter divided the load 
charge in accordance with the sales agreement. But the dealer 
could retain the full load when he filled the purchase order from an 
inventory position in shares purchased from retiring sha.reholde!1' 
or other dealers. /d., at 858-859. 
19 Sections 22 (a) and (c) reflect the same basic relationship between 
the SEC and the NASD that is established by the Maloney AC't. 
See n. 6, supra. Section 22 (a) authorizes registered securities associ· 
ations, in this case the NASD, to prescribe rule:-: for the regulation of 
.•. 
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associations and the SEC to prescribe the maximum 
sales commissions or loads that, can be charged in con~ 
nection with a primary distribution; and § 22 (e) pro-
tects the right of redemption by restricting mutual funds1 
power to suspend redemption or postpone the date of 
payment. 
The issues presented in this litigation revolve around 
subsections (d) and (f) of § 22. Bearing in mind the 
history and purposes of the Investment Company Act, 
we now consider the effect of these subsections on the 
question of potential antitrust liability for the practices 
here challenged. 
III 
Section 22 (d) prohibits mutual funds from selling 
shares at other than the current public offering price to 
any person except either to or through a principal underw 
writer for distribution. It further commands that "no 
these matters. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (a). The industry thus is 
afforded the initial opportunity to police its own practices. If, how-
ever, industry self-regulation proves insufficient, § 22 (c) authorizes 
the Commission to make rules and regulations "covering the same 
subject matter, and for the accompiishment of the same ends as are 
presnribed in subsection (a)," and proclaims that the SEC rules and 
regnlations supersede any inconsistent rules of the registered securi-
ties association. !d., § 80a-22 (c). 
Shortly after en&ctment of the Investment Compai1Y Act the 
NASD proposed, and the> SEC approved, a rule establishing twice· 
daily pricing. See Proposed Amendment to the Rules of Fair 
Practice of the NASD, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38 (1941). Twice-daily 
pricing reduced the time period m which persons could engage in 
riskless trading and correspondingly decreased the potential for 
dilution. The Commission subsequently provided full protection 
against the dilutive effects of riskless tn1ding. In late 1968 it ext·r~ 
cised its authority under § 22 (c) to adopt Rule 22c-1, which re-
quires all funds to establish "forward pricing." Forward pricing 
eliminates the potential for riskless trading altogether. See Adoption 
of Rule 22c-1, Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 5519 (1968), CCH Fed. Sec. L. 
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dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any person ex-
cept a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, 
except at a current public offering price described m the 
prospectus." 15 U. S. S. § 80a-22 (d). 20 By its terms1 
§ 22 (d) excepts in t.erdealer sales from its price main te-
nance requirement. Accordingly, this section cannot be 
relied upon by appellees as justification for the restric-
tions imposed upon interdealer transactions. At issue, 
rather, is the narrower question whether the § 22 (d) 
price maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" ap. 
plies to transactions in which a broker-dealer acts 
as a statutory "broker" rather than a statutory "dealer/' 
The District Court concluded that it does, and thus that 
§ 22 (d) governs transactions in which the broker-dealer 
acts as an agent for an investor as well as those in which 
he acts as a principal selling shares for his own account" 
A 
The District Court's decision reflects an expansive 
view of § 22 (d). The Investment Company Act spe-
cifically defines "broker" and "dealer" 21 and uses the 
20 This section provides in pertinent part: 
"No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable 
security issued by it to any person except either to or through a 
principal underwriter for distribution or at a current public offer-
ing price described in the prospectus, and, if such class of security 
is being currently offered to the public by or through an under-
writer, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer 
shall sell any such security to any person except a dealer, a prin-
cipal underwriter, or tht> issuer, except at a curr:mt public offering 
price described in the prospectus." 15 U S. C. § SOa-22 (d), 
21 The Investment Company Act defines a "dealer" to be: 
"[A]ny person regularly engagrd in the busine~:; of buying und 
selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, 
but does not include a bank, insurance company, or investment com-
pany, or any person insofar as he is engaged in investing, reinvesting, 
·or trading jn securities, or m owninj!: or holding ~curities, for h~ 
'4'3-1701-0PINION 
16 U. S. v. NATIONAL ASSR SECURITIES DEALERS 
terms distinctively throughout.22 Appellees maintain1 
however, that the defintion of "dealer" is sufficiently 
broad to require price maintenance in brokerage transac~ 
tions. In support of this position appellees assert that 
the critical elements of the dealer definition are that 
the term relates to a "person" rather tha.n to a trans~ 
action and that the persou must engage "regularly" in 
the sale and purchase of securities to qualify as a dealer, 
It is argued, therefore, that any person who purchases 
and sells securities with sufficient regularity to qualify as 
a statutory dealer is thereafter bound by all dealer re~ 
strictions, regardless of the nature of the particular 
transaction in question. We do not find this argument 
persuasive. 
Appellees' reliance on the statutory reference to "per-
son" in defining dealer adds little to the analysis, for the 
Act defines "broker," "investment banker," "issuer/' 
"underwriter," and others to be "persons" as well. See id., 
§ § 80a-2 (a) (6), (21), (22), & ( 40) . In each instance, thEe' 
own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but 
not as a part of a regular business." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (11). 
A "broker," by contrast, is defined to be : 
" [A] ny person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in 
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank or 
ar,y person solely by reason of the fact that such person is an 
underwriter for one or more investment companies." Id., § 80a-2 
(a) (6). 
22 Congress employed the term "broker" without reference to 
"dealer" in various sections of the Act . See id., §§ 80a-3 (c) (2); 
80a-10 (b) (1); 80a-17 (e) (1) and (2) . In other instances, the Act 
refers to "dealer" without reference to "broker," see id., §§ 80a-2 (a) 
(40) ; 80a- 22 (c) and (d) . And in some cases, includmg the very 
definition of the term "dealer" itself, see n. 21, supra, the Act refers 
to both "broker" and "dealer" in the same provision, see id., §§ 80a-t 
(b) (2) ; 80a- 9 (a)(l) and (2); and 8Qa .. 30 (a) . Finally, the Act 
in some cases refers to the more general term "broker-dealer ' :;<f'e 
id., §§ 80a-22 (b)(l) and (2) . 
,. 
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critical distinction relates to their transactional capacity, 
Moreover, we think that appellees reliance on the regu-
larity requirement in the dealer definition places undue 
emphasis on that element at the expense of the remamdet 
of the provision. On the face of the statute the most 
apparent distinction between a broker and a dealer IS that 
the former effects transactions for the account of others 
and the latter buys and sells securities for his own account, 
We therefore cannot agree that the terms of the Act. 
compel the conclusion that a broker-dealer acting in a 
brokerage capacity would be bound by the § 22 (d) 
dealer mandate. Indeed, the language of the Act. sug6 
gests the opposite result. 
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the statutory defi~ 
nition is ambiguous, we fir.d nothing in the extensive 
contemporaneous legislative history of the Investment• 
Company Act to justify interpreting § 22 (d) to encom-
pass brokered transactions. That history is sparse,28 and 
28 The original Commission-sponsored bill considered in the initial 
hearings before the Senate Banking and Commerce Subcommittee, 
S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. ( 1940), contained no provision resem-
bling this subsection. Section 22 (d) first emerged in a comprom.ise 
proposal advanced after a period of intensive consultation between 
the SEC and industry representatives that followed initial Senate 
hearings, see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt . 4, at 1105-1107, and the 
Commission subsequently has indicated that this provision was sug-
gested by the industry. See Midamerica Mutual Fund, 41 S. E. C. 
328, 331 (1963); 1966 Public Policy Study, at 219. Revised legis]a .. 
tion reflecting this compromise was submitted, and further hearings 
were conducted in the Senate and the House. Both bills were 
reported favorably by their respective committees, S. Rep. No. 1715, 
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) ; H. R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d 
Sess. (1940), and the House bill, with minor amendments not rele~ 
vant to this appeal, was accepted by the Senate. 86 Cong. Rec. 
10069-10071. 
This history perhaps explains the dearth of discussion relat n::o-r 
to § 22 (d) . The majority of the Senate hearings were completed 
r 
•. 
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suggests only that § 22 (d) was considered necessary td 
curb abuses that had arisen in the sales of securities to 
insiders as well.24 
The prohibition against insider trading would seem 
adequately served by the first clau!:le of § 22 (d), which 
prevents mutual funds from selling shares at other than 
the public offering price to any person except a principal 
underwriter or dealer. See n. ·20, supra. 2'5 The further 
restriction on dealer sales bears little relation to insider 
trading, however, and logically would be thought to serve 
some other purpose. The obvious effect of the dealer 
prohibition is to shield the primary distribution system 
from th3 competitive impact of unrestricted dealer trad-
ing in the secondary ma.rkets, a concern that was reflected 
before this provision was advanced, and both the Senate and House 
hearings that followed provide ·relatively little illumination as to 
the intended purpose or scope of this subsection. 
24 Insider trading abuses were identified as a problem during the 
Senate hearings that preceded submission of the compromise bill 
containing'§ 22 (d), see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 526-5p7 ancl 
660-661. At the close of the initial Senate hearings an industry 
·representative suggested that the Act should contain a provision 
·prohibiting sales at preferential terms to insiders and others. Id., 
at 105.7. The Commission and industry representatives thereafter 
met to seek a compromise on the various differences that had 
.been ider.tified in the Senate hearings, and the industry memoran-
.dum outlining the nature of the rP,1lltant agreement again indicated 
that a provision should be added to the Act to prohibit msider 
trading. See- Framework of Proposed InvestmPnt Company Bill 
(Title I), Memorandum Embodying Suggestions Resultmg from Con-
.fnrence Between Securities and Exchange Commission and Repn•-
,sentatives of Investment Companies (M'ly 13, 1940), printed iq. 
1940 House Hearingt<, at 99 
25 The insider trading prohibition is complimented by § 22 (g) 1 
whJCh precludes issuance of mutual fund shares for services or 
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in the Study, see Investment Trust Study, at 865. The 
SEC perceives this to be one of the purposes of this 
provision,26 
But concluding that protection of the primary distri-
bution system is a purpose of§ 22 (d) does littlA to resolve 
the question whether Congress intended to require strict 
price maintenance in all broker-deal~C'lr transactions with 
the investing public. By its terms, § 22 (d) protects only 
against the possibly disruptive ~ffects of secondary dealer 
sales which, as statutorily defined, constituted the most 
active secondary market existing prior to the Act's pas. 
sage. Nothing in the contemporary history suggests that 
Congress was equally concerned with possible disruption 
from investor transactions in outstanding shares con~ 
ducted through statutory brokers. 
Nor do we think that the history attending subsequent 
congressional consideration of the Act provides adequate 
support for appellees' contention that § 22 (d) requires 
strict price maintenance in all broker -dealer transactions 
in mutual-fund shares. To be sure, portions of the testi~ 
26 See Adoption of Rul~ N-22-JJ-1, Inv. Co. Act ReL No. 2798, 
p. 1 (1958), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 176,625, p. 80,393; Investors 
Diversified Services Inc., Inv. Co. Act Rel. No. 3015 (1960), CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ,76,690, p. 80,620; In re Sideris, Exch. Act Ret 
:~o. 8816, p. 2 (1970); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act 
Ret. No. 6932, p. 4 (1972). 
The SEC also has suggebted that preventing discrimination 
among investors was one of the purposes of this provision. See, 
e. g., In re Sideris, supra; Midamerica Mutual Fund, Inc., 41 8. E. C. 
328, 331 (1963); A.doption of Rule N22-D-1, supra. But we do 
not think that brokerage transaction~ mevitably would foste.r 
the kind of investor discrimination sought to be remedied by this 
statute. All investors would be equally free to seek to engage in 
brokered transactions, and the possibility that the more sophist] 
cated or fortuitous investor would profit from this market doeti 
not , by itself, bring this category of transactions within thr purvjpw: 
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mony of SEC Chairman Cohen before the House 
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance in 1967 sug-
gested that the price maintenance requirement of § 22 
(d) encompassed l'lJl broker-dealers, irrespective of how 
they obtained the traded shares, 27 und on other occasions 
the Chairman referred to sales by brokers when discuss~ 
ing mutual fund transactions.28 Appellees also can point 
· to congressional characterizations of § 22 (d) that suggest 
that some members of Congress understood the reach of 
that provision to be as broad as the District Court 
thought.211 
Appellees maintain that this history indicates that 
Congress always intended § 22 (d) to control broker as 
well as dealer transactions, and that it re-enacted the 
27 Responding to inquiries concerning the relationship of § 22 (d) 
and the operation of state law, Chairman Cohen stated: 
"The statute is unequivocal. No person, no matter where he gets 
it, from the issuer, from another dealer, or even from a private per~ 
son, no broker-dealer may sell a share of a particular fund at a 
price less than that fixed by the issuer!' 1967 House Hearings, pt. 
2, at 711. 
2Bfd., pt. 1, at 53. 
211 Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Banking and CUr~ 
rency Committee which reported the 1970 amendments to the full 
Senate, stated on the floor of the Senate that § 22 (d) "now makes 
it a Federal rnme for anyone to sell mutual fund shares at a price 
lower tb£n that fixed by the fund's distributor.'' 115 Cong. Rec. iol:~& 
(1969) (emphasis added). Senator Magnuson reflected perhaps a 
similar view, stating that, as a result of§ 22 (d) "mutual fund shares 
are totally msulated from pnce compet1tion." 114 Cong Rec. 23057 
(1968) (emphasis added). 
The testimony of some witnesses suggests that they shared this 
expansive view. See, e. g., Hearings on S. 1659 before the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess, pt. 2, 
at 741 (1967) (hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings) (testimony of 
Mr. Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange); id., 
pt 1, at 348, 356 (testimony of Profe::;sor Samnt>lson) ; ir/, p. Z,, 
~t 1064 (testunony of ProfQssor Wallich). 
..r· 
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amended § 22 with that purpose in mind. The Dis-
trict Court accepted this position, and it is not without• 
some support in this historical record.80 But impressive 
evidence to the contrary is found in the position consist · 
ently maintained by the SEC. Responding to an inquiry 
in 1941, the SEC General Counsel stated that § 22 (d) 
did not bar brokerage transactions in mutual fund shares ~ 
"In my opinion the term 'dealer,' as used in Sec-
tion 22 (d), refers to the c&.pacity in which a broker.~ 
dealer is acting in a particular transaction, It 
follows, therefore, that if a broker-dealer in a ps,r~ 
ticular transaction is acting solely in the capacity 
of agent for a selling investor; or for both a selling 
investor and a purchasing investor, the sale may be 
made at a price other than the current offering price 
described in the prospectus, 
g'On the other hand, if a broker-dealer is acting 
for his own account in a transaction and as principal 
sells a redeemable security to an investor, the public 
offering price must be maintained, even though the 
sale is made through another broker who acts as 
agent for the seller, the investor, or both. 
11As Section 22 (d) itself states, the offering price 
is not required to be maintained in the case of sales 
80 We conclude, however, that the context of the post-enactment 
history of § 22 (d) limits the force of the statements relied upon by 
appellees. A broker-dealer can serve in either a broker or a dealer's· 
capacity, and the distin~tion between the two functions is rathe1 
technical and precise. The parties are in general agreement that 
no significant number of brokered tr:msactions, as statutorily de-
fined, existed prior or subsequent to passage of the Act. In view of 
the care with which the statute defines these functions and the 
absence of focus on these distinctions in the statements in thE' subse-
quent considemtion of§ 22 (d), we think that the broader character~ 
W,tlons of that sectiP:n must be viewed with some ske:t)tici.~m ... 
... 
j_.' ;to ., 
. ~·' -e.lf.t ...... 
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in which both the buyer and the seller are dealers 
acting as principals in the transactions." Inv. Co, 
Act. Rel. No 78, March 4, 1941, 11 Fed. Reg .. 10~l92 
(1946). 
This substantially contemporaneous interpretation of the 
Act has consistently been maintained in subsequent SEC 
opinions, see Oxford, Co., Inc., 21 S. E. C. 681, 690 
(1946); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. ReL 
No. 6932, at 3 (1972). The same position was asserted in a 
recent Staff Report, see 1974 Staff Report, at 105 n. 2, 107 
n. 2, and 109 (1974), was relied on by the SEC in its sub~ 
sequent decision to encourage limited price competition 
in brokered transactions,31 and is advanced by it as amicus 
curiae in this Court. This consistent and longstanding 
interpretation by the agency charged with administration 
of the Act, while not controlling, is entitled consider-
able weight. See, e. g., Saxbe v. B·ustos, 419 U. S. 65 
(1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 
81 Acting in accordl!llce with the recommendations of the Staff 
Report, the SEC Chahman recently requested that the NASD 
amend its Rules of Fair Practice to prohibit agreements between 
underwriters and broker-dealers that preclude broker-dealers, acting 
as agents, "from matching orders to buy and sell fund shares in a 
secondary market at competitively determined prices and commis~ 
sion rates." Letter from Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the 
SEC to Mr. Gordon S. Macklin, President of the NASD, Novem~ 
ber 22, 1974, printed in addendum to brief of appellees Bache & 
Co., et al, at 18. The Chairman further rrvealed tllfl SEC's mten-
tion to exercise its regulatory authority under § 22 (f) to neu-
tralize any adverse effects this market might have on the 
fund's primary distribution systems. !d., at 19. A~ the Staff' 
Report indicates, the Commission's exercise of regulatory authority 
is premised on its view that § 22 (d) does not require strtct price 
maintenance in brokered transactions. See 1974 Staff Report, at 
104. If § 22 (d) did control these transactions as well as "dealer'~ 
sales, the Commission's ability to encourage controlled competitiol) 
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U, S, 617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U, S, 
1, 16 (1965). B 
The substance 0f appellees' position is that the dealer 
prohibition of § 22. (d) should be interpreted in generic 
rather than statutory terms, The price maintenance re= 
quirement of that section accordingly would encompas~ 
all broker-dealer transactions with the investing public 
and would shelter them from antitrust sanction" But 
such an expansion of § 22 (d) beyond its terms would 
not only displace the antitrust laws by implication; it 
also would impinge seriously on the SEC's more flexible 
regulatory authority under§ 22 (f).112 
Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be 
justified only by a convincing showing of clear repug~ 
nancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory sys-
tem. See, e. g., United States v. Philadelphia National 
Bank, 374 U. S. 321, ~48 (1963); United States v. 
Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 197-206 (\939). We think 
no such showing has been made. Moreover, in ad-
dition to satisfying our responsibility to reconcile the 
antitrust and regulatory statutes where feasible, Silver 
v, New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 356-357 
(1963), we must interpret the Investment Company Act 
n The Departmen~ of Justice previously suggested a manner in 
which its interpretation of § 22 (d) could be reconciled with the 
Commission's exercise of regulatory authority over brokered trams~ 
actions. Addressing the question of possible repeal of § 22 (d), the 
Justice Department suggested that rather than continue to wait 
for congressional repeal, the Commission should eliminate the adverse 
effects of price maintenance by freeing all transactions from the 
'§ 22 (d) mandate through the exercise of its § 6 (c) power of exemp-
tion, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-6 (c). !d., at 70. This presumably would 
leave the SEC free to regulate transactions through the exercise of 
the powers conferred to it by other provisions of the Act. We need 
not consider th.~ validity of the Justice Department's broad inter .. 
pretation of the SEC's power of exemption, for even assuming it 
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. ' 
in a manner most conductive to the effectuation of its 
goals. We conclude that appellee's interpretation of § 22 
(d) serves neither purpose, and cannot be justified by the 
language or history of that section. 
We therefore hold that the price maintenance mandate 
of § 2.2 (d) cannot be stretched beyond its literal terms 
to encompass transactions by broker-dealers acting as 
statutory "brokers." Congress defined the limitations 
for the mandatory price maintenance requirement of the 
Investment Company Act. "We are not only bound by 
those limitations but we are bound to construe them 
strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege re~ 
strictive of a free economy." United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956). Accordingly, we 
hold that the District Court erred in relying on § 22 (d) 
in determining that the activities here questioned are 
immune from antitrust liability. 
IV 
Our determination that the restrictions on the second-
ary market are not immunized by § 22 (d) does not end 
the inquiry, for the District Court also found them 
sheltered from antitrust liability by § 22 (f). Appellees, 
joined by the SEC, defend this ruling and urge that it 
requires dismissal of the challenge to the vertical restric-
tions sought to be enjoined in Counts II-VIIL 
Section 22 (f) authorizf's mutual funds to impose 
restrictions on the negotiability and transferability of their 
shares, provided they conform with the fund's regis-
tration statement and do not contravene any rules 
and regulations the Commission may prescribe in the 
interests of the holders of all of the outstanding securi-
ties.38 Appellant does not contend that the vertical 
38 Section 22 (f) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (f), provides: 
"No regil!'tered open-end company shall restrict the transferability 
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restrictions are not disclosed in the registration state~ 
ments of the funds in question. Nor does it assert that 
the agreements imposing such restrictions violate Com-
mission rules and regulations. Indeed, it could not do so, 
because to date the SEC has prescribed no such stand-
ards. Instead appellant maintains that th~ contractual 
restrictions do not come witl1in the meaning of the Act, 
asserting that § 22 (f) does not authorize the imposition 
of restraints on the distribution system rather than on the 
shares themselves. Appellant thus apparently urges that 
the only limitations contemplated by this section are 
those that appear on the face of the certificate itself. 
Appellant also urges that the SEC's unexercised power 
to prescribe rules and regulations is insufficient to create 
repugnancy between its regulatory authority and the 
antitrust laws. 
Our examination of the language and history of§ 22 (f) 
persuades us, however, that the agreements challenged 
in Counts II-VIII are among the kinds of restridions 
Congress contemplated when it enacted that section. And 
this conclusion necessarily leads to a determination that 
they are immune from liability under the Sherman Act, 
for we see no way to reconcile the Commission's power 
to authorize these restrictions with the competing man-
date of the antitrust laws. 
A 
Unlike§ 22 (d),§ 22 (f) originated in the Commission-
sponsored bin considered in the Senate subcommittee 
hearings that preceded 'introduction of the compromise 
proposal later enacted into law. The Commission-
·conformity with the statements with respect thereto contained in 
its registration statement nor in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe in the interests of 
the holders of aU of the outstanding securities of such investment 
company." 
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sponsored provision authorized the SEC to promul"' 
gate rules, regulations or orders prohibiting restrictions 
on the transferability or negotiability of mutual fund 
shares, S. 3580, § 22 (d) (2), 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) ;H 
Commission testimony indicates that it considered this 
authority necessary to allow regulatory control of indus~ 
try measures designed to deal with the disruptive effects 
of "bootleg market" trading and with other detrimental 
trading practices identified in the Investment Trust 
Study.35 
34 Section 22 (d) of the original bill, S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 
' (1940), provided, in pertinent part: 
"The Commission is authorized, by rules and regulations or order 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to prohib1t-
"(2) restrictions upon the transferability of negotiability of any 
redeemable security of which any registered investment company is 
the issuer .11 
35 Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee, an SEC spokesman 
stated: 
"Now coming to subparagraph (2) of (d), it just says that the 
'Commission shall have the right to make rules and regulations with 
respect to any restrictions upon the transferability or negotiability 
·of any redeemable security of which any registered investment 
company is the issuer. 
"There are some companies that have a provision in their certifi. 
•c:>.tes to the effect that you cannot sell that certificate to anybody 
else, and the only way you can sell it is to sell it back to the com 
pany. That is a technical problem. It presents a whole problem 
which they call the bootleg market. What happens is that dealers 
keep switching people from one company to another. In order to 
prevent these switches:, some provisions require that you cannot 
make these switches but must, sell the certificate back to the 
.company. 
"If the committee wants the provision, we shall recommend what, 
on the basis 0f our experience up to the present time, it ought to be: 
but we think subjects like that ought to be a matter of niles and: 
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The Study indicates, moreover, that a number of funds 
had begun to deal with these problems prior to passage 
of the Act. And while their methods may have included 
the imposition of restrictive legends on the face of the 
certificate, see n. 35, supra, they were by no means con~ 
fined to such narrow limits. A number of funds imposed 
controls on the activities of their principal underwriters, 
see Investment Trust Study, at 868-869; and in some 
instances the funds required the underwriters to impose 
similar restrictions on the dealers, see id., at 869, or entered 
into these restrictive agreements with the dealers them-
selves, id., at 870-871. 
In view of the history of the Investment Company 
Act, we find no jusLification for limiting the range of 
possible transfer restrictions to those that appear on the 
face of the certificate. The bootleg market was pri-
marily a problem of the distribution system, and bootleg 
dealers found a source of supply in the contract-dealers 
as well as in retiring shareholders. See id., at 865. 
Moreover, the Study indicates that part of the bootleg 
distribution system consisted of "trading firms" that 
served as wholesalers of mutual-fund securities in much 
the same fashion as the principal underwriters. These 
trading firms primarily purchased and sold shares to and 
from other dealers, id., pt. II, at 327, frequently offering 
them at a price slightly lower than the discounted rate 
charged to dealers in the primary distribution system. 
Id., at 327-328. Thus trading firms not only helped 
supply the bootleg dealers whose sales undercut those of 
the contract-dealers, they competed with the principal 
underwriters by offering a source for lower cost shares 
that inevitably discouraged participation in the primary 
distribution system. See id., at 328 n. 85. 
The bootleg market was a complex phenomenon whose 
'. 
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principal origins lay in the distribution system itself. In 
view of this history, limitation of the industry's ability, 
subject of course to SEC regulation, to reach these prob-
lems at their source would constitute an inappropriate 
contraction of the remedial function of the statute.86 In-
deed, in view of the role of trading firms and interdealer 
transactions in the maintenance of the bootleg market, 
the narrow interpretation of § 22 (f) urged by appellant 
would seem to afford inadequate authority to deal with 
the problem. 
Together, §§ 22 (d) and 22 (f) protect the primary 
distribution system for mutual-fund securities. SectiOn 
22 (d), by eliminating price competition in dealer sales, 
inhibits the most disruptive factor in the pre-1940's 
mutual market ami thus assures the maintenance of a 
viable sales system. Section 22 (f) compliments this 
protection by authorizing the funds and the SEC to deal 
more flexibly with other detrimental trading practices by 
imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability 
and negotiability. Appellant's limiting interpretation of 
§ 22 (f) compromises this flexible mandate, and cannot 
be accepted. 
We find support for our interpretation of § 22 (f) 
jn the views expressed by the SEC shortly after the 
passage of the Act. Rule 26 (j) (2), proposed by NASD 
to curb abuses identified in the Study and the con-
gressional hearings, provided limitations on underwriter 
86 Neither are we convinced of the necessity to limit negotiability 
or transferability restrictions to those appearing on the face of the 
certificate in order to assure their adequate disclosure to investons. 
Section 24 of the Act requires that mutual funds submit for SEC 
inspection copies of all sales literature that they send to prospective 
investors. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-24 (b). The Commission is thereforf\ 
fully apprised as to the nature and sufficiency of the disclosure of 
these restrictions and can, if necessary, require supplementatim11 
Qf the information provided investors. 
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sales and redemptions to or from dealers who are not 
parties to sales agreements. In commenting on this pro~ 
posed rule, the SEC characterized it as a "restriction 
on the transferability of securities," and specifically 
averted to its power to regulate such restrictions under 
22 (f) . National ABsociation of Securities Dealer.~, 
9 S. E. C. 38, 44-45 and n. 10 (1941). As indicated 
above, see supra, at 22, and sources there cited, this con .. 
temporaneous interpretation by the responsible agency 
is entitled to considerable weight. We therefore con-
clude that the restrictions on transferability and negotl~ 
ability contemplated by § 22 (f) include restnctions on 
the distribution system for mutual-fund shares as well 
as limitations on the face of the shares themaelves. The 
narrower interpretation of this provision advanced by 
appellant would disserve the broad remedial function of 
the statute.37 
87 Neither do we agree with appellant's suggestion that § 22 (f) 
does not authorize restrictions in contracts between underwriters 
:and dealers in which the fund is not a party. We note, prelim-
inarily, that this position would not save Counts III, V, and VII 
from dismissal, since they relate to restrictions on underwriter con-
duct that are imposed by the fund. Even under the most technical 
reading of the statute these restrictions are "fund-imposed." 
Moreover, it further appears from the complaint that the agree-
ment challenged in Count II is required by the fund-underwriter 
agreP-ment challenged in Count III and thus also is "fund-imposed" 
in any but the most literal sense. More importantly, however, we 
think that appellant's position fails to recognize the relationship be-
tween the vanous participants in the distribution chain: As the· 
history of the Investment Company Act recognizes, the relation-
ship between the fund and its prmcipal underwriter traditionally ha5 
been a close one. Sections 15 (b) and (c) reflect this fact, requiring,. 
in effect, that funds establish writt<'n contracts with the undPr· 
writer that must be approved by a majority of the fund's dism. 
terested directors and cannot remain in force for more than two 
years. 15 U.S. C. §§ SOa-15 (b) and (c) . And NASD Rule 26 (c),. 
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Appellant's additional contention that the SEC's exer .. 
cise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give 
rise to an implied immunity for agreements conforming 
with § 22 (f) misconceives the intended operation of the 
statute. By its terms, § 22 (f) authorizes properly 
disclosed restrictions unless they are inconsistent with 
SEC rules or regulations. The provision thus authorizes 
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restric-
tions, subject to Commission disapproval. In v1ew of the 
evolution of this provision, there can be no doubt that 
this is precisely what Congress intended. 
Section 22 (f) as originally introduced would have 
authorized the SEC to promulgate rules, regulations 
or orders prohibiting restrictions on the redeemability 
or transferability of mutual-fund shares. Congressional 
consideration of that provision raised some question 
whether existing restrictions on transferability and nego= 
tiability would remain valid unless specifically disap-
proved by the SEC.38 The compromise provision, which 
subsequently was enacted into law, eliminated this uncer-
tainty, however, and manifested a more positive attitude 
toward self-regulation. 
Thus § 22 (f) specifically recognizes that mutual 
funds can impose such restrictions on the distributiOn 
system provided they are disclosed in the registration 
statement and conform to any rules and regulations that 
the SEC might adopt. In addition, § 22 (f) alters the 
focus of Commission scrutiny. Whereas the original 
provision allowed the SEC to make rules that serve "the 
public interest and 0 o 0 the protection cf investors,'7 
agreements with the dealers who distribute the fund's securities .. 
See National Association of Securities Dealers, 9 S. E. C. 38, 44, 48 
( 1941). In view of these requirements, and the broad remedial 
purpose of § 22 (f), we think that the underwriter-dealer agree• 
ments challenged in this complamt also must be regarded as fund~ 
imposed within the contemplation of the statute. 
ss See 1940 Senatf:' Bearings, pt. 1, a.t 293. 
. < 
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S. 3580, § 22 (d) (2), supra, § 22 (f) as enacted limits 
the Commission's rulemaking authority to the protection 
of the "interests of the holders of all of the outstanding 
securities of such investment company." 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80a-22 (f). Viewed in this historical context, the 
statute reflects a clear congressional determination that, 
subject to Commission ov~rsight, mutual funds should 
be allowed to retain the initiative in dealing with the 
potentially adverse effects of disruptive trading practices. 
The Commission repeatedly has recognized the role 
of private agreements in the control of trading practices 
in the mutual fund industry. For example, in First 
Multifund of America, Inc., Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 6700 
(1971), F. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 78,209, at 80,602, ii looked to 
restrictive agreements simila!' to those challenged in 
this litigation to ascertai{'rnvestment advisor's capacity 
in a particular transaction. At no point did it intimate 
that those agreements were not legitimate.39 Likewise, 
Commission reports repeatedly have acknowledged the 
significant role that private agreements have played in 
restricting the growth of a secondary market in mutual~ 
fund shares!0 Until recently the Commission has al~ 
8~ Commissioner Loomis, dissenting from an SEC determination 
that an applicant lacked standing to seek an exemption from §§ 17 
(a) (1) and 22 (d) of the Act, stated, 
"I would conclude that applicant is a dealer in its relationship with 
the fund underwriter because to do otherwise would require us to 
ignore or nullify the perfectly lawful requirement in the dealer 
agreements that applicant act as a dealer. . . . [I] do not know 
of anything unlawful about the generally accepted form of dealer 
agreement used in the investment company industry." Mutual 
Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. !tel. No. 6932, at 7 (1972) 
(dissenting opinion) . 
While the majority disagreed with Commissioner Loomis' assessment 
of the facts of the case, it did not question his approval of the-
mentioned deal~r agreement. 
"'·0 See 1963 Special Study, at 98; 1974 Staff Report, at 104-lOIL 
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lowed the industry to control the secondary market through 
contractual restrictiOns duly fil2d and publicly disclosed. 
Even the SEC's recently expressed intention to introduce 
an element of competitiOn in brokered transactions rP.~ 
fleets measured caution as to the possibly adverse impart, 
of a totally unregulated and restrained brokerage market 
on the primary distribution system. See n. 31, supra, 
The Commission's acceptance of fund-initiated restric·' 
tions for more than three decades hardly represents abdi~ 
cation of its _regulatory responsibilities. Rather, we 
think it manifests an informed administrative judgment 
that the contractual restrictions employed by the funds 
to protect their shareholders were appropriate means for 
combatting the proClems of the industry. The SEC's 
election not to initiate restrictive rules or regulations is 
precisely the kind of administrative oversight of private 
practices that Congress contemplated when .it enactP-d 
§ 22 (f). 
We conclude, therefore, that the vertical restrictions 
sought to be enjoined in Counts II-VIII are among the 
kinds of agreements authorized § 22 (f) of the Invest~ 
ment Company Act, 
B 
The agreements questioned by the United States re~ 
strict the terms under which the appellee underwriters 
and broker-dealers may trade in shares of mutual funds. 
Such restrictions, affecting resale price maintenance and 
concerted refusals to deal, normally would constitute per 
se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., K.lor, 
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-213 
(1959); Fashion Originators' G'uild of America, Inc,. Vo 
Federal Tmde Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 465--468 
(1941), Here, however, Congress has made a judgment 
that these rPstrictions on competition might be necessi·" 
tated by the unique problems o£ the mutual fund in· 
. ' 
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dustry, and has vested in the SEC final authority to 
determine whether and to what extent they should be 
tolerated "in the interests of the holders of all the out~ 
standing securities" of mutual funds. 15 U. S.C. § 80ar-
22 (f). 
The SEC, the federal agency responsible for regulating 
the conduct of the mutual-iund indu~try, urges that its 
authority will be compromised seriously if these agree-
ments are deemed actionable under the Sherman Act.41 
We agree. There can be no reconciliation of its author-
ity under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restri(}c 
tive agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that 
they are illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust 
laws must give way if the regulatory scheme established 
by the Investment Company Act is to work. Silver v" 
New York Stock Exchange, supra. We conclude, there~ 
fore, that such agreements are not actionable under the 
Sherman Act, and that the District Court properly dis= 
missed Counts II -VIII. 
v 
It remains to be determined whether the District 
Court properly dismissed Count I of appellant's com-
plaint, which charged activities allegedly constituting a 
horizontal conspiracy between the NASD and its mem-
bers to "prevent t.he growth of a secondary dealer market 
and 11 brokerage market in the purchase and sale of 
:mutual fund shares." App. 9. 
41 In its brief to this Court, the SEC maintains: 
"It would nullify the effect of this grant of regulatory au~ 
thority to the Commission [under § 22 (f)] for this Court to 
hold that a district court may apply antitrust principles to con-· 
duct lil:e that alleged in Counts II through VIII, when the expert 
body designated and empowered by Congress to regulate and 
supervise that conduct has not deemed it appropriate to prohibit 
the conduct." Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as; 
Amic?t.s C!uria.e, at 54 •. 
I. 
;·' ' 
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The precise nature of the a:llegations of the complaint 
are obscured by subsequent concessions made by appel~ 
lant to the District Court and reiterated here. It is 
clear, however, that Count I alleges activities that are 
neither required by § 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22 
(f). And since they cannot find antitrust shelter in 
these provisions of the Jmrestment Company Act, the 
question presented is whether the SEC's exercise of reg~ 
ulatory authority under this statute and the Maloney 
Act is sufficiently pervasive to confer an implied im~ 
munity. We hold that it is, and accordingly affirm the 
District Court's dismissa1 of this portion of the complaint 
Count I originally appeared to be a general attack on 
' the NASD's role in encouraging the restrictions on sec~ 
· ondary market activities challenged in the remainder of 
· appellant's complaint. The acts charged in Count I 
focused in large part on N ASD rules, and on information 
distributed by that associ&.tion to its mem:bers.4 z Subse~ 
42 The complaint averred that, in effectuating the conspiracy to 
restrain the growth of a secondary market in mutual-fund shares, 
·the NASD, its members, and more particularly the other named 
defendants, 
"(a) established and maintained rules which inhibited the develop-
ment of a secondary dealer market and a brokerage market in 
·mutual fund shares; 
'·(b) established 11nd maintained rules which induced broker j 
dealers to enter into sales agreements with principal underwriters, 
with knowledge that sales agreements contained restrictive provision'! 
which inhibited the development of a secondary dealer market and 
"brokerage market in mutual fund shares ; 
" (c) induced member principal underwriters to include restrictive 
provisions in their sales agreements; 
" (d) discouraged persons who made inquiry about the legality of 
a brokerage market from p&rtidpating in a brokerage market and 
distributed misleading information to Its members concerning the 
legality of a brokerage market in mutual fund shares; and 
" (e) suppressed mark~?.t quotations for the secondary dealer 
market." App .. 9. 
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quently appellant advised the District Court that its 
complaint was not to be read as a direct attack on NASD 
rules, however, and it repeated that position before this 
Court.48 Appellant now contends that its complaint 
should be interpreted as a challenge to various unofficial 
NASD interpretations and to appellees' exten::;ion of the 
rules in a manner that inhibit a secondary market. 
In view of the scope of the SEC's regulatory authority 
over the activities of the NASD, appellant's decision to 
withdraw from direct attack on the association's rules 
was prudent. The SEC's supervisory authority over the 
N ASD is extensive. Not only does the Maloney Act 
require the SEC to determine whether an association 
43 Appellant first indicated abandonment of its attack on the 
NASD rules during oral argument of appelleeH' motion to dis-
miss. See App. 328-332. Notwithstandmg clauses (a) and (b) ot 
paragraph 17 of the complamt, see n. 42, supra, appellant's counsel 
stated that it did not intend to challenge a.ny NASD rule, app. 330 
Counsel ambiguously suggested, however, that the members' com~ 
pliance with those rules had aided and abetted alleged the conspiracy, 
id., at 332, and stated that informal and secret activities of the 
association likewise had tended to inhibit growth of the secondary 
market, id., at 330. Thereafter, in response to the District Court's 
invitation to join in the litlgatwn as amicus curiae, the SEC ex· 
pressed its concern that the action might mvolve an attack on NASD 
rule;;, a matter "over wh1ch the Commission is granted exclusive 
jurisdiction by Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 et seq. (the Maloney Act)." Letter from Mr. 
Lawrence E. Nerheim, General Counsel of the SEC to the District 
Court. App 323. Appellant thereafter informed the court that 
the issues Jt Hought to rai<ie did not represPnt "an attack npon 
NASD Rules as such" but ra.ther "aimed at an over-all course Qf 
conduct engaged in by the NASD and its member!' going beyond the 
NASD's rule-making authority." Letter from Mr. Bruce B. Wilson, 
Acting Asst. Attorney General for the Antitrust Division to the 
Du;tnct Court App :3'27 It m:lintains thP same po~1t10n illl 
thls Cour.t~ Sre Brief for the United States, at 51 n. 4'Z~ 
'?3- 1701--0PINtON 
36 U. S. v. NATIONAL ASSN. SECURITIES DEALERS 
satisfies the strict statutory requirements of that Act 
and thus qualifies to engage in supervised regulation of 
the trading activities of its membership, 15 U. S. C, 
§ 78o-3 (b), it requires registered associations thereafter 
to submit for Commission approval any proposed rule 
changes, id., § 78o-3 (j). The Maloney Act additionally 
authorizes the SEC to request changes in or supplemen~ 
tation of association rules, a power that recently has been 
exercised with respect to some of the precis~ conduct. 
questioned in this litigation, see n. 31, supra. If such a 
request is not complied with, the SEC may order such 
changes itself. Id., § 78o-3 (k)(2). 
The SEC, in its exercise of authority over association 
rules and practices, is charged with protection of the 
public interest as well as the interests of shareholders, 
see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 78o-3 (a)(1), (b)(3), (c), 
t and it repeatedly has indicated that it weighs competi-
tive concerns in the exercbe of its continued supervisory 
responsibility. See, e. g., In re Nat. Assn. of Securities 
Dealers, Inc., 18 S. E. C. 424, 236, 486-486-487 (1945); 
Proposed Amendment to The Rules of Fair Practice of 
Nat. Assn. of Se·curities Dealer3, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38, 43-46 
(1941); see also 1974 Staff Report, at 105, 109. As the 
Cou!'t previously has recognized, United States v. Socony~ 
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 227 n. 60 (1940), the 
investiture of such pervasive supervisory authority in 
the SEC suggests that Congress intended to lift the ban 
of the Sherman Act from association activities approved 
by the SEC. 
We further conclude that appellant's attack on NASD 
interpretations of those rules cannot be maintained under 
the Sherman Act, for we see no meaningful distinction 
between the association's rules and the manner in which 
it construes and implements them. Each is equally a. 
.subject of SEC oversight, 
·. 
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Finally, we hold that appellant's additional challenges 
to the alleged activities of the membership of the 
NASD designed to encourage the kinds of restraints 
averred in Counts II-VIII likewise are precluded 
by the regulatory authority vested in the SEC by 
the Maloney and Investment Company Ac~. It 
should be noted that appellant does not contend that 
appellees' activities have had the purpose or effect of 
restraining competition among the various funds. 44 In-
stead, appellant urges in Count I that appellees' alleged 
conspiracy was designed to encourage the suppression of' 
intrafund secondary market activities, precisely the re-
striction that the SEC consistently has approved pursu-
ant to § 22 (f) for nearly 35 years. This close rela-. 
tionship is fatal to appellant's ccmplaint, as the Commis-
sion's regulatory approval of the restrictive agreements 
challenged in Counts II-VIII cannot be reconciled with 
appellant's attack on the ancillary activities averred in 
Count I. And this conclusion applies with equal force· 
now that the SEC has determined to introduce a con-
trolled measure of competition into the secondary market. 
There can be little question that the broad regulatory 
authority conferred upon the SEC by the Maloney and 
Investment Company Acts enables it to monitor the 
act:vities questioned in Count I, and the history of Com~ 
mission regulations suggests no laxness in the exercise 
of this authority.45 To the extent that any of appellees' 
44 Indeed, it appears that vigorous inter-brand competition exists 
in the mutual-fund industry-between the load funds themselves, 
between load and no-load funds, between open and closed-end com· 
panies, and between all of these investment forms and other invest-
ments. See 1974 Staff Report, at 20 et seq. 
45 As SEC Chairman Garrett observed in his letter submitting the· 
1974 Staff Report for congressional consideration, "No issuer of 
securities is subject to more detailed regulation than a mutual 
{und." Letter' .from Ray Garrett,. Jr.,. Chairman, Securities andt 
• '1· 
,. •. f 
··~ ._ '. .~ 
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ancillary activities frustrate the SEC's regulatory objec-
tives it has ample authority to eliminate them.46 
Here implied repeal of the antitrust laws is "necessary 
to make the [regulatory scheme] work." Silver v. New 
York Stock Exchange, .supra. In generally similar situa-
tions, we have implied immunity in particular and dis-
crete instances to assure that the federal agency entrusted 
with regulation in the public interest could carry out that 
responsibility free from the disruption of conflicting judg-
ments that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdic-
tion under the antitrust laws. See Hughes Tool Co. v. 
Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (19·73) ; Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 296 
( 1963) . In this instance, maintenance of an antitrust 
action for activities so directly related to the SEC's re · 
sponsibilities poses a substantial danger that appellees 
would be subjected to duplicative and inconsistent stand-
ards. This is hardly a result that Congress would have 
mandated. We therefore hold that with respect to the 
activities challenged in Count I of the complaint, the 
Sherman Act has been displaced by the pervasive regu-
latory scheme established by the Maloney and Invest-
ment Company Acts. 
Affirmed. 
Exchange Commission to the Honorable J ohn Sparkman, Chairman 
of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United 
States Senate (Nov. 4, 1974), contained in 1974 S~aff Report, at v. 
«The Commission can,. for example, require amendment of the 
NASD rules regulating the conduct of its membership, see 15 
U. S. C. § 78o-3 (k) (2), or exercise the more general rulemaking 
power conferred by § 38 (a) of the 'Investment Comp::my Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 80a-38 (a), to contain any of the challenged activities 
that might in any way frustrate its regulation of the restrictions it 
~1.\thorizes under § 22 (f). 
·. 
NOTE: Where lt ts feasible, a ayllabus (headnote) wtll be re-
leased, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United Statea v. Detroit Lumber 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
SECURITIES DF.ALERS, INC., ET AL. 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
No. 73-1701. Argued March 17, 1975-Decided June 26, 1975 
Section 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides 
that "no dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any person 
except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, except at 
a current public offering price described in the prospectus." Sec-
tion 22 (f) authorizes mutual funds to impose restrictions on 
the negotiability and transferability of shares, provided they 
conform with the fund's registration statement and do not con-
travene any rul<'s and regulations that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) may prescribe in the interests of the holders 
of all of the outstanding securities. Section 2 (6) of that Act 
defines a "broker" as a person engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities for the account of others, and § 2 ( 11) 
defines a "dealer" as a person regularly engaged in the business 
of buying and selling securities for his own account. The Maloney 
Act of 1938 (§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) sup-
plements the SEC's regulation of over-the-counter markets by 
providing a system of cooperative self-regulation through volun-
tary associations of brokers and dealers. The Government 
brought this action against appellee National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD), certain mutual funds, mutual-fund 
underwriters, and broker-dealers, alleging that appellees, in viola-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act, combined and agreed to restrict 
the sale and fix the resale prices of mutual-fund shares in second-
ary market transactions between dealers, from an investor to a 
dealer, and between investors through brokered transactions, and 
sought to enjoin such agreements. Count I of the complaint 
charged a honzontal combination and conspiracy among NASD's 
members to prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market in 
I 
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the purchase and sale of mutual-fund shares, the Government 
contending that such count was r:ot to be read as direct attack 
on NASD rules, but on NASD's interpretations and appellees' 
extension of tho rules so as to include a secondary market. 
Counts II-VIII alleged various vertical restrictions on secondary 
market activities. The District Court dismissed the complaint 
on the grounds that §§ 22 (d) and (f), when read in conjunction 
with the Maloney Act, afforded antitrust immunity from all of 
the challenged practices. lt further determined. that, apart from 
this statutory immunity, the pervasive regulatory scheme estab-
lished by these statutes conferred an implied immunity from anti-
trust sanction. The court concluded that the § 22 (d) price 
maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" applied to transactions 
in which a broker-dealer acts as statutor~r "broker" rather than 
a r;:tatutory "dealer,'! and thus that § 22 (d) governs transactions 
in which the broker-dealer acts as an agent for ::m investor as 
well as those in which he acts as a principal selling shares for 
his own account. Held: 
1. Neither the language nor legislative history of § 22 (d) 
justifies extending the section's price maintenance mandate beyond 
its literal terms to encompass transactions by broker-dealers act-
ing as statutory "brokers." Pp. 15-24. 
(a) To construe § 22 (d) to cover all broker-dealer trans-
actions would displace the antitrust laws by implication and also 
would impinge on thr SEC's more flexible authority under § 22 (f). 
Implied antitrust immunity can be justified only by a convincing 
showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the 
regulatory system, and here no such showing has been made. 
P. 23. 
(b) Such an expansion of § 22 (d)'s coverage would serve 
neither this Coures respomibility to reconcile the antitrust and 
regulatory statutes where feasible nor the Court's obligation to 
interpret the Investment Company Act in a manner most con-
ducive to the effectuation of its goals. Pp. 23-24. 
2. The vertical re~;trictions sought to be enjoined in Counts 
II-VIII are among tlw kinds of agreements authorized by§ 22 (f), 
and hence such restrictions are immune from liability under the 
Sherman Art. Pp. 24-33. 
(a) The restrictions on transferability and negotiability con-
templated by § 22 (f) include rest rictions on the distribution 
system for mutual-fund shares as well as limitations on the face 
·of the shares themselves. To interpret the section as cove~ing 
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only the latter would disserve the broad remedial function of 
the section, which, as a complement to § 22 (d)'s protection against 
disruptive price competition caused by dealers' "bootleg market'' 
trading of mutual-fund shnrt>s, authorizes the funds and the 
SEC to deal more fit>xibly with othrr detrimental trading practices 
by imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability and 
negotiability. Pp. 25-29. 
(b) To contend, as the Government does, that the SEC's 
exercise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give rise 
to an implied immunity for agreements conforming with § 22 (f) 
misconcrivcs the statute's intended operation. By its terms 
§ 22 (f) authorizes properly disclosed restrictions unless they are 
inconsistent with SEC rules or regulations and thus authorizes 
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restrictions subject 
to SEC disapproval. Pp. 30-32 
(c) The SEC's authority would be compromised if the agree-
ments challenged in Counts II-VIII were deemed actionable under 
the Sherman Act. There can be no reconciliation of the SEC's 
authority under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restrictive 
agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that they are 
illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust laws must give way 
if the regulatory scheme t>stablished by the, Investment Company 
Act is to work. Pp. 32-33. 
3. The activities charged in Count I are neither required by 
§ 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22 (f), and therefore cannot find 
antitrust shelter therein. The SEC's exercise of regulatory 
authority under the Maloney and Investment Company Acts is 
sufficiently pervasive, however, to confer implied immunity from 
antitrust liability for such activities. Pp. 33-38. 
374 F . Supp. 95, affirmed. 
PowELL, .T., deliwr<'d the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER, 
C. J., and STEWART, BLAcKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined·. 
WHITE, .T., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DouGLAS, BRENNANr 
and MARSHALL, JJ ., JO.ll'ted:.. 
NOTICE : This opinion Is subject to formal revision before publlcatloll. 
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re-
quested to notify the lteporter of D~cislons, Supreme Court of the 
Unite(! States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary prln t goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 73-1701 
United States, Appellant, 
v. 
National Association of 
Securities Dealers, 
Inc., et al. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the District of Columbia. 
[June 26, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
This appeal requires the Court to determine the extent 
to which the regulatory authority conferred upon the 
Securities and Exchange Commission by the Maloney Act 
and the Investment Company Act of 1940 displaces the 
strong antitrust policy embodied in § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. At issue is whether certain sales and distribution 
practices employed in marketing securities of open-end 
management companies, popularly referred to as "mutual 
funds," are immune from antitrust liability. We con-
clude that they are, and accordingly affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
I 
An "investment company" invests in the securities of 
other corporations and issues securities of its own.1 
1 The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines "investment com-
pany" to include any issuer of securities which 
"(1) is or holds itself out as bemg engaged primarily, or pro-
poses to engage primarily, in thr busine::;s of investing, reinvesting, 
<lr trading in securities; 
"(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing 
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Shares in an investment company thus represent propor~ 
tionate interests m its investment portfolio, and their 
value fluctuates in relation to the ch:tnges in the value 
of the securitie~ it owns. The most common form of 
investment company, the "open end" company or mutual 
fund, is required by law to redeem its secur.ities on demand 
at a price approximating their proportionate share of the 
fund's net asset value at the time of redemption.2 In 
order to avoid liquidation through redemption, mutual 
funds continuously issue and sell new shares. These 
features-continuous and unlimited distribution and com-
pulsory redemption-are, as the Court recently recog-
nized, "unique characteristic [s]" of this form of invest-
ment. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U. S. 546, 547 
(1973). 
The initial distribution of mutual-fund shares is con-
ducted by a principal underwriter, often an affiliate of 
the fund, and by broker-dealers 3 who contract with that 
face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been 
engagrd m such busine1<s and has any such certificate outstandmg; or 
"(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, owning, haWing, or trading in securities, and owns or 
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 
40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of 
Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis." 
15 U. S. C. § 80a-3 (a) . 
Tlus broad definition is qualified, however, by a series of specific 
exemptions. See id., §§ SOa-3 (b) and (c) 
'!See 15 U S. C.§ SOa-2 (a) (32), id., § SOa-22 (c) . 
Management investment compames whose securities lack this 
redeemability feature are defined as "closed-end" companies, id., 
§ 80a- 1), nnd the1r ~ale~ and distributiOn pract1crs are regulated 
under § 23 of the Act. Id., § 80a-23. Section 22, the provision 
under consideration in this appeal, governs the sales and distribu-
tiOn practices of "open-end'' compames only. 
B In this opimon we will usc the term "broker-dealer" to refef' 
generally to persons registered under the Securities Exchange Aot 
of 19a4, 15 U. S. C. 78o et seq, and authorized to effect trans. 
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underwriter to sell the securities to the public. The 
sales price commonly consists of two components, a sum 
calculated from the net asset value of the fund at the 
time of purchase, and a "load," a sales charge represent-
ing a fixed percentage of the net asset value. The load 
is divided between the principal underwriter and the 
broker-dealers, compensating them for their sales efforts.' 
The distribution-redemption system constitutes the 
primary market in mutual-fund shares, the operation of 
which is not questioned in this litigation. The parties 
agree that § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act 
requires broker-dealers to maintain a uniform price in 
sales in this primary market to all purchasers except the 
fund, its underwriters, and other dealers. And in view 
of this express requirement no question exists that anti-
trust immunity must be afforded these sales. This case 
focuses, rather, on thB potential secondary market in 
mutual-fund shares. 
Although a significant secondary market existed prior 
to enactment of the Investment Company Act, little 
presently remains. The United States agrees that the 
actwns or induce the purchase or sale of securities pursuant to the 
authorization of that Act. ·we also will refer separately to "brokers" 
and "dealers" as defined by the Investment Company Act, see 15 
U.S. C. §§ 80a-2 (a) (6) and (11), to describe the capacity in which 
a broker-dealer acts in a particular transaction. 
4 The Act defines "sales load" to be the difference between the 
public offering price and the portion of the sales proceeds that is 
invested or held for investment purposes by the issuer. I d., § 80a-
2 (a) (35). Most mutual funds rhnrgr this sales load in order to 
encourage vigorous sales efforts on the part of underwriters and 
broker-dealers. There are some funds that do not charge tlus addi-
tional sales fee. These "no load" funds generally sell directly to the 
mvestor without relying on the promotional and sales efforts of 
underwriters and brciker-dmlrrs. See SEC Report of the Division 
of lnvcstmeut Management Regul:ttion, Mutual Fund Distribution 
and § 22 (d) of ·the 1nvestment Company Act of 1940, 112 (August 
1974) (hereinafter HJ74 Staff Report) . 
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Act 'vas designed to restrict most of secondary market 
tradmg, but nonetheless contends that certain industry 
practices have extended the statutory limitation beyond 
its proper boundaries. The com1)laint in this action 
alleges that the defendants, appellees herein, combined 
and agreed to restrict the sale and fix the resale prices 
of mutual-fund shares in secondary market transactions 
between dealers, from an investor to a dealer, and be-
tween investors through brokered transactions.;' Named 
as defendants are the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD),6 and certain mutual funds/ mutual-
fund underwriters,8 and securities broker-dealers.0 
6 Two additional private antitrust actions premised on similar 
theories were filed in the Cistrict Court and subsequently dismissed, 
Haddad v. Crosby Corp. and Gross v. National Assn. of Securities 
Dealers, Inc., 374 F. Su11p. 95. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
tnct of Columbia stayed those appeals to await the resolution of 
th1s case, and the petition of one of the partie~ for certiorari before 
judgment was denied, G1·oss v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 
Inc., 419 U. S. 843 (1974) . 
Subsequent to the filing of the United States' compl:lint some 50 
private suits purporting to be class actions under Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 23 were filed in various district courts around the country. 
These cases were transferred to the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
LitJgatJOn, In l'e Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, Civil Ac-
tion No. Misc. 103-73. See 374 F. Supp., at 97 n. 4. The District 
Court deferred determination whether the actions could be main-
tamed as class actions under Rule 23 and additionally postponed 
discovery and other activity pending disposition of the motion to 
chsmJ~s Ill this rase. l d., at 114 
'• The National AssociatiOn of Securities Dealers is rrgistered under 
§ 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 19.'34, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3, 
the so-called Maloney Act of 1938. Tlw Maloney Act supp[e .. 
rnents the Securitief5 and Exchange Commission's regulation of the 
over-the-counter marketR by providmg a system of cooperative self-
r" ''nloiinn thrOUJrh vnh h•· ,. '''"~ ir+ •nJW of hrnkrrs }llHi nr·l]Pr<> 
•• c ..... '" U'' '"' " .. ~~\WJ'Itmns nwy rt>glstP1' with tl!(' Comnd~sion 
fF'ooft>.OcCJ ?', 8, llhd. ,t:~ ar•' r111 ;). l(l 
- - ···-- ·- ~ - - ---- ----· .~.,....."'---
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The United States charges that these agreements vio-
late § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1,10 and prays 
that they be enjoined under § 4 of that Act. /d., § 4. 
Count I charges a horizontal combination and con-
spiracy among the members of appellee N ASD to pre-
vent the growth of a secondary dealer market in the 
purchase and suk of mutual-fund shares. See n. 42, 
pursuant to specified terms and conditions, and authorizes them to 
promulgate rules designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative 
practices; to promote equitable principles of trade; to safeguard 
against unreasonable profits and charges; and generally to protect 
inve.:;tors and the public interest. !d., § 78o-3 (b) (8). The Act 
also authorizes the SEC to exercise a significant oversight function 
over the rules and activities of thE: registered associations. See, e. g., 
id., §§ 78o-3 (b), (e), (h), (J), and (k). The NASD is presently 
the only association registered under this Act. 
7 The mutual funds na,ned as defendants in this action are 
Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, Inc., Fidelity Fund, 
Inc., and Wellington Fund, Inc. 
8 The defendant underwriters include the Crosby Corporation, 
Vance Sanders & Co., and the Wellington Management Company. 
9 Named as defendant broker-dealers are the following: Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Bache & Company, Inc., 
Reynolds Securities Corp., F. I. duPont, Glore Forgan, Inc., E. F. 
Hutton, Inc., Walston & Company, Inc., Dean Witter & Company, 
Inc., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., and Hornblower & 
Weeks-Hemphill, NoyPs, Inc. 
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: 
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . • 
"Every person who shall make any c0ntract or engage in any combi-
nation or conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be· 
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand 
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said! 
punishments, in the discretion of the court .. " 
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infra. Counts II-VIII, by contrast , allege various ver-
tical restrictions on secondary market activities. In 
Counts II, IV, and VI the United States charges that the 
principal underwriters and broker-dealers entered into 
agreements that compel the maintenance of the public 
offering price in brokerage transactions of specified 
mutual-fund shares, and that prohibit interdealer trans-
actions by allowing each broker-dealer to sell and pur-
chase shares only to or from investors.11 Count VIII 
alleges that the broker-dealers entered into other, similar 
contracts and combinations with numerous principal 
underwriters. Counts III, V, and VII allege violations 
on the part of the principal underwriters and the funds 
themselves. In Cou11ts III and VII the various defend-
ants are charged with entering into contracts requiring 
the restrictive underwriter-dealer agreements challenged 
:u The violations alleged in Count II are typical of those charged 
in Counts IV and VI. In Count II, appellee Crosby, a principal 
underwriter of appellee Fidelity Fund, Inc., is charged with entering 
into contracts and combmations with appellee broker-dealers, the 
substantial terms of whic!1 are that 
"(a) each brokerjdealer must maintain the public offering price in 
any brokerage transaction in which it participates involving the 
purchase or sale of shares of the F1dehty Funds; and 
"(b) each broker frlealer must sell shares of the Fidelity Funds only 
to investors or the fund and purchase such shares only from investors 
or the fund." App. 10-11. 
Count VI, in addition to charging restnctive agreements similar to 
the above, alleged that appellee Wellington, a principal underwriter, 
agreed to act only as an agent of t11e appropriate mutual fund in all 
transactions with the broker-dealers. ld., at 15. 
The alleged effect of the restnctive agreement charged in ~ (a) 
was to inhibit the growth and drvelopmrnt of a brokerage market 
in mutual fund shares. The alleged effect of the restriction identi.,. 
fied in ~ (b), by contrast, was to inh1bit interdraler transactions and 
tlms to restrict the growth and development of a secondary dealer 
market. Td", at 11 
73-1701-0PINION 
U. S. v. NATIONAL ASSN. SECURITIES DEALERS 1 
in Counts II and VI. Count V charges that the agree-
ment between one fund and its underwriter restricted the 
latter to serving as a principal for its own account in all 
transactions with the public, thereby prohibiting broker-
age transactions in the fund's shares. App. 14. 
After carefully examining the structure, purpose and 
history of the Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80a-1 et seq., and the Maloney Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78o-3, 
the District Court held that this statutory scheme 
was "incompatible with the maintenance of [an] anti-
trust action," 347 F. Supp., at 109, quoting Silver v. New 
York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 358 (1963). The 
court concluded that§§ 22 (d) and (f) of the Investment 
Company Act, when read in conjunction with the Ma-
loney Act, afford antitrust immunity for all of the prac-
tices here challenged. The court further held that 
apart from this explidt statutory immunity, the per-
vasive regulatory scheme established by these statutes 
confers an implied immunity from antitrust sanction in 
the "narrow area of distribution and sale of mutual 
fund shares." 374 F. Supp., at 114. The court accord-
ingly dismissed the complaint, and the United States 
appealed to this Court.12 
The position of the United States in this appeal can 
be summarized briefly. Noting that implied repeals of 
the antitrust laws are not favored, see, e. g., United States 
v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 348 
(1963), the United States urges that the antitrust im-
munity conferred by § 22 of the Investment Company 
Act should not extend beyond its precise terms, none-of 
which, it maintains, requires or authorizes the practices 
12 The Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 15, 1974, 
419 U. S. 822. Accordingly, the recent amendments to the Expedit-
ing Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29, as amended by 88 Stat. 1709, do not 
affect our jurisdiction. 
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here challenged. The United States maintains, moreover, 
that the District Court expanded the parameters of the 
implied immunity doctrine beyond those recognized by 
decisions of this Court. In response, appellees advance 
all of the positions relied on by the District Court. They 
are joined by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) , which asserts as amicus curiae that the reg-
ulatory authority conferred upon it by § 22 (f) of the 
Investment Company Act displaces § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The SEC contends, therefore, that the District 
Court properly dismissed Counts II-VIII but takes no 
position with respect to Count I. 
II 
A 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 originated in 
congressional concern that the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U. S. C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchang~ Act of 
1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq., were inadequate to protect 
the purchasers of investment company securities. Thus, 
in § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 79z-4, Congress directed the SEC to study 
the structures, practices and problems of investment 
companies with a view toward proposing further legisla-
t ion. Four years of intensive scrutiny of the industry 
culminated in the public::ttion of the Investment Trust 
Study and the recommendation of legislation to rectify 
the problems and abuses it identified. After extensive 
congressional consideration, the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 was adopted. 
The Act vests in the SEC broad regulatory authority 
over the business practices of investment companies.18 
15 For example, the Act requires companies to register with the 
SEC, 15 U. S. C. § SOa-8, see also, id., § 80a-7. Companies also 
must register all securities they issue, see Securities Exchange Act of 
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We are concerned on this appeal with § 22 of the Act, 
id., § SOa-22, which controls the sales and distribution of 
mutual-fund shares. The questions presented require 
us to determine whether § 22 (d) obligates appellees 
to engage in the practices challenged in Counts II-VIII 
and thus necessarily confers antitrust immunity for them. 
If not, we must determine whether such practices 
are authorized by § 22 (f) and, if so, whether they 
are immune from antitrust sanction. Resolution of 
these issues will be facilitated by examining the nature of 
the problems and abuses to which § 22 is addressed, a 
matter to which we now turn. 
B 
The most thorough description of the sales and distri-
bution practices of mutual funds prior to passage of the 
Investment Company Art may be found in Part III of 
the Investment Trust Study.14 That study, as Congress 
1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a; Investment Company Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80a-24 (a), and must submit for SEC inspection copies of the 
sales literature they send to prospective investors. I d., § 80a-24 (b). 
The Investment Company Act requires the submission and periodic 
updating of detailed financial reports and documentation and the 
semiannual transmission of reports containing similar information 
to the shareholders. /d ., § 80a-29. It also imposes controls and 
restrictions on the internal management of investment companies: 
establishing minimum capital requirements, id., § 80a-14; limiting 
permissible methods for selecting directors, id., § 80a-16; and estab-
li::;hing certain qualifications for persons seeking to affiliate with 
thE' companiPs, id., § 80a-9. Fmally, the Act imposes a num-
ber of controls on the internal practices of investment companies. 
For example, it requires a majority shareholder vote for certain 
fundamental business decisions, id., § 30a-13, and limits certain 
dividend distributions, id., § 80a-19. See generally, the Mutual Fund 
Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Law. 732 (1969). 
14 SEC Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, 
H. R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940) (The Investment 
Trust Study) . In this opinion we will refer primarily to Part III of 
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has recognize~, see 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1, forms the initial 
basis for any evaluation of the Act. 
Prior to 1940 the basic framework for the primary dis-
tribution of mutual-fund shares was similar to that exist-
ing today. The fund normally retained a principal 
underwriter to serve as a wholesaler of its shares. The 
principal underwriter in turn contracted with a number 
of broker-dealers to sell tho fund's shares to the invest-
ing public.15 The price of the shares was based on the 
fund's net asset value at the approximate time of sale, 
and a sales commission or load was added to that price. 
Although prior to 1940 the primary distribution sys-
tem for mutual-fund shares was similar to the present 
one, a number of conditions then existed that largely 
disappeared following passage of the Act. The most 
prominently discussed characteristic was the "two-
price system," which encouraged an active secondary 
market under conditions that tolerated disruptive 
and discriminatory trading practices. The two-price 
system reflected the relationship between the com-
monly used method of computing the daily net asset 
value of mutual-fund shares and the manner in which 
the price for the following day was established. The net 
the Study, and all citations w111 be to that part unless otherwise 
designated. For aciditional discussion of the operations of open-end 
management investment companies, see 1974 Staff Report; SEC 
Report of the Staff on the Potential Economic Impact of a Repeal 
of § 22 (d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (November 
1972); SEC Report on Public Policy Implications of Investment 
Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 
(hereinafter the 1966 SEC Report); SEC Report of the Special 
Study of Securities Markets, c. XI, Open-End Investment Com-
panies (Mutual Funds), H. R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1963) (hereinafter 1963 Special Study). 
15 The broker-dealers oprrn ting within the primary distribution 
system are denominated "contract dealers" in the Study and will be· 
so identified in this opimon 
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asset value of mutual funds, which depends on the mar· 
ket quotations of the stocks in their investment port-
folios, fluctuates constantly. Most funds computed their 
net asset values daily on the basis of the fund's portfolio 
value at the close of exchange trading, and that figure 
established the sales price that would go into effect at a 
specified hour on the following day. During this interim 
period two prices were known: the present day's trading 
price based on the portfolio value established the previ-
ous day; and the following day's price, which was based 
on the net asset value computed at the close of exchange 
trading on the present day. One aware of both prices 
could engage in "riskless trading" during this interim 
period. See Investment Trust Study, at 851-852. 
The two-price system did not benefit the investing 
public generally. Some of the mutual funds did not 
explain the system thoroughly, and unsophisticated in-
vestors probably were unaware of its 6xistence. See id., 
at 867. Even investors who knew of the two-price 
system and understood its operation were rarely in a 
position to exploit it fully. It was possible, however, 
for a knowledgeable investor to purchase shares in a ris-
ing market at the current price with the advance infor-
mation that the next day's price would be higher. He 
thus could be guaranteed an immediate appreciation in 
the market value of his investment/6 although this ad-
vantage was obtained at the expense of the existing share-
1 6 The Study indicates that mutual funds increasingly began to 
disclose more information about the existence and operation of the 
two-price system. See Investment Trust Study, at 867-868. And 
in some instances the funds encouraged broker-dealers to explain 
to potential incoming investors the immrdiate appreciation in in-
vestment value that could be obtained from the pricing system in 
the hope of encouraging the purchase of shares. I d., at 854. See 
1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 138. 
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holders, whose equity interests were diluted by a cor-
responding amount.17 The load fee that was charged 
in the sale of mutual funds to the investing public made 
it difficult for these investors to realize the "paper gain" 
obtained in such trading. Because the daily fluctuation 
in net asset value rarely exceeded the load, public in-
vestors generally were una~le to realize immediate profits 
from the two-price system by engaging in rapid in-and-
out trading. But insiders, who often were able to pur-
chase shares without paying the load, did not operate 
under this constraint. Thus insiders could, and some-
times did, purchase shares for immediate redemption at 
the appreciated value. See n. 24, infra, and sources 
cited therein. 
The two-price system often afforded other advantages 
to underwriters and broker-dealers. In a falling market 
they could enhance profits by waiting to fill orders with 
shares purchased from the fund at the next day's antici-
pated lower price. In a similar fashion, in a rising mar-
ket they could take a "long position" in mutual-fund 
shares by establishing an inventory in order to satisfy 
anticipated purchases w1th securities previously obtained 
at a lower price. I d., at 854-855. In each case the 
investment company would receive the lower of the two 
prevailmg prices for its shares, id., at 854, and the equity 
interests of shareholders would suffer a corresponding 
dilution. 
As a result, an active secondary market in mutual-
fund shares existed. !d., at 865-867. Principal under-
writers and contract broker-dealers often maintained 
17 The existing shareholders' eqmty !nterests were diluted because 
the incoming investors bought mto the fund at less than the actual 
value of the shares at tlw tune of purcha~. Moreover, SEC testi-
mony indicated that this dilution could be substantial. In one 
instancr the Commis;;ion calrulatcd that the two-price system re-
!'lUlted in a loss to existmg shareholders of one trust of some $133,000 
in a single day. !d., at 139-140. 
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inventory positions established by purchasing shares 
through the primary distribution system and by buy-
ing from other dealers and retiring shareholders."8 Ad-
ditionally, a "bootleg market" sprang up, comprised 
of broker-dealers having no contractual relationship with 
the fund or its principal underwriter. These bootleg 
dealers purchased shares at a discount from contract 
dealers or bought them from retiring shareholders at a 
price slightly higher than the redemption price. Bootleg 
dealers would then offer the shares at a price slightly 
lower than that required in the primary distribution sys-
tem, thus "initiating a small scale price war between re-
tailers and tend[ing] generally to disrupt the established 
offering price." I d., at 865. 
Section 22 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
was enacted with these abuses in mind. Sections 22 (a) 
and (c) were designed ~o "elimina t [ e] or red uc [ e] as 
far as reasonably practicable any dilution of the value 
of other outstanding securities , . . or any other result of 
[the] purchase, redemption or sale [of mutual fund 
securities] which is unfair to holders of such other out-
standing securities," 15 U.S. C. § 80a-22 (a). They au-
thorize the N ASD and the SEC to regulate certain pric-
ing and trading practices in order to effectuate that 
goal.19 Section 22 (b) authorizes registered securities 
18 Contract dealers tradmg from an mventory position often could 
obtain an additional profit from the sales load. When the dealer 
acted as an agent for the fund and traded from the primary distri-
bution system, the dealer and ihe underwriter divided the load 
charge in accordance with the sales agreement . But the dealer 
could retain the full load when he fillPd the purchase order from an 
inventory position in shares purclvtsed from retiring shareholders 
or other dealers. !d., at 858-859. 
w SectiOns 22 (a) and (c) refiect the same basie relationship between 
the SEC and the NASD that 1s \'~tahli~lwd by the Maloney Act. 
Eke n. 6, supra. Sectwn :J2 (a) anthonze~ rPgibterecl securities a::;~<ori-· 
ations, in thi'> ca::;e the NASD, to prPscnbe rules for the regulation of 
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associations and the SEC to prescribe the maximum 
sales commissions or loads that can be charged in con-
nection with a primary distribution; and ~ 22 (e) pro-
tects the right of redemption by restricting mutual funds' 
power to suspend redemption or postpone the date of 
payment. 
The issues presented in this litigation revolve around 
subsections (d) and (f) of § 22. Bearing in mind the 
history and purposes of the Investment Company Act, 
we now consider the effect of these subsections on the 
question of potential antitrust liability for the practices 
here challenged. 
III 
Section 22 (d) prohibits mutual funds from selling 
shares at other than the current public offering price to 
any person except either to or through a principal under-
writer for distribution. It further commands that "no 
these matters. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (:1). The mdustry thus is 
afforded the initial opportunity to police its own practices. If, how-
ever, industry self-regulation proves insufficient, § 22 (c) authorizes 
the Commission to make rules and regulations "cowring the same 
subject matter, and for the accomplishment of the ~ame ends as are 
prescribed in subsection (a)," and proclaims that the SEC rules and 
regulations supersede any incon~istent rules of the regi~tered secun-
t,es associatiOn. Id., § SOa-22 (c). 
Shortly after enactment of the Investment Company Act the 
NASD propo5ed, and the SEC approved, a rule establishing twice-
daily pricing. See Proposed Amendment to the Rules of Fair 
Practice of the NASD, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38 (1941) . Twice-daily 
pncing reduced the time penod in which persons could engage in 
nskless trading and correspondingly drrrcascd the potential for 
dilution. The CommiAsJon subsequently prm·idcd full protcctwn 
against the diluhve effects of ri:-:klcss tradmg. In late 1968 it cxer-
cJsed its authority under § 22 (c) to bdopt Rule 22c-1, which re-
quires all funds to establish "forward priring," Forwnrd priring 
eliminates the potential for risldcss trading :1ltogether. Sec Adoptwn 
of Rule 22c-1, Inv. Co. Art Rcl. No. 5519 (1968), CCII Fed. Sec . L 
Rep. fi77,616; 17 CFR §270,22c-l. 
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dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any person ex-
cept a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer, 
except at a. current public offering price described in the 
prospectus." 15 U. S. S. § 80a-22 (d).20 By its terms, 
§ 22 (d) excepts interdealer sales from its price mainte-
nance requirement. Accordingly, this section cannot be 
relied upon by appellees as justification for the restric-
tions imposed upon interdealer transactions. At issue, 
rather, is the narrower question whether the § 22 (d) 
price maintenance mandate for sales by "dealers" ap-
plies to transactions in which a broker-dealer acts 
as a statutory "broker" rather than a statutory "dealer." 
The District Court concluded that it does, and thus that 
§ 22 (d) governs transactions in which the broker-dealer 
acts as an agent for an investor as well as those in which 
he acts as a principal selling shares for his own account. 
A 
The District Court's decision reflects an expansive 
view of § 22 (d). The Investment Company Act spe-
cifically defines "broker" and "dealer" 21 and uses the 
20 Tins section provides m pertinent part: 
"No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable 
security issued by it to any person except either to or through a 
principal underwnter for distribution or at a current public offer-
mg price described in the pro8pectus, and, if such class of security 
is bemg currently offered to the public by or through an under-
writer, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer 
shall sell any such secunty to any person except a dealer, a prin-
cip~l underwriter, or the issuer, except at a current public offering 
price described in the prospectus." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (d). 
21 The Investment Company Act detines a "dealer" to be : 
"[A]ny per:.;on regHlarl~· rngagrcl m the business of buying and 
sellmg securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, 
but does not include a bank, msuranre company, or investment com-
pany, or any person insofar as he is engaged in investing, reinvesting, 
or trading in :;ccuriti<'s, or in owning or holding 8ecurities, for his 
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terms distinctively throughout.22 Appellees maintain1 
however, that the defintion of "dealer" is sufficiently 
broad to require price maintenance in brokerage transac-
tions. In support of this position appellees assert that 
the critical elements of the dealer definition are that 
the term relates to a "person" rather than to a trans-
action and that the person must engage "regularly" in 
the sale and purchase of securities to qualify as a dealer. 
It is argued, therefore, that any person who purchase~ 
and sells securities with sufficient regularity to qualify as 
a statutory dealer is thereafter bound by all dealer re-
strictions, regardless of the nature of the particular 
transaction in question. We do not :find this argument 
persuasive. 
Appellees' reliance on the statutory reference to "per-
son" in defining dealer adds little to the analysis, for the 
Act defines "broker," "investment banker," "issuer," 
"underwriter," and others to be "pel'sons" as well. See id.; 
§ § SOa-2 (a) ( 6), (21), (22), & ( 40). In each instance, the 
own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but 
hot as a part of a regular business." 15 U S. C. § SOa-2 (a) (11). 
A "broker," by contrast, is defined to be·: 
"[A]ny person engaged in the l.msine~s of effecting transactions in 
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank or 
any persoii solely by feaSou of the fact that such person is an 
underwriter for one br more investment companies." !d., § SOa-2 
(a)(6) . 
22 Congress employed the term "broker" without reference to 
"dealer" in various sections of the Act~ See id., §§ SOa-3 (c) (2); 
80a-10 (b) (1); SOa-17 (e) (l) and (2) , In other instances, the Act 
refers to "deaier" without reference to "broker," see id., §§ SOa-2 (a) 
(40); SOa-22 (c) and (d). And in some cases, including the very 
definition of the term "dealer" itself, sec n. 21, supra, the Act refers 
td both "bfoker" and "dealer'' in the same provision, see id., §§ 80a-i 
(b) (2); 80a-9 (a) (1) and (2) , and SOa-30 (a). Finally, the Act 
in some cases refers to the more general term "broker-dealer," see 
id.; §§ 80a-22 (b) (1) and (2). 
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critical distinction relates to their transactional capacity. 
Moreover, we think that appellees reliance on the regu-
larity requirement in the dealer definition places undue 
emphasis on that element at the expense of the remainder 
of the provision. On the face of the statute the most 
apparent distinction between a broker and a dealer is that 
the former effects transactions for the account of others· 
and the latter buys and sells securities for his own account. 
We therefore cannot agree that the terms of the Act 
compel the conclusion that a broker-dealer acting in a 
brokerage capacity would be bound by the § 22 (d)' 
dealer mandate. Indeed, the language of the Act sug-
ge~ts the opposite result. 
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the statutory defi-
nition is ambiguous, we find nothing in the extensive· 
contemporaneous legislative history of the Investment 
Company Act to justify interpreting § 22 (d) to encom-
pass brokered transactions. That history is sparse,23 and 
28 The original Commission-sponsored bill considered in the initial 
hearings before the Senate Banking and Commerce Subcommittee, 
S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), contained no provision resem-
hling this subsection. Section 22 (d) first emerged in a compromise 
proposal advanced after a period of intensive consultation between 
the SEC and industry representatives that followed initial Senate 
hearings, see Hl40 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, at 1105-1107, and the 
C::Jmmission subsequently has indicated that this provision was sug-
gested by the industry. See Midamerica Mutual Fund, 41 S. E. C. 
328, 331 (1963); 1966 Public Policy Study, at 219. Revised legisla-
tion reflecting this compromise was submitted, and further hearings 
were conducted in the Senate and the House. Both bills were 
reported favorably by their respective committees, S. Rep. No. 1775, 
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H. R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d 
Sess. (1940), and the House bill, with minor amendments not rele-
vant to this appeal, was accepted by the Senate. 86 Cong. Rec. 
10069-10071. 
I ,'• ,, 
This history perhaps explains the dearth of discussion relating 
to § 22 (d). 'l'he majority of the Senate hearings were completed'. 
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suggests only that § 22 (d) was considered necessary to 
curb abuses that had arisen in the sales of securities to 
insiders as wcll,24 
The prohibition against insider trading would seem 
adequately served by the first clause of § 22 (d), which 
prevents mutual funds from selling shares at other than 
the public offering price to any person except a principal 
underwriter or dealer. See n. 20, supra.2~ The further 
restriction on dealer sales bears little relation to insider 
trading, however, and logically would be thought to serve 
some other purpose. The obvious effect of the dealer 
prohibition is to shield the primary distribution system 
from the competitive impact of unrestricted dealer trad-
ing in the secondary markets, a concern that was reflected 
before this provision was advanced, and both the Senate and House 
hearings that followed provide relatively little illumination as to 
the intended purpose or scope of this subsection. 
24 Insider trading abuses were identified as a problem during the 
Senate hearings that preceded submission of the compromise bill 
containing§ 22 (d), see 1940 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 526-5p7 and 
660-661. At the close of the initial Senate hearings an industry 
representative suggested that the Act should contain a provision 
prohibiting sales at preferential ternlS to insiders and others. Id., 
at 1057. The Commission and industry representatives thereafter 
met to seek a compromise on the various differences that had 
been identified in the Senate hearings, and the industry memoran-
dum outlining the nature of the resultant agreement again indicated 
that a provision should be added to the Act to prohibit insider 
trading. See Framework of Proposed Investment Company Bill 
(Title I), Memorandum Embodying Suggestions Resulting from Con-
ference Between Securities and Exchange Commission and Repre-
sentatives of Investment Companies (May 13, 1940), printed in 
1940 House Hearings, at 99. 
25 The insider trading prohibition is complimented by § 22 (g), 
whJCh precludes issuance of mutual fund shares for services or 
property other than cash or securities 15 U. S. C. § 80a-22 (g). 
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in the Study, see Investment Trust Study, at 865. The 
SEC perceives this to be one of the purposes of this 
provision.26 
But concluding that protection of the primary distri-
bution system is a purpose of § 22 (d) does little to resolve 
the question whether Congress intended to require strict 
price maintenance in all broker-dealer transactions with 
the investing public. By its terms, § 22 (d) protects only 
against the possibly disruptive effects of secondary dealer 
sales which, as statutorily defined, constituted the most 
active secondary market existing prior to the Act's pas-
sage. Nothing in the contemporary history suggests that 
Congress was equally concerned with possible disruption 
from investor transactions in outstanding shares con-
ducted through statutory brokers. 
Nor do we think that the history attending subsequent 
congressional consideration of the Act provides adequate 
support for appellees' contention that § 22 (d) requires 
strict price maintenance in all broker-dealer transactions 
in mutual-fund shares. To be sure, portions of the testi-
26 See Adoption of Rule N-22-D-1, Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 2798, 
p. 1 (1958), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 76,625, p. 80,393; Investors 
Diversified Services Inc., Inv. Co. Act. Rrl. No. 3015 (1960), CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 176,699, p. 80,620; In re Sideris, Exch. Act Rei. 
No. 8816, p. 2 (1970); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act 
Rei. No. 6932, p. 4 (1972). 
The SEC also has suggested that preventing discrimination 
among investors was one of the purposes of this provision. See, 
e. (].,In re Sideris, supra,· Midamerica Mutual Fund, Inc., 41 S. E. C. 
328, 331 (1963); Adoption of Rule N22-D-1, supra. But we do 
not think that brokeragf' transactions inevitably would foster 
the kind of investor discrimination sought to be remedied by this 
statute. All investors would be equally free to seek to engage in 
brokercd transactions, and the possibility that the more sophisti-
cated or fortuitous investor would profit from this market does 
not, by itself, bring this catrgory of transactions within the purview 
of§ 22 (d). 
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mony of SEC Chairman Cohen before the House 
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance in 1967 sug-
gested that the price maintenance requirement of § 22 
(d) encompassed all broker-dealers, irrespective of how 
they obtained the traded shares, 27 and on other occasions 
the Chairman referred to sales by brokers when discuss-
ing mutual fund transactions.28 Appellees also can point 
to congressional characterizations of § 22 (d) that suggest 
that some members of Congress understood the reach of 
that provision to be as broad as the District Court 
thought.29 
Appellees maintain that this history indicates that 
Congress always intended § 22 (d) to control broker as 
well as dealer transactions, and that it re-enacted the 
27 Responding to inquiries concerning the relationship of § 22 (d) 
and the operation of state law, Chairman Cohen stated: 
"The statute is unequivocal. No person, no matter where he gets 
it, from the issuer, from another dealer, or even from a private per-
son, no broker-dealer may sell a share of a particular fund at a 
price less than that fixed by the issuer." 1967 House Hearings, pt. 
2, at 711. 
28 !d., pt. 1, at 53. 
2 ~ Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Committee which reported the 1970 amendments to the full 
E'enate, stated on the floor of the Senate that § 22 (d) "now makes 
it a Federal crime for anyone to sell mutual fund shares a.t a price 
lower than that fixed by the fund's distributor." 115 Cong. Rec. 838 
(1969) (emphasis added). Senator Magnuson reflected perhaps a 
similar view, stating that, as a result of§ 22 (d) "mutual fund shares 
are totally insulated from price competition." 114 Cong. Rec. 23057 
(1968) (emphasis added). 
The testimony of some witnesses suggests that they shared this 
expansive view. See, e. g., Hearings on S. 1659 before the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 
at 741 (1967) (hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings) (testimony of 
Mr. Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange); id., 
pt. 1, at 348, 356 (testimony of Professor Samuelson); id., p. 2, 
.at 1064 (testimony of Professor Wallich). 
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amended § 22 with that purpose in mind. The Dis-
trict Court accepted this position, and it is not without 
some support in this historical record.30 But impressive 
evidence to the contrary is found in the position consist-
ently maintained by the SEC. Responding to an inquiry 
in 1941, the SEC General Counsel stated that § 22 (d) 
did not bar brokerage transactions in mutual fund shares: 
"In my opinion the term 'dealer,' as used in Sec-
tion 22 (d), refers to the capacity in which a broker-
dealer is acting in a particular transaction. It 
follows, therefore, that if a broker-dealer in a par-
ticular transaction is acting solely in the capacity 
of agent for a selling investor, or for both a selling 
investor and a purchasing investor, the sale may be 
made at a price other than the current offering price 
described in the prospectus. 
"On the other hand, if a broker-dealer is acting 
for his own account in a transaction and as principal 
sells a redeemable security to an investor, the public 
offering price must be maintained, even though the 
sale is made through another broker who acts as 
agent for the seller, the investor, or both. 
"As Section 22 (d) itself states, the offering price 
is not required to be maintained in the case of sales 
80 We conclude, however, that the context of the post-enactment 
history of § 22 (d) limits the force of the statements relied upon by 
appellees. A broker-dealer can serve in either a broker or a dealer's 
capacity, and the distinction between the two functions is rather 
technical and precise. The parties are in general agreement that 
no significant number of brokered transactions, as statutorily de-
fined, existed prior or subsequent to pm·sage of the Act. In view of 
the care with which the statute drfines these functions and the 
absence of focus on thesr distinction::; in the statements in the subse-
quent consideration of§ 22 (d), we think that the broader character~ 
izations of that sect~on must be viewed with some skepticism. 
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in which both the buyer and the seller are dealers 
acting as principals in the transactions." Inv. Co. 
Act. Rei. No. 78, March 4, 1941, 11 Fed. Reg. 10992 
( 1946). 
This substantially contemporaneous interpretation of the 
Act has consjstently been maintained in subsequent SEC 
opinions, see Oxford, Co., Inc., 21 S. E. C. 681, 690 
(1946); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. Rei. 
No. 6932, at 3 ( 1972). The same position was asserted in a 
recent Staff Report, see 1974 Staff Report, at 105 n. 2, 107 
n. 2, and 109 (1974), was relied on by the SEC in its sub-
sequent decision to encourage limited price competition 
in brokered transactions,31 and is advanced by it as amicus 
curiae in this Court. This consistent and longstanding 
interpretation by the agency charged with administration 
of the Act, while not controlling, is entitled consider-
able weight. See, e. g., Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65 
(1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 
81 Actmg m accordance with the recommendations of the Staff 
Report, the SEC Chairman recently requested that the NASD 
amend its Rules of Fair Practice to prohibit agreements between 
underwriters and broker-dealrrs that preclude broker-dealers, acting 
as agents, "from matching orders to buy and sell fund shares in a 
&econdary market at comprtitively determmed prices and commis-
sion rates." Letter from Mr. Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the 
SEC to Mr. Gordon S. Mack!in, President of the NASD, Novem-
ber 22, 1974, printed in addendum to brief of appellees Bache & 
Co., et al, at 18. The Chairman further rrvraled thE' SEC's inten-
tion to exerct.;e It~ regulatory authonty under § 22 (f) to neu-
tralize any ad' crse effects this market might have on the 
fund's prunarv dif'trihution sy~tem:-<. !d., at 19. As the Staff 
Report indicates, the Commission's exercise of regulatory authority 
iR premised on its view that § 22 (d) does not require strict price 
maintenance in brokered transactions. See 1974 Staff Report, at 
104. If § 22 (d) did r:ontrol these transactions as well as "dealer" 
sales, the Commission's abihty to encotu·,tge controlled competition 
in this market would bn snbject to question. 
73-1701-0PINION 
U. S. v. NATIONAL ASSN SECURITIES DEALERS 23 
U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 
1, 16 (1965). 
B 
The substance of appellees' position is that the dealer 
prohibition of § 22 (d) should be interpreted in generic 
rather than statutory terms. The price maintenance re-
quirement of that section accordingly would encompass 
all broker-dealer transactions with the investing public 
and would shelter them from antitrust sanction. But 
such an expansion of § 22 (d) beyond its terms would 
not only displace the antitrust laws by implication; it 
also would impinge seriously on the SEC's more flexible 
regulatory authority under§ 22 (£).32 
Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be 
justified only by a convincing showing of clear repug-
nancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory sys-
tem. See, e. g., United States v. Philadelphia National 
Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 348 (1963); United States v. 
Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 197-206 (19·39). We think 
no such showing has been made. Moreover, in ad-
dition to satisfying our responsibility to reconcile the 
antitrust and regulatory statutes where feasible, Silver 
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 356-357 
(1963), we must interpret the Investment Company Act 
82 The Department of Justice previously suggested a manner in 
which its interpretation of § 22 (d) could be reconciled with the 
Commission's exercise of regulatory authority over brokered trans-
actions. Addressing the questiOn of possible repeal of § 22 (d), the 
Justice Department suggested that rather than continue to wait 
for congressional repeal, the Commission should eliminate the adverse 
effects of price maintenance by freeing all transactions from the 
§ 22 (d) mandate through the exercise of its§ 6 (c) power of exemp-
tion, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-6 (c). !d., at 70. This presumably would 
leave the SEC free to regulate transactions through the exercise of 
the powers conferred to it by other provisions of the Act. We need 
not consider the validity of the Justice Department's broad inter-
pretation of the SEC's power of exemption, for even assuming it 
to be correct our analysis would not be affected. 
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in a manner most conductive to the effectuation of its 
goals. We conclude that appellee's interpretation of § 22 
(d) serves neither purpose, and cannot be justified by the 
language or history of that section. 
We therefore hold that the price maintenance mandate 
of § 22 (d) cannot be stretched beyond its literal terms 
to encompass transactions by broker-dealers acting as 
statutory "brokers." Congress defined the limitations 
for the mandatory price maintenance requirement of the 
Investment Company Act. "We are not only bound by 
those limitations but we arc bound to construe them 
strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege re-
strictive of a free economy." United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956). Accordingly, we 
hold that the District Court erred in relying on § 22 (d) 
in determining that the act ivities here questioned are 
immune from antitrust liability. 
IV 
Our determination that the restrictions on the second-
ary market are not immunized by § 22 (d) does not end 
the inquiry, for the District, Court also found them 
sheltered from antitrust liability by § 22 (f). Appellees, 
joie.ed by the SEC, defend this ruling and urge that it 
requires dismissal of the challenge to the vertical restric-
tions sought to be enJOined in Counts II- VIII. 
Section 22 (f) authorizes mutual funds to impose 
restrictions on the negotiability and transferability of their 
shares, provided they conform with the fund's regis-
tration statement and do not contravene any rules 
and regulations the f'ommission may prescribe in the 
interests of the holders of all of the outstanding securi-
ties.33 Appellant docs not contend that the vertical 
33 Section 22 (f) of the Act, 15 U S. C. § 80a-22 (f) , provides : 
'No registered open-end comJYWY shall restrict the t ransferability 
or negotiabil ity of any ~ecurity of which it is the issuer except in 
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restrictions are not disclosed in the registration state-
ments of the funds in question. Nor does it assert that 
the agreemen · · imposing such restrictions violate Com-
mission rules and regulations. Indeed, it could not do so, 
because to date the SEC has prescribed no such stand-
ards. Instead appellant maintains that the contractual 
restrictions do not come within the meaning of the Act, 
asserting that § 22 (f) does not authorize the imposition 
of restraints on the distribution system rather than on the 
shares themselves. Appellant thus apparently urges that 
the only limitations contemplated by this section are 
those that appear on the face of the certificate itself. 
Appellant also urges that the SEC's unexercised power 
to prescribe rules and regulations is insufficient to create 
repugnancy between its regulatory authority and the 
antitrust laws. 
Our examination of the language and history of§ 22 (f) 
persuades us, however, that the agreements challenged 
in Counts II-VIII are among the kinds of restrictions 
Congress contemplated when it enacted that section. And 
this conclusion necessarily leads to a determination that 
they are immune from liability under the Sherman Act, 
for we see no way to reconcile the Commission's power 
to authorize these restrictions with the competing man-
date of the antitrust laws. 
A 
Unlike § 22 (d), § 22 (f) originated in the Commission-
sponsored bill considered in the Senate subcommittee 
hearings that preceded introduction of the compromise 
proposal later enacted into law. The Commission-
conformity with the statements with respect thereto contained in 
its registration statement nor in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe in the interests of 
the holders of all of the outstanding securities of such investment 
company!' 
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sponsored provision authorized the SEC to promul-
gate rules, regulations or orders prohibiting restrictions 
on the transferability or negotiability of mutual fund 
shares, S. 3580, § 22 (d) (2), 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).34 
Commission testimony indicates that it considered this 
authority necessary to allow regulatory control of indus-
try measures designed to deal with the disruptive effects 
of "bootleg market" trading and with other detrimental 
trading practices identified in the Investment Trust 
Study.35 
34 Section 22 (d) of the original bill, S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess, 
(1940), provided, in pertinent part: 
"The Commission is authorized, by rules and regulations or order 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to prohibit-
"(2) restrictions upon the transferability of negotiability of any 
redeemable security of which any registered investment company is 
the issuer." 
85 Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee, an SEC spokesman 
stated: 
"Now coming to subparagraph (2) of (d), it just says that the 
Commission shall have the right to make rules and regulations with 
respect to any restrictions upon the transferability or negotiability 
of any redeemable security of which any registered investment 
company is the issuer. 
"There are some companies that have a provision in their certifi-
cates to the effect that you cannot sell that certificate to anybody 
else, and the only way you can sell it is to sell it back to the com-
pany. That is a technical problem. It presents a whole problem 
which they call the bootleg market. What happens is that dealers 
keep switching people from one company to another. In order to 
prevent these switches, some provisions require that you cannot 
make these switches but must sell the certificate back to the 
company. 
"If the committee wants the provision, we shall recommend what, 
on the basis of our experience up to the present time, it ought to be; 
but we think subjects like that ought to be a matter of rules and 
regulations." 1940 Senate Hearings, pt . 1, at 292-293. 
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The Study indicates, moreover, that a number of funds 
had begun to deal with these problems prior to passage 
of the Act. And while their methods may have included 
the imposition of restrictive legends on the face of the 
certificate, see n. 35, supra, they were by no means con-
fined to such narrow limits. A number of funds imposed 
controls on the activities of their principal underwriters, 
see Investment Trust Study, at 868-869; and in some 
instances the funds required the underwriters to impose 
similar restrictions on the dealers, see id., at 869, or entered 
into these restrictive agreements with the dealers them-
selves, id., at 870-871. 
In view of the history of the Investment Company 
Act, we find no justification for limiting the range of 
possible transfer restrictions to those that appear on the 
face of the certificate. The bootleg market was pri-
marily a problem of the distribution system, and bootleg 
dealers found a source of supply in the contract-dealers 
as well as in retiring shareholders. See id., at 865. 
Moreover, the Study indicates that part of the bootleg 
distribution system consisted of "trading firms" that 
served as wholesalers of mutual-fund securities in much 
the same fashion as the principal underwriters. These 
trading firms primarily purchased and sold shares to and 
from other dealers, id., pt II, at 327, frequently offering 
them at a price slightly lower than the discounted rate 
charged to dealers in the primary distribution system. 
Id., at 327-328. Thus trading firms not only helped 
supply the bootleg dealers whose sales undercut those of 
the contract-dealers, they competed with the principal 
underwriters by offering a source for lower cost shares 
that inevitably discouraged participation in the primary 
distribution system. See id., at 328 n. 85. 
The bootleg market was a complex phenomenon whose 
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principal origins lay in the distributio~ system itself. In 
view of this history, limitation of the industry's ability, 
subject of course to SEC regulation, to reach these prob-
lems at their source would constitute an inappropriate 
contraction of the remedial function of the statute.30 In-
deed, in view of the role of trading firms and interdealer 
transactions in the maintcuance of the bootleg market, 
the narrow interpretation of § 22 (f) urged by appellant 
would seem to afford inadequate authority to deal with 
the problem. 
Together, §§ 22 (d) and 22 (f) protect the primary 
distribution system for mutual-fund securities. Section 
22 (d), by eliminating price competition in dealer sales, 
inhibits the most disruptive factor in the pre-1940's 
mutual market a.nd thus assu!'es the maintenance of a 
viable sales system. Section 22 (f) compliments this 
protection by authorizing the funds and the SEC to deal 
more flexibly with other detrimental trading practices by 
imposing SEC-approved restrictions on transferability 
and negotiability. Appellant 's limiting interpretation of 
§ 22 (f) compromises this flexible mandate, and cannot 
be accepted. 
We find support for our interpretation of § 22 (f) 
in the views expressed by the SEC shortly after the 
p2.ssage of the Act. Rule 26 (j) (2), proposed by NASD 
to curb abuses identified in the Study and the con-
gressional hearings, provided limitations on underwriter 
86 Neither are we convu1ccd of the necessity to limit negotiability 
or transferability restrictions to those appearing on the face of the 
certificate in order to assure their adequate disclosure to investors. 
Section 24 of the Act requires that mutual funds submit for SEC 
inspection copies of all sales literature that they send to prospective 
investors. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-24 (b) The Commission is therefore 
fully apprised as to the nature and sufficiency of the disclosure of 
these restrictions and can, 1f necessary, require supplementation 
of the information provided inveKtors. 
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sales and redemptions to or from dealers who are not 
parties to sales agreements. In commenting on this pro-
posed rule, the SEC characterized it as a "restriction 
on the transferability of securities," and specifically 
averted to its power to regulate such restrictions under' 
22 (f). National Association of Securities Dealers, 
9 S. E. C. 38, 44-45 and n. 10 (1941). As indicated 
above, see supra, at 22, and sources there cited, this con-
temporaneous interpretation by the responsible agency 
is entitled to considerable weight. We therefore con-
clude that the restrictions on transferability and negoti-
ability contemplated by § 22 (f) include restrictions on 
the distribution system for mutual-fund shares as well 
as limitations on the face of the shares themselves. The 
narrower interpretation of this provision advanced by 
appellant would disserve the broad remedial function of 
the statute.37 
87 Neither do we agree With appellant's Ruggestion that § 22 (f) 
does not authorize restrictions in contracts between underwriters· 
and dealers in which the fund is not a p!Lrty. We note, prelim-
inarily, that this position would not save Counts III, V, and VII 
from dismissal, since they relate to restrictions on underwriter con-
duct that are imposed by the fund. Even under the most technical 
reading of the statute these restrictions are "fund-imposed." 
1\1oreover, it further appears from the complaint that the agree-
ment challenged in Count II is required by the fund-underwriter 
agreement challenged iu Count III and thus also is "fund-imposed" 
in any but the most literal sense. More importantly, however, we 
thmk that appellant's position fails to recognize the relationship be-
tween the various participants in the distribution chain. As the 
history of the Investment Company Act recognizes, the relation-
ship between the fund and its principal underwriter traditionally ha,s 
been a close one. Sections 15 (b) and (c) reflect this fact, requiring, 
m effect, that funds rstablish written contracts with the under-
writer that must be approved by a majority of the fund's disin-
terested directors and cannot remain in force for more than two· 
years. 15 U.S. C. §§ 80n.-15 (b) and (c). And NASD Rule 26 (c) ,. 
in effect since 1941, requires that principal underwriters enter intQ! 
'; 
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Appellant's additional contention that the SEC's exer-
cise of regulatory authority has been insufficient to give 
rise to an implied immunity for agreements conforming 
with § 22 (f) misconceives the intended operation of the 
statute. Hy its terms. § 22 (f) authorizes properly 
disclosed n ,trictions unless they are inconsistent with 
SEC rules or regulations. The provision thus authorizes 
funds to impose transferability or negotiability restric-
tions. subject to Commission disapproval. In view of the 
evolution of this provision, there can be no doubt that 
this is precisely what Congress intended. 
Section 22 (f) as originally introduced would have 
authorized the SEC to promulgate rules, regulations 
or orders prohibiting restrictions on the redeemability 
or transferability of mutual-fund shares. Congressional 
consideration of that provision raised some question 
whether existing restrictions on transferability and nego-
tiability would remain valid unless specifically disap-
proved by the SEC.38 The compromise provision, which 
subsequently was enacted into law, eliminated this uncer-
tainty, however, and manifested a more positive attitude 
toward self-regulation. 
Thus § 22 (f) specifically recognizes that mutual 
funds can impose such restrictions on the distribution 
system provided they are disclosed in the rPgistration 
statement and conform to any rules and regulations that 
the SEC might adopt. In addition, § 22 (f) alters the 
focus of Commission scrutiny. Whereas the original 
provision allowed the SEC to make rules that serve "the 
public interest and ... the protection of investors," 
agreements with the dealers who chstribute the fund's securities. 
See National Association of Securities Dealers, 9 S. E. C. 38, 44, 48 
(1941) In view of these requirements, and the broad remedial 
purpose of § 22 (f) , we think that the underwriter-dealer agree-
ments challenged m this complaint also must be regarded as fund-
impo~ed within the contempbt10n of the statute. 
B' Ser 1940 Senat<.' Hearings, pt. 1 'lt 293. 
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S. 3.5~0, § 22 (d) (2), supra, § 22 (f) as enacted limits 
the C , mission's rulemaking authority to the protection 
of the ''interests of the holders of all of the outstanding 
securities of such investment company." 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80a-22 (f). Viewed in this historical context, the 
statute reflects a clear congressional determination that, 
subject to Commission oversight, mutual funds should 
be allowed to retain the initiative in dealing with the 
potentially adverse effects of disruptive trading practices. 
The Commission repeatedly has recognized the role 
of private agreements in the control of trading practices 
in the mutual fund industry. For example, in First 
Multifund of America, Inc.1 Inv. Co. Act Rei. No. 6700 
(1971), F. Sec. L. Rep. 1178,209, at 80,602, it looked to 
restrictive agreemei1ts similar to those challenged in this 
litigation to ascertain an investment advisor's capacity 
in a particular transaction. At no point did it intimate 
that those agreements were not legitimate.39 Likewise, 
Commission reports repeatedly have acknowledged the 
significant role that private agreements have played in 
restricting the growth of a secondary market in mutual-
fund shares.40 Until recently the Commission has al-
89 Commissioner Loomis, disRenting from an SEC determination 
that an applicant lacked standing to seek an exemption from §§ 17 
(a) (1) and 22 (d) of the Act, stated, 
"I would conclude that applicant is a dealer in its relationship with 
the fund underwriter because to do otherwise would require us to 
Ignore or nullify the perfectly lawful requirement in the dealer 
agreements that applicant act as a dealer. . . . rrJ do not know 
of anything unlawful about the generally accepted form of dealer 
agreement used m the investment company industry." Mutual 
Funds Advisory, Inc., Inv. Co. Act. Rei. No. 6932, at 7 (1972) 
(dissenting opinion) 
While the majority disagrerd with Commissioner Loomis' assessment 
of the facts of the case, it did not question his approval of the· 
mentiOned dealrr agreement. 
111 Hre 1963 Spreial Study, at 98; 1974 Staff Report, at 104-106... 
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lowed the industry to control the secondary market through 
contractual restrictions duly filed and publicly disclosed. 
Even the SEC's recently expressed intention to introduce 
an element of competition in brokered transactions re-
flects measured caution as to the possibly adverse impact 
of a totally unregulated and restrained brokerage market 
on the primary distribution system. See n. 31, supra. 
The Commission's acceptance of fund-initiated restric-
tions for more than three decades hardly represents abdi-
cation of its regulatory responsibilities. Rather, we 
think it manifests an informed administrative judgment 
that the contractual restrictions employed by the funds 
to protect their shareholders were appropriate means for 
combatting the problems of the industry. The SEC's 
election not to initiate restrictive rules or regulations is 
precisely the kind of administrative oversight of privat~ 
practices that Congress contemplated when it enacted 
§ 22 (f). 
We conciude, therefore, that the vertical restrictions 
sought to be enjoined in ,Counts II-VIII arc among the 
kinds of agreements authorized § 22 (f) of the Invest-
ment Company Act. 
B 
The agreements questioned by the United States re-
strict the terms under which the, appellee underwriters 
and broker-dealers may trade in shares of mutual funds. 
Such restrictions, affecting resale price maintenance and 
concerted refusal~ to deal, normally would constitute per 
se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., Klor, 
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-213 
(1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. 
Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 465-468 
(1941). Here, however, Congress has made a judgment 
that these restrictions on competition might be necessi-
ta ted by the unique problems of the mutual fund in .. 
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dustry, and has vested in the SEC final authority to 
determine whether and to what extent they should be 
tolerated "in the interests of the holders of all the out-
standing securities" of mutual funds. 15 U. S. C. § 80a-
22 (f). 
The SEC, the federal agency responsible for regulating 
the conduct of the mutual-fund industry, urges that its 
authority will be compromised seriously if these agree-
ments are deemed actionable under the Sherman Act.41 
We agree. There can be no reconciliation of its author-
ity under § 22 (f) to permit these and similar restric-
tive agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that 
they are illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust 
laws must give way i.f the regulatory scheme established 
by the Investment Company Act is to work. Silver v. 
New York Stock Exchange, supra. We conclude, there-
fore, that such agreements are not actionable under the 
Sherman Act, and that the District Court properly dis-
missed Counts II-VIII. 
v 
It remains to be determined whether the District 
Court properly dismissed Count I of appellant's com-
plaint, which charged activities allegedly constituting a 
horizontal conspiracy between the NASD and its mem-
bers to "prevent the growth of a secondary dealer market 
and a brokerage market in the purchase and sale of 
mutual fund shares." App. 9. 
41 In its brief to this Court, the SEC maintains: 
"It would nullify the effect of this grant of regulatory au-
thority to the Commission [under § 22 (f)] for this Court to 
hold that a di::itrict court may apply antitrust principles to con-
duct like that alleged in Counts II through VIII, when the expert 
body designated and empowered by Congress to regulate and 
supervise that conduct has not deemed it appropriate to prohibit 
the conduct ." Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
Amtcus Curiae, at 54. 
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The precise nature of tho allegations of the complaint 
are obscured by subsequent concessions made by appel-
lant to the District Court and reiterated here. It is 
clear, however, that C'ount 1 alleges activities that are 
neither required by § 22 (d) nor authorized under § 22' 
(f). And since they cannot find antitrust shelter in 
these provisions of the Investment Company Act, the 
question presented is whether the SEC's exercise of reg-
ulatory authority under this statute and the Maloney 
Act is sufficiently pervasive to confer an implied im-
munity. We hold that it is, and accordingly affirm the 
District Court's dismissal of this portion of the complaint. 
Count I originally appeared to be a general attack on 
the N ASD's role in encouraging the restrictions on sec-
ondary market activities challenged in the remainder of 
appellant's complaint. The acts charged in Count I 
focused in large part on NASD rules. and on information 
distributed by that association to its members.u Subse-
42 The complamt averred that, in effectuating the conspiracy to 
restrain the growth of a secondary market in mutual-fund shares, 
the NASD, its members, and more particularly the other named 
defendants, 
"(a} established and maintained rules whJCh inhibited the develop-
meut of a secondary dealer market and a brokerage market in 
mutual fund shares, 
''(b) established and m~intainPd rules wh1ch induced broker/ 
dealers to enter mto sales agreements w1th principal underwriters, 
with knowledge that sales agreements contained restrictive provisions 
winch inhibited the development of a secondary dealer market and 
brokerage market in mutual fund shares, 
" (c) induced member principal underwntcrs to include restrictive 
provi~ions in their sales agreements , 
" (d) discourr.ged per~ons who made inqmry about the legality of 
a brokrrage market from pariic1patmg m a brokerage market and 
distributed mJslcadmg information to 1ts members concerning the 
]pgahty of a brokerage market in mutual fund shares; and 
"(c) suppre.sed market quotatiOns for the secondary dealer 
markr>t " App. 9. 
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quently appellant advised the District Court that its 
complaint was not to be read as a direct attack on NASD 
rules, however, and it repeated that position before this 
Court.43 Appellant now contends that its complaint 
should be interpreted as a challenge to various unofficial 
NASD interpretations and to appellees' extension of the 
rules in a manner that inhibit a secondary market. 
In view of the scope of the SEC's regulatory authority 
over the activities of the NASD, appellant's decision to 
withdraw from direct attack on the association's rules 
was prudent. The SEC's supervisory authority over the 
NASD is extensive. Not only does the Maloney Act 
require the SEC to determine whether an association 
48 Appellant first indicated abandonment of its attack on the 
NASD rules during oral argument of appellees' motion to dis-
miss. See App. 328--332. Notwithstanding clauses (a) and (b) of 
paragraph 17 of the complaint, see n. 42, s'upra, appellant's counsel 
stated that it did not intend to challenge any NASD rule, app. 330. 
Counsel ambiguously suggested, however, that the members' com-
pliance with those rules had aided and abetted alleged the conspiracy, 
id.1 at 332, and stated that informal and secret activities of the 
association likewise had tended to inhibit growth of the secondary 
market, id., at 330. Thereafter, in response to the District Court's 
invitation to join in the litigation as amicus curiae, the SEC ex-
pressed its concem that the action might involve an attack on NASD 
rules, a matter "over which the Commission is granted exclusive 
jurisdiction by Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U. S. C. § 78o-3 et seq. (the Maloney Act)." Letter from Mr. 
Lawrence E. Nerheim, General Counsel of the SEC to the District 
Court. App. 323. Appellant thereafter informed the court that 
the issues it sought to raise did not represent "an attack upon 
NASD Rules as such" but rather "aimed at an over-all course of 
conduct engaged in by the NASD and its members going beyond the 
NASD's rule-making authority." Letter from Mr. Bruce B. Wilson, 
Acting Asst. Attorney General for the Antitrust Division to the 
District Co,lrt. App. 327. It maintains the same position in 
this Court. See Brief for the United States, at 51 n. 47 . 
. I 
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satisfies the strict statutory requirements of that Act 
and thus qualifies to eiJgage in supervised regulation of 
the trading activities of its membership, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78o-3 (b), it requires registered associations thereafter 
to submit fo~ Commission approval any proposed rule 
changes, id., § 78o-3 (j). The Maloney Act additionally 
authorizes the SEC to request changes in or supplemen-
tation of association rules, a power that recently has been 
exercised with respect to some of the precise conduct 
questioned in this litigation, see n. 31, supra. If such a 
request is not complied with, the SEC may order such 
changes itself. I d. , § 78o-3 (k) (2). 
The SEC, in its exercise of authority over association 
rules and practices, is charged with protection of the 
public interest as well as the interests of shareholders, 
see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 78o-3 (a)( 1), (b)(3), (c), 
and it repeatedly has indicated that it weighs competi-
tive concerns in the exercise of its continued supervisory 
responsibility. See, e. g., In re Nat. Assn. of Securities 
Dealers, Inc., 18 S. E. C. 424, 236, 486-486-487 (1945); 
Proposed Amendment to The Rules of Fair Practice of 
Nat. Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 9 S. E. C. 38, 43-46 
(1941); see also 1974 Staff Report, at 105, 109·. As the 
Court previously has recognized, United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 227 n. 60 (1940), the 
investiture of such pervasive supervisory authority in 
the SEC suggests that Congress intended to lift the ban 
of the Sherman Act from association activities approved 
by the SEC. 
We further conclude that appellant's attack on NASD 
interpretations of those rules cannot be maintained under 
the Sherman Act, for we see no meaningful distinction 
between the association's rules and the manner in which 
It construes and implements them. Each is equally a 
subject of SEC oversight. 
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Finally, we hold that appellant's additional challenges 
to the alleged activities of the membership of the 
N ASD designed to encourage the kinds of restraints 
averred in Counts II-VIII likewise are precluded 
by the regulatory authority vested in the SEC by 
the Maloney and Investment Company Acts. It 
should be noted that appellant does not contend that 
appellees' activities have had the purpose or effect of 
restraining competition among the various funds:u In-
stead, appellant urges in Count I that appellees' alleged 
conspiracy was designed to encourage the suppression of 
intrafund secondary market activities, precisely the re-
striction that the SEC consistently has approved pursu-
ant to § 22 (f) for nearly 35 years. This close rela-
tionship is fatal to appellant's complaint, as the Commis-
sion's regulatory approval of the restrictive agreements 
challenged in Counts II-VIII cannot be reconciled with 
appellant's attack on the ancillary activities averred in 
Count I. And this conclusion applies with equal force 
now that the SEC has determined to introduce a con-
trolled measure of competition into the secondary market. 
There can be little question that the broad regulatory 
authority conferred upon the SEC by the Maloney and 
Investment Company Acts enables it to monitor the 
activities questioned in Count I, and the history of Com-
mission regulations suggests no laxness in the exercise 
of this authority.15 To the extent that any of appellees' 
44 Indeed, it appears that vigorous mter-brand competition exists 
in the mutual-fund industry-between the load funds themselves, 
between load and no-load funds, between open and closed-end com-
panies, and between all of thesC' mvestment forms and other invest-
ments See 1974 Staff Report, at 20 et seq. 
45 As SEC Chairman Garrett observed m his letter submitting the 
1974 Staff Report for rongresswnal consideration, "No issuer of 
securities is snbject to more detailed rC'gulation than a mutual 
fund" Letter from Ray Garrett, Jr ., Chairman, Securities and 
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ancillary activities frustrate the SEC's regulatory objec-
tives it has ample authority to eliminate them.46 
Here implied repeal of the antitrust laws is "necessary 
to make the [regulatory scheme] work." Silver v. New 
York Stock Exchange, supra. In generally similar situa-
tions, we have implied immunity in particular and dis-
crete instances to assure that the federal agency entrusted 
with regulation in the public interest could carry out that 
responsibility free from the disruption of conflicting judg-
ments that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdic-
tion under the antitrust laws. See Hughes Tool Co. v. 
Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 296 
(1963). In this instance, maintenance of an antitrust 
action for activities so directly related to the SEC's re-
sponsibilities poses a substantial danger that appellees 
would be subjected to duplicative and inconsistent stand-
ards. This is hardly a result that Congress would have 
mandated. We therefore hold that with respect to the 
activities challenged in Count I of the complaint, the 
Sherman Act has been displaced by the pervasive regu-
latory scheme established by the Maloney and Invest-
ment Company Acts. 
' 
Affirmed. 
Exchange Commission to the Honorable John Sparkman, Chairman 
of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United 
States Senate (Nov. 4, 1974), contained in 1974 Staff Report, at v. 
46 The Commission can, for example, require amendment of the 
NASD rules regulating the conduct of its membership, see 15 
U S. C. § 78o-3 (k) (2), or exercise the more general rulemaking 
power conferred by § 38 (a) of the Investment Company Act, 15 
U. S C. § 80a-38 (a), to contain any of the challenged activities 
that might in ally way frustrate its regulation of the restrictions it 
authonzes under§ 22 (f). 
